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EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF DISRUPTION, SUPPLIER QUALITY AND 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER: RECOMMENDED STRATEGIES FOR MEETING 
DEMAND AND SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT 
 
REBECCA CLEMONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
I investigate the effect of supply-chain disruption on a firm’s decisions on investment in 
quality, and on ordering decisions, when there is a choice between suppliers, and a 
variable rate of knowledge transfer. I find that supply-chain disruption has a negative 
effect on profit, which can be mitigated by appropriate policies for order allocation and 
supplier development. When the probability of disruption is high, the firm should seek 
alternative sources of supply (even if they have lower levels of quality). Under certain 
conditions, the firm can improve its profit by investing in quality improvement efforts at 
the alternative supplier. I consider three different policies for supply-chain management 
and quality investment, and find that investment in supplier development is warranted 
when the initial quality level of the new supplier is relatively low; when the expected rate 
of improvement from such investment is relatively high; when the effectiveness of 
inspection is relatively low; and when the cost of inspection is relatively high. 
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CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Hurricane Sandy roared up the east coast in the fall of 2012, causing an estimated 
30 to 50 billion dollars in lost business, damage and power outages (WSJ Sarabacha, 
2012). Although the hurricane was forecast to be devastating, and businesses and 
individuals were warned, the ability to react and prevent losses was limited. It wasn’t 
feasible for businesses to relocate. Business losses from this east coast hurricane provide 
a powerful example of a firm’s vulnerability to sudden and extreme external events. Even 
with adequate warning, businesses do not always have the ability to prevent loss or 
disruption of services.   
The financial consequences of such a disruption highlight the importance of 
planning to mitigate or prevent a loss of supply. This work defines disruption as an event 
where a supplier unexpectedly fails to deliver goods or services. These are unexpected 
disruptions in normal activities as opposed to problems of coordinating supply and 
demand (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005).  
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Supply disruption is costly in terms of interrupted production and lost sales. The 
effects of a loss of goods or services can impact an entire supply chain, where a supply 
chain is defined as a network of firms established to provide goods or services. Hendricks 
and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) have demonstrated the financial impact of disruption 
for publicly traded firms. Their research reveals that for a two-year period following such 
a disruption in supply, operating performance continues to show a negative impact.  
With global economies it is not only natural disasters that impact supply chain 
production, in a 2012 survey of Industry Week readers, over half of the respondents 
indicated that uncertainty over U.S. economic policy had a major impact on their 
business (Industry Week Minter, 2012). “‘Uncertainty is the number one issue for us 
globally,’ said Veronica Hagen, president and CEO of Polymer Group Inc., a 
manufacturer of nonwoven materials with plants in nine countries. Instability and 
volatility are value-destroying for any business”. According to USA Today (USA Today 
MacCleod & Wiseman, 2008) a Chinese factory shut its doors, leaving 4000 workers 
without jobs and $290 million debt, due to the U.S. housing market collapse and the 2008 
financial crisis. Disruption is inevitable and a firm’s survival may depend on how well it 
plans for disruption. 
1.2 Planning for Disruption 
Planning for disruption may include establishing alternative sources of supply to 
mitigate the loss of production at a sole supplier. One example of a successful reaction to 
a natural disaster which interrupted production is what happened after the tsunami 
disrupted production in Japan in March of 2011. U.S. industries were able to find 
alternative suppliers for $10.8 million in imports in part due to advanced risk 
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management strategies. According to MacKenzie, Santos, and Barker (2012), many 
companies benefited from the loss of production in Japan. Germany and China combined 
increased exports by over $17 million. Because industries in other countries were able to 
replace Japanese imports through other sources of supply their losses were minimal. 
These examples demonstrate the importance of research on practices that mitigate the 
impact of disruption within a supply chain. 
Practices such as back-up inventories or flexible sources of supply can offset the 
unexpected loss of a supplier. Japan’s economy did not suffer as much as expected after 
the tsunami, in part due to seasonal high levels of inventory throughout the supply chain 
(MacKenzie et al., 2012). With available inventories, many firms were able to continue 
production after a short period of downtime. However, there were still firms which 
experienced a significant loss of production, especially in the electronic and automotive 
industries. One example of the financial impact of disruption in supply was the spot 
market for computer chips, which increased by 27%. There has been a growing interest in 
supply chain disruption and strategies for mitigating the risk of disruption. Tang and 
Musa (2011) document that since 2008, there is an increasing interest in research dealing 
with strategies for managing risk in supply chains. 
A firm’s success is directly tied to the performance of its supply chain. 
Maintaining these critical networks of suppliers has an impact on the competitive 
advantage of a firm. Reeves and Deimler (2011) state that in the current business 
environment, supply chains must be agile and adaptable to change in order to survive. 
The increasing complexity of supply chains and the interdependence between a buyer and 
supplier provide a competitive advantage but conflicts with policies that would protect a 
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firm in the event that a buyer experiences a disruption in supply. For example, objectives 
that minimize inventory magnify the impact to a network when a supplier can no longer 
provide goods or services. 
The study of supply chain disruption leads to a review of supply chain risk 
management literature. These two topics; supply chain disruption and supply chain risk 
management (SCRM) are closely aligned. SCRM reviews firm strategies for avoiding or 
minimizing supply chain disruption. In contrast, research on disruption deals with the 
impact of lost production or services, recovery and optimal strategies for recovery. If a 
firm develops effective strategies to manage supply chain risk then it will be more 
resilient to supply disruption. In response to Hurricane Sandy, David Sarabacha with 
Deloitte and Touché LLP identified ten lessons to help businesses prepare for disaster, 
one being to plan for impacts that differ in magnitude and duration (WSJ Sarabacha, 
2012). One method is to include a provision for flexible supply of goods. Flexibility can 
be provided through multiple suppliers, flexible supply contracts, flexible manufacturing, 
postponement and pricing strategies.  
In the event of a supply disruption, when a critical supplier unexpectedly fails to 
deliver goods, a firm may decide to allocate a portion of demand to a new supplier. If a 
new supplier is contracted to produce product for the firm, one concern is the quality of 
that supplier’s product. How can a buyer ensure that the quality of its product is 
maintained? Established controls for the prevention and early detection of defects are not 
yet in place, and these controls take time to establish. How much is the buyer willing to 
invest in a new supplier, given the cost of supplier development compared to the cost of 
disruption? 
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The focus is on suppliers of critical components which are defined as critical to 
customer satisfaction or product functionality. It is assumed that the buyer is not price 
sensitive and therefore price is not a decision variable. It is also assumed that the product 
is established with well-defined specifications, that processing of the product is well 
understood, and that necessary technology is readily available.   
1.3 Supplier Development 
In order to provide flexibility in the supply chain, a firm may need to develop new 
suppliers. Developing a relationship with a new supplier requires establishing channels of 
communication, establishing a working relationship based on trust and sharing critical 
knowledge. Once the buyer chooses to bring on a new supplier, questions arise regarding 
the amount of resources to utilize for supplier development, the capability of the supplier 
to produce an acceptable product, and the use of inspection to detect defects. Should the 
supplier invest in controls and systems to prevent quality problems? Investing in 
prevention activities can lengthen the time until production is started. Would it be more 
cost effective for the buyer to accept lower levels of quality, spend resources inspecting 
product for defects and get into production quickly? For this investment, what can the 
buyer expect in return? My research will provide insights that will assist management 
decision making in regard to these questions.    
Developing a new supplier requires multiple levels of information sharing and the 
benefits depend in part on a firm’s ability to effectively transfer information so that it 
becomes knowledge that the supplier can use. Understanding the factors that are 
important for effective knowledge transfer is critical for successful supplier development. 
Should personnel be onsite at the supplier’s production facility and assist with the 
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production launch? Should a cross-functional team be established to assist with the new 
supplier development? What are the best means for effectively communicating 
information? Management decisions should be based on the most effective use of the 
firm’s resources. 
I include chapter 3 which examines factors impacting the transfer of knowledge. 
It is shown that effective transfer of knowledge leads to improved supplier performance, 
where knowledge transfer is a cost that the firm incurs in order to improve supplier 
performance and improve a firm’s competitive advantage. 
1.4 Ensuring Product Quality 
Quality is a strategic element of the supply chain. When planning strategies to 
manage supply chain risk, a firm must also be cognizant of maintaining acceptable levels 
of quality. Quality is important for customer retention and satisfaction as well as 
minimizing operating costs. Quality is defined as a quantitative outcome: the percent of 
product which meets specifications.  
Prevention activities are those activities that minimize defects and provide long 
term benefits. The costs of prevention are associated with activities that predict product 
or process failures and prevent the production of defects. Preventative measures 
ultimately reduce operating costs. One example of a preventative measure is the 
implementation of quality control systems which can predict defects during the 
production process and allows firms to react accordingly to reduce defect rates, resulting 
in reduced product failures and improved customer satisfaction. Data collection, analysis, 
and information sharing between buyers and suppliers are also preventative activities.  
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Appraisal costs, unlike prevention costs, are associated with the detection of 
defects after production. Appraisal costs are incurred during inspection of finished 
product and before shipment to the buyer. Using appraisal, 100% inspection, is less 
desirable than preventing defects because appraisal incurs either rework or scrap costs. 
Also, appraisal is not 100% effective at finding all defective product. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
My research provides insights into decision making when there is risk of supply 
chain disruption, including decisions about how to allocate resources to launch a new and 
critical supplier as part of a firm’s strategy of managing supply chain risk. The loss of 
supply may have a significant impact on a firm’s ability to meet customer demand 
depending on length of disruption and inventory levels. A disruption in supply may be 
short in length and frequent, or a rare event that lasts for a long period of time. Despite 
the length or frequency, the potential exists that the entire supply chain is impacted. The 
manager has to make multiple decisions regarding what actions to take to ensure 
acceptable quality levels while minimizing down time, including how much to invest in 
prevention activities. Does the cost of supplier development change the decision to 
contract with a new supplier and what is an acceptable level of quality? 
Flexibility in supply through multiple suppliers is evaluated as well as quality and 
the cost of supplier development. I develop a model that allows for two suppliers, one 
being a current, but unreliable supplier. The second supplier is a new supplier and will 
require an investment by the firm before it can meet demand. Demand is allocated 
between the two suppliers, based on the probability of disruption, quality levels of the 
two suppliers and the cost of supplier development. The firm’s decision is to determine 
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whether or not to add supply flexibility with a new supplier and what, if any, investment 
should be made to improve performance of the new supplier. If a new supplier is utilized 
the model assumes that the initial quality level of the new supplier is less than the current 
supplier, but the new supplier will be 100% reliable.  
This study adds to the body of knowledge on management decision making for 
supply chain disruption by providing an analytical process to determine order allocation 
between two suppliers and investment levels to insure product meets specifications. The 
purpose is to provide data driven insights to be used by managers to develop effective 
and targeted strategies to mitigate the impact of potential disruption. My research 
addresses a gap in the supply chain disruption literature because it incorporates the cost 
of quality for supplier development to ensure a quality product is received. Chapter 4 
presents a model which measures the impact of investment decisions on profitability, 
with tradeoffs between revenue and costs.  
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the current 
literature on supply chain disruption and management of supply chain risk, as well as a 
quality within the supply chain. The factors that impact knowledge transfer during new 
supplier development are discussed in Chapter 3. The model is presented in Chapter 4 
followed by Chapter 5 which verifies the model using data derived from a simulation 
study. Conclusions and implications for managers are presented in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is an extensive literature on supply chain disruption and supply chain risk 
management strategies. However, there are not many studies of the management of 
supply chain risk that include the management of quality. In particular, there are no 
models that analyze multiple sources of supply along with quality improvements at the 
supplier. Some of the research on supply chain risk management discusses additional 
sources of supply as an appropriate risk mitigation strategy. However, there have been no 
studies that evaluate the practice of rerouting or securing multiple sources of supply 
while considering the level of quality of the alternative source and the cost associated 
with developing this alternative source. Since part of the cost of developing a new 
supplier is the transfer of knowledge from the buyer to the new supplier, I also review 
research in the field of knowledge management. 
The literature review is organized as follows. First I examine research about the 
sources of supply chain disruption (including random yield), the impact of supply 
disruption and explore supply chain risk management through a modeling approach and 
empirically. Next I review the literature on supply chain management and supplier
10 
 
development. Because the transfer of knowledge is critical during new supplier 
development and needs to happen quickly, I also provide a review of the knowledge 
management literature and factors that impact the knowledge transfer process. A review 
of the literature on swift knowledge transfer reveals additional insights on the factors 
impacting knowledge transfer: communication, collaboration, absorptive capacity, trust, 
and knowledge management systems. The chapter concludes with a review of the 
research on quality management. 
2.1 Sources of supply chain disruption 
Supply chain disruption risk includes unforeseen discontinuities in supply and 
risks arising from events such as natural hazards, terrorism and political instability. 
Identifying sources of risk is an important first step when developing strategies to 
mitigate supply chain disruption since the appropriate strategy is dependent, in part, on 
potential sources of disruption.  
Ritchie and Marshall (1993) identify five sources of business risk: environmental 
factors, industry factors, organizational factors, problem-specific factors, and factors 
related to decision-makers, which are indicators of supply chain vulnerability. Each 
source of risk requires a different strategy.  
Aron, Clemons, and Reddi (2005) discuss three forms of risk associated with a 
supply network, including operational risks caused by breakdowns at a supplier, long-
term intrinsic risks of atrophy due to the loss of core personnel, and intrinsic risk due to 
remote locations of suppliers. Their discussion focuses on an understanding of the types 
of risk, and how to manage each type of risk. 
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Disruption in the chemical industry is studied by Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) 
who develop a framework based on the joint activities of risk assessment and risk 
mitigation. The authors discuss the key drivers of disruption risk for suppliers, 
production, outgoing logistics and customers and their impact in order to evaluate the 
economic value of disruption risk management. Based on empirical results from the U.S. 
Chemical Industry over the time period 1995 to 2000, they discuss designing supply 
chains to cope with risk. 
Cucchiella and Gastaldi (2006) use a real option approach to allow for flexibility 
in the supply chain, claiming that evaluating sources of risk or uncertainty is critical in 
order to individualize effective risk management practices. They define six steps that 
should be part of a firm’s plan for supply chain risk mitigation. It is suggested that 
managers 1) analyze the supply chain, 2) identify sources of uncertainty, 3) examine the 
subsequent risk, 4) manage risk,           5) individualize the appropriate options and 6) 
implement supply chain risk strategy. 
A review of the supply chain risk management literature by Rao and Goldsby 
(2009) extends the work of Ritchie and Marshall (1993) and demonstrates how several 
variables within each of these factors could contribute to the risk within a supply chain. 
The authors claim that environmental factors evolve around different types of 
uncertainty: political uncertainty, policy uncertainty, macroeconomic uncertainty, social 
uncertainty, and national uncertainty. They suggest that supply chain risk management 
should follow a systematic approach which identifies, quantifies and reduces risk.  
A case study of disruption in a retail supply chain conducted by Oke and 
Gopalakrishnan (2009) categorizes risk according to frequency and duration. A review of 
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the literature finds that there are two categories of supply chain risk: high-likelihood, 
low-impact risks and low-likelihood, high-impact risks. However, the empirical study of 
a large retail supply chain indicates a third category of moderate impact, medium 
probability risks. They argue that risk categorization is important when developing 
mitigation strategies.  
Using a multiple case study approach of seven different industries, Christopher, 
Mena, Khan, and Yurt (2011) explores approaches to managing risk in a global supply 
base. They study supply risk, risks associated with the global sourcing of products by a 
firm. The authors find that the majority of firms do not have a formal system for 
managing supply chain risk but use informal methods instead. Risk mitigation strategies 
include: network re-engineering, collaboration between buyer and supplier, an ability to 
respond quickly to changes (agility) and create a global sourcing risk management 
culture. 
According to Vilko and Hallikas (2012) the increased complexity of supply 
chains makes identifying sources of risk outside the firm more difficult. Drivers of risk 
are analyzed in a simulation study of a multimodal maritime supply chain and show that 
visibility and co-operation in the supply chain improve the ability to detect risk, thus 
making it easier to manage. It finds that supply is the most significant source of risk in 
this industry, supporting the need for continued research on the impact of supply 
disruption and firm profitability. 
It is critical to define the category of risk when discussing strategies to mitigate 
risk. My work focuses on supply risk using quantitative methods to determine the impact 
of choices available to a buyer. There are qualitative factors which are also important for 
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management planning but are not considered here. Supply risk can be frequent in nature 
with low impact or infrequent with high impact. Both dimensions are accounted for in my 
analysis by assigning a probability to disruption and allowing for variation in the 
frequency of disruption. Disruption is defined as an unexpected event resulting in 
unfulfilled orders at the buyer.  
2.2 Random yield in the supply chain 
The research on random yield considers supply chain uncertainty due to yield loss 
during production. Some causes of yield loss are poor quality and unusable non-
conforming product or unplanned machine downtime. The problem occurs in a variety of 
industries and is heightened for processes with relatively low yields and high variability 
in output. In my research I am only considering random yield in the context of supply 
chain networks. 
Pentico (1994) develops and tests four heuristics that assist managers in 
determining the best order quantity or lot size, for a given level of demand. He does not 
consider lead time because it is assumed that there is no penalty for late deliveries. Using 
a set of 64 problems, he compares the heuristic solutions to the optimal solution obtained 
through dynamic programming. Pentico’s work does not lend itself to the study of 
unexpected supply chain disruption because it assumes a predictable loss of a portion of 
supply. The order quantity, or lot size is adjusted to account for yield loss during 
production. 
Yano and Lee (1995) review the literature on quantitative approaches for 
determining lot size when production yields are random. Three important issues in 
modeling random yield are identified: 1) costs affected by the presence of random yields, 
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2) modeling yield uncertainty, and 3) performance measures. Variable costs that are 
affected by random yield are identified, variable unit costs and inventory holding costs; 
which are specific to the application. Yield uncertainty doesn’t complicate lot sizing 
decisions if a firm does not need to plan for material inputs or allocate capacity among 
several products or where yield uncertainty is of the “all-or-nothing” form. The authors 
discuss five different ways of modeling yield using the minimization of costs (or 
maximization of profits) as the performance measure. The general model types reviewed 
are: single-stage, continuous-time models; continuous-time models with random 
demands; discrete time models; and models of more complex manufacturing systems. 
Yano and Lee conclude their discussion with a summary of elements that are included in 
good models and that require adequate treatment. 
Subsequent research allows for demand uncertainty as well as supplier 
uncertainty. Guler and Bilgic (2009) consider the problem of random yield for a 
manufacturer with both supplier uncertainty and demand uncertainty. They examine the 
expected supply chain profit for two types of contracts with three components: buy-back, 
revenue sharing and a payment/penalty to suppliers. The first contract is a mixture of 
revenue sharing and buy-back contracts. The second contract is a modified buy-back with 
revenue sharing and a payment or penalty to the worst supplier. It is shown that 
coordination of a supply chain is achieved by a hybrid of contracts with specific measures 
that address the worst performing supplier. 
Kelle, Transchel, and Minner (2009) extend the discussion of random yield by 
focusing on inventory costs and how such cost is influenced by ordering policies, set-up 
policies and delivery policies. It is found that yield uncertainty and not average expected 
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yield is a critical component to determine the best policy.  Their analysis does not assume 
that all units delivered are defect free and they include the cost of 100% inspection, either 
by the buyer or supplier. Like Kelle, my research accounts for defective units. 
It is recommended by Xu (2010) that supply uncertainty due to random yield be 
managed through the use of option contracts. Option contracts hedge against supply 
uncertainty for the buyer and protect the supplier from price and demand uncertainty. 
Xu’s findings can assist managers who have proactively evaluated supply chain risk and 
determined which suppliers are most likely to deliver less than the full order quantity. His 
analysis determines the optimal strategy for a given order quantity and a given supplier’s 
profit function, assuming the supplier has the capacity to produce additional product 
when order quantity is unfulfilled. 
Sobel and Babich (2012) utilize an autoregressive demand process to study lot-
size policies in a serial, multistage production facility where random yield can occur at 
each stage of production. The decisions are how much material to order from suppliers 
for each period of production and lot sizes for each stage of production for that period. 
Each decision state not only includes the amount of inventory, but also includes 
information about past demand. The optimal solution is based on the assumptions that 
yield is dependent on lot-size and the variation in yield is independent of lot-size. They 
find that the optimal policy is myopic and can be solved by solving static one-
dimensional optimization problems for each state of production, therefore avoiding 
dynamic programming. 
Li, Li, and Cai (2012) determine that random yield always has a negative impact 
on the buyer and supply chain. The authors focus on ordering decisions in a model 
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describing the impact of random yield on a supply chain, and show that random yield 
always has a negative impact on the buyer and supply chain. 
From the buyer’s perspective, Yan, Ji, and Wang (2012) find that in the case of 
correlated supplier yields, a buyer’s expected profit may increase with unreliable 
suppliers, as opposed to reliable suppliers. They use a random-yield model to 
demonstrate that correlation among suppliers’ yields impacts decision making, for 
suppliers with the same production inputs or geographical market. If a supplier is reliable, 
given independent correlations, then the buyer always chooses the supplier with the 
lowest price. However, when random yields are positively correlated, the optimal 
supplier selection not only depends on price but also on the correlation in yield between 
suppliers.  
2.3 The impact of disruption 
The financial impact on a firm when a disruption in product flow occurs is 
documented in the work of Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b). Their research 
considers the impact on shareholder wealth, stock performance and equity risk 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2003, 2005a), and operating performance (Hendricks & Singhal, 
2005b). Their analysis of supply chain glitches that impacted production or created 
shipment delays using publicly available data over a span of 21 years (1989-2000), 
demonstrates that supply chain glitches are associated with an abnormal decrease in 
shareholder value and operational performance, including metrics such as sales, customer 
service, costs, inventory performance and productivity.  Their results point to lower sales 
growth, higher growth in costs and higher growth in inventories for a two-year time 
period after a disruption. In addition findings in Hendricks and Singhal (2005a) confirm 
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that recovery from such disruption is slow. This evidence demonstrates the long-term 
impact of disruption from a variety of causes, and suggests that the root cause of such 
disruption is not easily fixed.  
The case study conducted by Gorton, Dumitrashko, and White (2006) explores 
how a lack of information between farmers and processors within the agri-food sector 
supply chain led to market failure in Moldova. The authors evaluate the strategies used 
by the case study firm to rebuild relationships with farmers. The firm overcame the crisis 
by investing in better monitoring of milk quality.  
Narasimhan, Talluri, and Mahapatra (2008) develop mathematical models of 
supply disruption using DEA. Included are some of the non-price attributes considered by 
firms when requesting quotes from suppliers, such as quality and delivery. The objective 
function of the model maximizes the relative strength of a winning quote, incorporating 
quality, delivery and price. They recommend that buyers and suppliers discuss the 
consequence of supply disruption when requesting quotes. 
Other authors have also documented the impact of supply chain disruption. A 
review of the research by Tang and Musa (2011) find that research in this area increased 
dramatically since 2004. They suggest that these disruptions not only impact the firm’s 
ability to remain solvent, but have ramifications for the sustainability of the entire supply 
chain. Their review includes research that evaluates supply chain risk management 
strategies and the impact on disruption recovery using quantitative analysis, case studies 
and empirical methods.  The benefit from focusing on a supply chain as an integrated 
network and pro-active planning for disruption are supported in the supply chain 
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management literature (Tang & Musa, 2011; Hendricks, Singhal, & Zhang, 2009; Ellis, 
Shockley, & Henry, 2011).  
Srinivasan, Mukherjee, and Gaur (2011) point to the negative impact of 
environmental risks on supply chain performance. Based on a study of U.S. firms, they 
find that the buyer-supplier partnership quality is weakened by environmental 
uncertainty. The study supports the benefits of supply chain risk management practices 
while emphasizing the drawback of closely-knit partnerships that leave a firm more 
vulnerable to a disruption in supply. 
More recently, MacKenzie et al. (2012) analyze the changes in international 
production resulting from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. A multi-regional 
input-output model quantifies the impact on global production. They find that global 
demand for Japanese production was satisfied by manufacturing firms in other countries, 
particularly Germany and China. High inventory levels in the supply chain pipeline also 
minimized the negative economic effects on production. Their work demonstrates the 
importance of maintaining adequate inventory levels. In addition they show that impacts 
vary by industry. Industries such as agriculture and mining which produce months or 
even a year in advance of demand experienced few negative consequences. 
Unexpectedly, companies like Toyota and Honda recovered quickly due to an integrated 
and well-managed supply chain.  
These studies suggest that a disruption in the delivery of goods and services, no 
matter what the cause or length, has a financial impact on the firm. The failure of the 
agri-sector in Moldov, and Toyota and Honda’s successful recoveries, demonstrate that 
the use of back-up methodologies and inventory placement make a supply chain more 
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resilient. These results concur with the simulation study conducted by Schmitt and Singh 
(2012), which also shows the value of back-up methodologies and inventory placement.  
Wagner, Mizzier and Arner (2014) conduct an empirical study to estimate the 
economic impact of disruption in the oil industry. They study the complex supply chain 
of the oil industry in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico is regularly exposed to 
major hurricanes, which presents a significant financial risk. The oil industry supply 
chain is very interconnected, with tightly coupled infrastructures, making it highly 
vulnerable to disruption. They find that the concentration and interconnectedness of the 
network creates a substantial risk. Because the industry relies on a handful of platforms 
located in deep waters, new structures that are resistant to hurricanes would make the 
supply chain would more robust. They also show that losses depend on where hurricanes 
occur, certain corridors of the gulf are more prone to substantial losses. Therefore 
location decisions should consider the economic impact of eventual disruptions. 
Section 2.4 Supply chain risk mitigation strategies 
Understanding how to manage risk is essential to the long-term sustainability of a 
firm and its suppliers. In a study of supply chain complexities, the efficiencies, and 
competitive advantages, Choi and Krause (2006) conclude that many practices that 
increase the efficiency of the supply chain may also increase dependency on suppliers 
and leave a firm more vulnerable to supply disruption. Supply chain risk management is 
defined as “the management of supply chain risks through coordination or collaboration 
among the supply chain partners so as to ensure profitability and continuity” Tang 
(2006).  
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An early study by March and Shapira (1987) explores management behavior and 
attitudes toward risk. They discover that managers do not rely on analytic methods, but 
that their decisions are focused instead on critical performance targets. They observe that 
for managers, risk is defined as an event that has a negative impact on firm performance. 
Managers do not consider risk to be an event with a given likelihood of occurrence; 
instead, risk involves uncertainty and most importantly, the magnitude of possible bad 
outcomes.  This highlights the importance of examining disruptions that are infrequent 
and of relatively long duration, and the strategies which minimize its impact. 
The work of Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) explores disruption in the U.S. chemical 
industry from 1995 to 2000. Two strategies to minimize the impact of supply chain 
disruption are identified: 1) reducing the frequency and severity of disruption, and 2) 
increasing capacity within the supply chain to better absorb risk.  The authors claim that 
effective management of risk accomplishes two goals: 1) the integration of risk 
assessment and risk mitigation, and 2) providing strategic direction for cost effective 
mitigation practices. Analyzing mitigation strategies quantitatively provides a solid 
foundation for effective risk management strategies. They indicate the need for research 
that quantifies risk and determines the costs and benefits of risk mitigation strategies, to 
assist managers’ decision making. 
Tang (2006) discusses two topics relating to supply chain risk: first, supply chain 
risk which is operational risk or disruption risk, and second, a mitigation approach 
defined to be supply management, demand management, product management, or 
information management. Tang reviews quantitative models for managing uncertain 
supply capacity and relates strategies reviewed in the supply chain risk management 
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literature to actual practices. One objective of the review is to motivate researchers to 
continue to develop models for mitigating supply chain risk. 
The concept of risk pooling is based on the fact that the “standard deviation of a 
sum of the sum of interdependent random demands can be lower than the sum of the 
standard deviation of the component demands” (Sobel, 2008). Consolidating inventories 
can mitigate the risk of demand uncertainty and can have a cost advantage, depending on 
the cost to centralize. One benefit of consolidation is it may reduce safety stocks which 
can be contradictory to risk mitigation practices. Also, if centralized inventories are no 
longer available due to natural disasters, labor disruption or a disruption in transportation 
then the advantages of consolidation are lost. Sobel demonstrates that dual sourcing will 
reduce the risk of disruption if that risk is negatively correlated between two suppliers. If 
the risk is positively correlated, the advantage of dual sourcing becomes negligible as the 
correlation approaches a value of one. Understanding risk pooling is important to 
managers developing risk mitigation strategies that involve multiple sources of supply or 
inventory management policies.  
Hendricks et al. (2009) investigate the effect of operational slack, business 
diversification, geographic diversification and vertical relatedness on the stock market 
reaction to disruptions in supply. A sample of 307 supply chain disruptions announced by 
publicly traded firms reveals that firms with more slack in their supply chain experience a 
less negative reaction from the stock market. The negative impact to the stock market is 
also reduced when there is a high degree of vertical relatedness. However, firms that have 
more geographic diversification have a more negative stock market reaction. These 
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results show the importance of a reliable and responsive supply chain, and suggest that 
firms must design their supply chains to mitigate the effect of supply chain disruption. 
Rao and Goldsby (2009) also review current literature on supply chain risk management 
and provide a review of 55 papers on the subject. Grouping articles by the type of study 
and key findings, the authors develop a typology of supply chain risk sources which are 
environmental factors, industry factors, organizational factors, problem-specific factors, 
and decision-maker related factors. Managers can use this typology to guide supply chain 
risk management strategies. The typology provides a basis for developing and testing 
hypotheses and promotes further exploration of the relationships in a supply chain. The 
authors point to the need for research which quantifies the risk reduction benefits of 
supply chain visibility. 
How a firm strategizes to mitigate risk depends in part on its perception of risk. 
Ellis, Shockley, and Henry (2010) assess a buyer’s decision making process. Drawing on 
behavioral risk theory, they explore the causal relationship between situation, 
representations of risk and decision making using data collected from purchasing 
managers and buyers of direct material. Their results show that the probability and 
magnitude of disruption are significant factors that influence decisions.  Probability and 
magnitude of risk influence a buyer’s perception, which impacts the decision-making 
process, and perceptions of risk drive supply chain risk management practices. This in 
turn justifies the study of potential sources of risk in order to influence a buyer’s 
perception. 
Samaddar and Nargundkar (2010) discuss backup production for the purpose of 
flexibility. Backup production reduces the cost of disruption, but adds an extra expense 
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during uninterrupted periods of supply. The authors advocate monitoring and evaluating 
suppliers, which requires an exchange of information and propose the use of flexible 
contracts, where a penalty is incurred for unfulfilled orders, as another means to mitigate 
risk.  
Ellis et al. (2011) use enactment theory to evaluate the literature on supply 
disruption risk. Enactment theory offers insight into the decision-making process through 
a three-stage, closed-loop process. The review provides a comprehensive list of research 
categorized by research method.  
According to Franklin (2011), risk mitigation in a supply chain requires 
coordination between buyers and suppliers. Effective risk management requires a mix of 
risk mitigation tactics, including introducing flexibility within a supply chain. Multiple 
sourcing is one means of achieving flexibility. Like Samaddar and Nargundkar (2010), 
Franklin suggests that the exchange of information is a useful tactic.  
Tang and Musa (2011) point to the need for quantitative models in the area of 
supply chain risk management. Their review of research from 1995 to 2009 discloses a 
significant change in focus between 2000 and 2005. The main issues have evolved from a 
focus on financial risk management and operation strategies to a focus which includes 
environmental strategies, information management strategies, and outsourcing strategies. 
Tomlin and Wang (2012) provide a comprehensive discussion of supply chain 
risk management that recognizes that a firm’s choice of action must be tailored to its own 
unique set of circumstances, such as industry, objectives, budget, competition and supply 
chain complexity. They discuss five different approaches for dealing with disruption in 
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supply that can be implemented in parallel: the first four mitigate the impact of 
disruption, and the last is a pro-active strategy involving supplier development. 
According to Tomlin and Wang (2012), inventory management is one way to deal 
with supply chain risk. Its appropriateness depends on the risk profile of the firm, where 
risk profile is defined by the likelihood and severity of the disruption. Stockpiling 
inventory is recommended for relatively frequent but short disruptions. Inventory can 
also be utilized as a secondary strategy to other policies. Having an appropriate level of 
inventory allows time for a firm to react to a disruptive event and implement other 
strategies, such as rerouting demand, managing demand or diversifying the supply base. 
Adaptive inventory strategies allow for a reduction or increase in inventory based on the 
probability of disruption. This requires an ability to detect and respond to changes over 
time. In order for inventory to be an effective buffer against disruption, it must be 
isolated from and unaffected by the cause of the disruption. If inventory management is 
used, a company must recognize the cost and time required to rebuild inventory. As the 
length of recovery increases, all else being equal, inventory becomes a less effective 
practice.  
Another option discussed by Tomlin and Wang (2012) is to diversify the supply 
base by allocating orders among multiple suppliers. This practice incurs increased costs 
due to initial investment in suppliers, increased coordination and network decisions, 
reduction in economies of scale and different operating costs between suppliers. 
Rerouting or back-up supply is similar to diversity in the supply base, except that costs 
occur only if there is a disruption. An important consideration is the availability of and 
the costs associated with back-up suppliers. Approaches that provide for multiple 
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suppliers, incentives for suppliers, and direct involvement with suppliers are also 
recommended by Krause (1999). 
Managing demand through the use of alternative products, rationing limited 
inventory or maintaining positive customer relations through effective communication 
are strategies that Tomlin and Wang (2012) claim would work well in parallel with 
inventory management, rerouting, or supply base diversity. Being able to switch to 
another product requires a flexible supply network and knowledge of consumer 
purchasing behavior.  
Finally, Tomlin and Wang (2012) discuss proactively strengthening the supply 
chain. Supplier-induced disruptions can be reduced by supplier development activity, 
requiring the buyer to evaluate the competitive risks of strengthening the supply base. 
Tomlin and Wang conclude with a general statement that strategies should be tailored for 
each product and should depend on the availability, cost, demand and quality risks, since 
a disruption is difficult to predict and determining the correct strategy is even more 
difficult.  
The use of analytical methods can provide insight for managers and have 
implications for policy development. Managers should consider the results of quantitative 
analyses which are not always intuitive and therefore can eliminate costly mistakes in 
strategic planning by providing documented and indisputable evidence of the impact of 
strategies. My work provides an analytic approach to decision making that builds on 
previous research. This work can assist managers in the decision making process by 
determining when to continue ordering from an unreliable supplier and when to invest in 
a new supplier. Following the recommendations of Krause (1999) and Tomlin and Wang 
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(2012), this research will include multiple suppliers and direct involvement with 
suppliers. This model allocates demand two suppliers, and costs for new supplier 
development and product appraisal. In order to utilize the model, management must 
engage in advance planning and anticipate the likelihood of disruption based on potential 
causes.  
Bandaly, Satir and Shanker (2014) study a supply chain that experiences price 
fluctuation and uncertain demand.  Using simulation-based optimization they examine 
two models that minimize expected total opportunity cost of the supply chain. Supply 
chain performance is studied as a function of three factors: risk aversion, demand 
variability and price volatility. They find that a less risk adverse supply chain has better 
performance, but there is a point at which accepting higher risk is not justified. 
2.4.1 Modeling supply chain disruption management 
Quantitative analysis is important for management decision making. 
Mathematical models provide a quantitative method for evaluating the decisions of a 
firm.  Supply chain risk management policies that use inventory, back-up production or 
multiple sourcing can be examined using the results of an analysis that compares costs 
and benefits.  The claim of Tomlin (2006), that there is no one best strategy, is confirmed 
by the research reviewed in the next two subsections. 
Early work in the area of supply uncertainty by Anupindi and Akella (1993) 
reveals when to use a second, more expensive, supplier with a given probability of 
delivery. Their model minimizes inventory and back-order costs, and determines under 
which conditions a buyer would order from one or two suppliers subject to inventory 
levels and a given probability of order fulfillment. As the probability of delivery in a 
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period decreases, minimum inventory levels increase and it becomes profitable to allocate 
some or all orders to the more expensive supplier.  
Given that flexible supply is one means of planning for supply chain risk, 
Agrawal and Nahmias (1997) examine the tradeoff between small orders among many 
suppliers and the fixed costs associated with each supplier. A multiplicative model of 
random yield determines optimal order quantities and optimal number of suppliers, while 
maximizing profit. Based on their findings, a minimal number of suppliers provide 
sufficient flexibility within a supply chain.  
Flexibility in a supply chain can be accomplished through mitigation or 
contingent rerouting. Mitigation strategies include inventory management, sourcing or 
passive acceptance. Using dynamic programming models, Tomlin (2006) evaluates the 
tradeoffs between the disruption management strategies of mitigation and rerouting under 
varying frequencies and duration of disruptions.  The results provide direction for 
development of firm disruption policies while allowing for uncertain demand and a 
mixed mitigation strategy. Using a base stock inventory policy up to the time of 
disruption, the model determines when to order and how to allocate orders using the state 
variables of supplier up-time and on-hand inventory. The objective function minimizes 
costs, including back-order costs, inventory costs and the cost of rerouting, for a given 
lead time and length of disruption. Tomlin finds that the length and frequency of the 
expected disruption and the reliability of the supplier are critical factors for determining 
the best strategy. The model is for a firm with two suppliers: one is reliable and the other 
is unreliable, and the reliable supplier is more expensive. As the length of the disruption 
increases, sourcing is preferred over inventory. A risk-averse firm should implement a 
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mixed mitigation practice that uses sourcing and inventory if the supplier has finite 
capacity. Tomlin shows that finite capacity amplifies the effect of the disruption and 
delays recovery. Contingent rerouting can be effective if the alternative supplier has 
volume flexibility. However, rerouting is only cost effective for frequent disruptions. 
Tomlin extends the base model to determine optimal inventory levels for two extreme 
cases of volume flexibility. One, if the supplier has no flexibility, then the optimal 
inventory must compensate for lead time and no rerouting. Two, if the supplier has 
infinite flexibility and immediate response, then rerouting depends on costs to reroute 
relative to back-order costs. The idea is that the firm reroutes just enough to meet demand 
and cover inventory lead time.  
Tang and Tomlin (2008) highlight the power of flexibility to enhance supply 
chain resiliency, where flexibility refers to the ability to utilize alternative sources of 
supply during a disruption. Desired levels of flexibility are based on the likelihood of an 
event and its impact. They model five different strategies for supply risk, process risk and 
demand risk, with two measures of risk: the probability of occurrence and the negative 
impact. Supply risk is mitigated by two strategies: multiple sourcing and a flexible supply 
contract. The results show that flexible supply through multiple suppliers has a 
decreasing rate of return as the number of suppliers increase. The most gain is achieved 
as the supply base is increased from one to two suppliers. A dynamic model maximizes 
profit, with the decision variable of order quantity, based on demand, cost and selling 
price. The impact of a flexible contract is also evaluated. 
When information is symmetric between a buyer and supplier, the dynamic 
programming model introduced in Yang, Aydin, Babich, and Beil (2009) shows that the 
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value of information increases as supplier types become more uniformly reliable. 
Information visibility impacts optimal contract terms. The buyer is willing to pay the 
most for information when supplier back-up production is moderately expensive. The 
model maximizes profit, given a probabilistic measure of reliability and shows the value 
of information and back-up production. The authors conclude that higher reliability is not 
necessarily a substitute for better information, supporting the need for continued research 
that focuses on the transfer of information.  
Schmitt and Singh (2012) state that “what matters is the company’s ability to 
serve its customers.” The goal of the firm is to be informed about risk. Using simulation 
techniques, they demonstrate that the resilience of a supply chain to recover from a 
disruption increases with the addition of flexible sources of supply, inventory and 
effective recovery logic. The analysis is extended to show that the cost structure 
determines where to locate inventory. 
Klibi and Martel (2012) develop various dynamic modeling approaches to 
strategic supply network design decisions. The objective function maximizes 
shareholders’ value. The authors note that supply network design should take into 
consideration high-impact disruptions as well as normal, random events. Their approach 
utilizes a multi-hazard model and defines vulnerable sources of risk, estimates their 
impact on supply and assesses the consequences. 
Lundin (2012) conducts a case study of a central bank and a group of private 
actors. He uses network flow models that incorporate time and costs to evaluate supply 
chain design changes and their effect given a quantifiable risk.  
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A supply chain consisting of a single buyer and two suppliers is modeled by 
Gumus, Ray, and Gurnani (2012). One supplier is more reliable and more expensive than 
a second supplier with a higher risk of disruption. The supply risk for the reliable supplier 
is public knowledge whereas the level of risk is private information for the unreliable 
supplier. The unreliable supplier has the option to provide a price and quantity guarantee 
which improves visibility in the supply chain. Both suppliers have capacity to meet the 
buyer’s demand. The model captures differences between two suppliers based on levels 
of risk, information availability, and marginal costs. The results show that in the setting 
with asymmetric information, price and quantity guarantees can reduce competition 
between suppliers, resulting in higher costs for the buyer. 
Cruz (2013) examines how corporate social responsibility can mitigate some 
internal or intra-organizational risks.  Using a variational inequality decision model to 
capture the interaction of several decision-makers, Cruz captures supply-side disruption 
risk, social risks and demand risk within a supply chain. It demonstrates that socially 
responsible action mitigates the risk of internal disruption. The research reveals the 
complex interactions among decision-makers. Investment in corporate socially 
responsible activities is determined to be one method to avoid future disruptions in 
operations and poor workmanship, among other negative consequences. This is one of the 
few papers that evaluates social risk quantitatively.  
Sawik (2013) presents a stochastic mixed integer programming approach to 
supplier selection and order scheduling. Potential suppliers are from two different 
geographical locations, domestic and foreign, and are subject to local and regional 
disruption. There are multiple potential suppliers in each location, but only one will be 
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chosen. Domestic suppliers are more reliable, but more expensive than foreign suppliers. 
The objective is to minimize cost or maximize customer delivery performance. Sawik 
finds that sourcing strategies vary depending on the objective, minimizing costs or 
maximizing customer demand, and whether a firm is risk neutral or risk averse. 
Research by Shu, Chen, Wang and Lai (2014) investigates uncertainty in 
production in supply chain enterprises for the purpose of maximizing profits.  Based on a 
generic bill-of-material (GBOM) the study examines the control of production disruption 
risk using a combination of a genetic algorithm and simulated annealing to achieve the 
optimal scheme of supply chain construction under uncertainty. 
A stochastic mixed integer programming approach is used by Sawik (2014) to 
examine order allocation, scheduling of customer orders and supplier selection, given the 
risk of disruption. Optimal solutions for both average and worst-case performance are 
compared for strategies that single source and multiple source. Their approach allows 
managers to coordinate inputs from suppliers and outputs to customers. They find that 
suppliers with a high probability of disruption or high prices are allocated a low portion 
of demand. The results also show that purchasing cost relative to shortage cost impacts 
the optimal number of suppliers. Findings are discussed for both risk-neutral and risk-
averse portfolios. The number of suppliers for single sourcing is smaller than the number 
of supplier for multiple sourcing strategies for both risk-neutral and risk averse. However, 
a risk-averse portfolio has smaller scheduled production for each period resulting in high 
unfulfilled demand. The risk neutral portfolio does not consider low probabilities of 
disruption and higher cost outcomes. 
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2.4.2 Empirical studies of supply chain risk management  
As early as 1991, Blenkhorn and Banting (1991) use a case study to examine the 
changing role of purchasing and call for a closer relationship between a buyer and its 
suppliers. They propose that building a trusting relationship offers unexpected benefits, 
and describe a concept called reverse marketing, which involves a reversal of traditional 
buyer-supplier roles, where the buyer takes the initiative. These earlier results provide 
support for investing in suppliers to achieve mutually beneficial goals.  
Zsidisin, Panelli, and Upton (2000) interview purchasing managers from nine 
companies. Many of these managers express a belief that there is not enough planning in 
their organization to mitigate supply-related risk, despite recognizing that risk 
assessments, contingency plans and risk management are important. The authors define 
several key supply risks; financial risk, quality, production technology change, capacity 
constraints and unexpected disasters. Studies such as this provide the motivation for later 
research on supply chain risk management. 
In support of multiple sources, Chopra and Sodhi (2004) review the literature and 
determine that risk is heightened by dependency on a single supplier. They acknowledge 
that actions that mitigate risk, such as increased inventories and redundant suppliers, 
conflict with a lean supply chain practice. Actions taken by another supply chain partner 
may also increase the risk for the entire supply chain. Therefore risk due to delays can be 
mitigated by intelligently positioning and sizing supply chain inventories. Finally, risk 
increases as product complexity increases. 
Christopher and Lee (2004) also suggest that one way to mitigate supply chain 
risk is to increase the quality of information shared within the supply chain network. 
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They argue that increased visibility as a result of improved information flow will increase 
confidence in the ability of the supply chain to mitigate a disruption.  
Aron et al. (2005) provide a conceptual study of outsourcing and identify 
knowledge transfer, which is a result of information sharing, as a source of risk. They 
look at methods to control risks in outsourcing decisions and propose a technique that 
divides processes into segments which may be outsourced. One form of risk deals with a 
loss of expertise; limiting or controlling knowledge transfer mitigates some of the 
outsourcing risk. 
Through a series of executive interviews in the automotive industry, Blackhurst, 
Craighead, Elkins, and Handfield (2005) seek insight into the problems with global 
sourcing and supply chain disruption. Disruptions are present in all supply chains and 
additional research in this area is needed, specifically quantitative assessment of risk to 
identify areas with a high probability of disruption. Crucial factors for successful risk 
management are identified: 1) disruption discovery, 2) disruption recovery and 3) supply 
chain redesign.  
Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007) propose that the 
severity of disruption is based on supply chain density, complexity, node criticality, and 
supply chain mitigation capabilities. The authors introduce a quantitative measure, 
warning capability, that is based on the time a disruption is detected. Their findings call 
into question practices such as supply base reduction and global sourcing. Policies, 
practices and initiatives that increase the severity of disruption should be avoided. Like 
Klibi and Martel (2012), their work examines supply design characteristics and 
mitigation capabilities as they relate to supply chain disruption. 
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Manuj and Mentzer (2008) bring together insights from several disciplines and 
propose a comprehensive risk management and mitigation model for global supply 
chains. Their intent is to drive management decision-making using a step-by-step 
procedure to identify, assess and manage risk. A five-step process is documented: risk 
identification, risk assessment and evaluation, selection of appropriate risk management, 
implementation of supply chain risk management strategies and mitigation of supply 
chain risks. A key challenge of supply chain risk management is the difficulty of 
developing a probabilistic estimate of uncertainty. This model utilizes a probability 
estimate of disruption due to supply risk, price escalation, inventory and scheduling, 
technology access and quality. The objective is to evaluate the impact of these factors. 
The proposed model includes the capability to share risk through multiple sourcing.  
Using a contingency theory approach, Trkman and McCormack (2009) develop a 
conceptual model for managing risk in a supply chain. Contingency theory claims that 
there is no one single most effective way to manage or one best leadership style for all 
situations. In agreement with Tomlin and Wang (2012), they propose that evaluating 
suppliers for the potential of disruption is critical. In addition, environmental uncertainty 
makes it even more critical to manage risk within a supply chain. The authors claim that 
while there are “many suppliers who perform well in a stable environment fewer can 
perform well in a more turbulent one.” Suppliers are classified based on their attributes, 
such as financial performance, culture and relationship factors. Business structure, 
geographic location and supply chain type are elements of supply chain strategy and 
structure. These characteristics, when impacted by market turbulence and environmental 
uncertainty, determine the risk of supplier disruption. The main contribution is that the 
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proposed model incorporates a supplier’s attributes and performance, of which quality is 
one measure.  
Srinivasan et al. (2011) draw on the buyer-supplier relationship to analyze the role 
of risk and environmental uncertainty, based on a survey of 127 US firms. They propose 
that supplier quality and supply chain performance is weakened in the presence of 
environmental uncertainty, is strengthened when there is high demand and supply-side 
risks under conditions of low environmental risk. Environmental risk includes factors 
external to the supply chain and weakens the relationship between buyer and supplier. 
This uncertainty affects the firm’s ability to evaluate suppliers. The authors suggest that 
under uncertain conditions, a firm should conduct a complete and accurate scan of the 
external environment.   
Reeves and Deimler (2011) show that since 1980 the volatility in business operating 
margins has more than doubled and that the gap between companies with high operating 
margins and companies with low operating margins has widened. According to the 
analysis, market leadership does not automatically translate to higher profit margins. 
According to their calculations the probability that the market share leader is also the 
most profitable fell from 34% in 1950 to 7% in 2007. This is in part due to uncertainty in 
the market place which poses a challenge for managers. Traditional approaches often 
assume a relatively stable and predictable world. Companies must recognize that they 
have to be good at learning new things and this learning must extend to the supply chain 
since a firm has an advantage when it creates effective strategies at the supply chain 
network level. 
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The effectiveness of Toyota’s closely knit supply chain was demonstrated 
immediately following the Japanese tsunami in 2011. The study by MacKenzie et al. 
(2012) of the Japanese tsunami documents the importance of inventory and a well-
managed supply chain. The influence of flexible supply is demonstrated when demand is 
reallocated to certain suppliers to compensate for lost production at other facilities and 
resulted in Toyota’s and Honda’s speedy recovery. 
Sodhi, Son, and Tang (2012) interview operations and supply chain management 
scholars who point to three gaps in researchers’ perception of supply chain risk 
management. These gaps are 1) a consistent definition of supply chain risk management, 
2) inadequate coverage of a buyer’s response to disruptive events, and 3) insufficient 
empirical methods with regard to the definition of supply chain risk management. Of 
those surveyed, 47% felt that supply chain risk management should be defined as dealing 
with unexpected, low-probability, high-impact events. The authors also note that some 
respondents suggested that supply chain risk management be limited to quantifiable risks, 
while others promote continued discussion in academia and industry.  
Through interviews in the European automotive industry, Grotsch, Blome, and 
Schleper (2013) explore antecedents which foster a proactive supply chain risk 
management policy. Using past supplier insolvencies as a measure of vulnerability, they 
document the inter- and intra-organizational factors which build and maintain a resilient 
supply chain and identify three antecedents. First, a structured management control 
system based on analytical processes correlates positively with proactive supply chain 
risk management. Secondly, management’s ability to engage in advance planning, 
anticipate risks and evaluate the causes of risk positively affects the resiliency of a supply 
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chain. Lastly, the level of interdependence between the buyer and supplier increases the 
level of proactive risk management strategies. 
Supply chain disruption is discussed by Chakravarty (2013) in a review of cases 
of disruption and the impact on a firm. The author states that the true cost of downtime 
from unanticipated disruption is not just the immediate loss of production or revenue, but 
also strategic and marketing consequences. The article goes on to state that firms need to 
model the extent to which the loss of a supplier puts the firm at risk and the capacity of a 
back-up supplier to compensate for this loss. A five-level approach to managing risk is 
discussed. By understanding the supply network risk firms can gain a competitive 
advantage. A firm with a superior supply chain robustness may be able to charge a 
pricing premium. 
The practices that are examined in my research are 1) multiple sources of supply 
and 2) investment in supplier systems in order to maintain required quality levels and the 
establishment of a close working relationship. I develop a model that examines a 
proactive strategy of increasing supply chain flexibility through the use of a redundant 
supplier. My work builds on previous work that quantifies the impact of supply chain risk 
management practices. It also helps to fill that gap in the research with respect to the 
impact of disruption on new supplier development and supplier quality performance. I 
will look at measures to improve a supplier’s performance. Developing a new supplier 
requires information sharing between buyer and supplier. An effective transfer of 
information, explicit and tacit, results in knowledge transfer to the supplier, promoting 
systems that prevent the occurrence of defects, thus improving firm performance. 
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2.5 Supply Chain Management 
An early study of suppliers in the automotive industry is conducted by Lascelles 
and Dale (1989). The objective is to report on the barriers to an effective buyer-supplier 
relationship with regard to quality. Barriers to improvement include poor communication, 
supplier complacency, poorly defined and unstructured supplier quality improvement 
programs, the buyer’s credibility with the supplier, and misconceptions of purchasing 
power by the buyer. Their work indicates that the demands of the buyer initiate changes 
in quality. 
Dyer and Singh’s (1998) relational view of a firm suggests that a firm’s critical 
resources extend beyond the firm’s boundaries and are part of inter-firm resources and 
routines. They argue that there are four sources that provide a competitive advantage; 1) 
relation specific assets, 2) knowledge-sharing routines, 3) complementary resources or 
capabilities, and 4) effective governance. Relation-specific assets between partners 
provide an advantage as partners develop experience working together and accumulate 
knowledge. This allows the alliance to communicate effectively and efficiently, reduces 
errors, improves quality, and increases the speed to market. Partners can increase 
absorptive capacity by designing inter-firm routines and increasing social networks which 
increases knowledge sharing. Firms with more experience may have a more precise view 
of alliances that generate above normal returns because they recognize complementary 
resources that are distinct and provide value. Effective governance is key because it 
lowers transaction costs and provides incentives for alliance partners to engage in value-
creating initiatives. 
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A study of over 400 articles by Chen and Paulraj (2004) extends supply chain 
management theory. The authors identify key supply chain management constructs where 
the supply chain is viewed as a “network of materials, information and services 
processing links with the characteristics of supply, transformation, and demand”. A 
research framework is presented that includes strategic purchasing, logistics integration, 
supply network structure, buyer performance and supplier performance. The buyer-
supplier relationship is viewed as a dyad. This relationship involves supply base 
reduction, long-term relationships, communication, cross-functional teams, and supplier 
involvement. A set of measurements to test theoretical models is also introduced. 
2.5.1 Supplier development 
Supplier development is a strategically important effort by a firm to improve a 
supplier’s capabilities and performance, targeting areas of quality, product performance, 
process performance or cost reduction in order to enhance firm performance and the 
overall performance of the supply chain. Grotsch et al. (2013) provide support for the 
proactive management of suppliers to prevent supplier insolvency risks.  
From an empirical study of 60 firms Ragatz, Handfield, and Scannell (1997) state 
that costs are reduced if a buyer effectively integrates suppliers into new product 
development. They find that the most widely used techniques for supplier involvement in 
new product development are direct, cross-functional and inter-organizational 
communication. The most successful factor is membership in cross functional teams. 
Other measures that overcome barriers to success are shared education and training, 
formal processes to develop trust, agreements that mitigate the risk of reward sharing 
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information, mutual agreement on performance measures, top management commitment, 
and confidence in suppliers’ capabilities. 
Krause, Handfield, and Scannell (1998) argue that a firm needs suppliers that are 
able to perform in the short-term with respect to quality, cost and delivery, as well as in 
the long term. They emphasize the importance of a process-oriented rather than results-
oriented approach. Supplier development is defined to be those actions taken by the firm 
to identify, measure, and improve supplier performance. A process model based on an 
empirical study of 84 firms is developed. The process begins with identifying suppliers of 
critical products and suppliers needing improvement. The process is complete when a 
continuous improvement system is established and verified. The authors find that 
strategic efforts to improve the supply base require a commitment of resources, personnel 
and communication and increased involvement in the supplier’s processes.  
An empirical study by Krause in (1999) also supports firm involvement in 
supplier development. Krause reveals that effective inter-firm communication, supplier 
commitment, and the buyer’s perspective toward the supplier positively influences 
supplier development activities.  
A case study of Toyota’s supply chain by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) supports the 
close involvement of a buyer and supplier. The Toyota network provides evidence that 
suppliers learn faster after participating in Toyota’s knowledge sharing network. Toyota 
has solved three problems associated with knowledge sharing: 1) motivating suppliers to 
share information, 2) preventing free riders, and 3) reducing the cost of finding and 
accessing knowledge. 
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Zsidisin and Smith (2005) study early supplier involvement as a tool for 
managing risk. Their case study explores how early supplier involvement reduces the 
probability of disruption for an aerospace supplier. Early supplier involvement consists of 
supplier involvement at the early stages of product development with mutual goals for 
both the buyer and supplier. It finds involving suppliers early in product development 
projects can reduce the product development cycle time, improve product quality, allow 
the firm to draw on the supplier’s technical expertise and provide better management of 
costs. Negative aspects of early supplier involvement include increased project costs, 
improper sequencing of tasks, possible incorrect levels of supplier involvement, 
organizational resistance and the potential to select incapable suppliers.  
Wagner (2006) examines dimensions of supplier development using an 
exploratory empirical study. The study documents supplier problems encountered by 
firms. The problems consist of suppliers who cannot meet demand, unacceptable 
performance, a supply base that is not competitive, or a lack of capable suppliers (Krause 
1999). Approaches to resolve these problems include: switching suppliers and finding 
alternative sources of supply; vertical integration by bringing the product in-house; 
supplier development to improve supplier capabilities; and the support of suppliers in 
performance improvement efforts. Wagner reveals two factors that directly impact the 
effect of supplier development: human and capital support. Three factors indirectly affect 
supplier development activities: formal evaluation of suppliers, structure and process 
evaluation of suppliers, and communication. 
Agility refers to superior performance by a supplier with respect to flexibility, 
time-based performance, delivery performance, and responsiveness. The empirical study 
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by Paulraj and Chen (2007) provides support for the benefit of effective buyer-supplier 
relationships and the positive impact on supplier agility performance.  
Wagner and Krause (2009) advocate the establishment of goals for supplier 
development programs and establishing how best to achieve these goals. They investigate 
the importance of supplier development activities using empirical means. It is shown that 
in order to reduce costs, improve quality and delivery performance, and gain benefit from 
improved supplier capabilities, there must be a joint investment in the buyer-supplier 
relationship and sharing of knowledge. They find that the relationship between the goal to 
improve suppliers’ capabilities and the transfer of knowledge is moderated by human 
interaction such as training and co-location.  
Supplier development requires a financial investment in suppliers. Talluri, 
Narasimhan, and Chung (2010) examine the optimal investment of funds among multiple 
suppliers while minimizing financial risk and maintaining an acceptable rate of return. 
They identify conditions which cooperation may or may not be beneficial, and determine 
the optimum investment level to achieve high levels of risk reduction benefits under 
conditions of cooperation. 
2.6 Knowledge Management 
 One aspect of supplier development that is repeatedly mentioned in the literature 
is the sharing of information which leads to knowledge transfer. A review of the 
knowledge management literature is helpful to understand factors that impact the sharing 
of information which leads to knowledge sharing between a buyer and supplier. The 
knowledge management literature draws from the knowledge-based view of the firm 
which states that what firms do best is share and create knowledge (Grant, 1996a). 
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 Brown and Duguid (1991) suggest that with a unified view of working, learning, 
and innovating firms can redesign organizations to improve all three. A review of a 
workplace study reveals that conventional job descriptions hide the ways people work 
and masks significant learning and innovation that takes place in informal groups. They 
conclude a firm must acknowledge and accommodate these informal communities-of-
practice which generate learning and innovation. 
Kogut and Zander (1992) develop an argument that understanding the basis of a 
firm requires understanding what they know how to do. They look at the theory of the 
firm from a knowledge-based view which sees the firm as a mechanism for sharing and 
transferring knowledge of individuals and groups within the organization. Knowledge is 
defined as information or know-how, where information is defined as “knowledge which 
can be transmitted without loss of integrity” given the rules for deciphering are known. 
Know-how is defined to be an accumulation of skills and expertise that allows one to do 
something and must be learned and acquired. I refer to information as explicit knowledge 
and know-how as tacit knowledge. Kogut and Zander suggest that firms create new 
knowledge by recombining current capabilities and building on social relationships, thus 
the responsibility of the firm rests in organizing human resources. The level of 
cumulative knowledge then provides options for expansion and growth.  
Differences in firm performance can lie in the difficulty of transferring and 
imitating knowledge, which is addressed by Allen and Cohen (1969). Allen and Cohen 
point to a fundamental problem in knowledge transfer due to different professional 
languages, requiring individuals that are “boundary spanners”.  Kogut and Zander (1992) 
propose that the speed of replication of knowledge determines the growth rate of a firm 
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and this speed is related to issues of knowledge transfer and imitation.  The goal is to 
reduce the cost of transfer while preserving the quality and the value of the information. 
Later Grant (1996b) explores characteristics associated with knowledge 
integration within the firm to create and sustain a competitive advantage drawing on 
research in competitive dynamics, the resource-based view of the firm, organizational 
capabilities, and organizational learning. Grant looks at efficiency of knowledge 
integration, the scope of integration or breadth of knowledge, and the flexibility of 
integrating knowledge which is an ability to access additional information and 
reconfigure existing knowledge. Grant extends the knowledge-based view of the firm 
where knowledge is viewed as residing in individuals and the firm’s role is to apply 
knowledge. He views knowledge as the most strategically important resource of a firm 
and addresses several concerns with the firm’s role in the knowledge process; one being 
that the transferability of knowledge is not an efficient means to integrate knowledge. In 
Grant’s opinion the key to efficiency is to achieve effective integration while minimizing 
knowledge transfer through cross functional learning by firm employees. It is argued the 
biggest contribution of the firm is the coordination of knowledge.  
Spender and Grant (1996) address a special issue of the Strategic Management 
Journal that discusses the implication of the knowledge-based theory of the firm. This 
special edition focuses on the organization of knowledge as opposed to knowledge 
content. Spender (1996) revisits sociotechnical systems theory and states the firm’s 
knowledge and its ability to generate knowledge is the core of the knowledge-based 
theory of the firm. He conceptualizes and discusses the effect of intangible knowledge, 
also called tacit knowledge, which firm’s employees apply to make value. He continues 
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by explaining how firms enable collective learning and retain collective knowledge and 
identifies four methods which managers can use to define and understand the knowledge 
based activity of a firm: 1) interpretive flexibility, 2) boundary management, 3) 
identification of institutional influences, and 4) the distinction between systemic and 
component features. Spender sees managers as an integral component in the knowledge 
transfer process. 
2.6.1 The process of knowledge transfer 
Throughout the knowledge management literature the ability of a firm to 
effectively transfer knowledge provides a competitive advantage. This can be extended to 
the supply chain, where effective and efficient transfer of knowledge can improve supply 
chain performance. 
Interfirm knowledge transfer within strategic alliances is examined using 
empirical methods by Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996). They find support for 
equity arrangements positive effect on knowledge transfer and shows that absorptive 
capacity helps to explain the effectiveness of the process. Equity joint ventures appear to 
be more effective transferring knowledge than contract-based alliances. The results show 
a limit to the extent of knowledge acquisition and that partner firms become more 
divergent in their capabilities in many cases. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) study knowledge flows within multi-national 
firms. Firms consist of bundles of knowledge and multi-national firms exist because they 
transfer and use knowledge effectively and efficiently. The authors argue that the 
knowledge transfer process involves five major elements; 1) value of the knowledge, 2) 
motivation of the source to share,   3) knowing how to communicate and the existence, 
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quality, and cost of communication channels, 4) motivation of the receiver to accept 
knowledge, and 5) receiver’s absorptive capacity or the ability to recognize and use 
information. They study knowledge flows that are lateral, among piers, and hierarchical, 
between subsidiary and parent firm. 
An empirical study by Ko, Kirsch, and King (2005) examines knowledge transfer 
from consultants to clients in enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. It reveals three 
groups of factors that influence knowledge transfer: 1) communication-related factors, 2) 
motivational factors, and 3) knowledge-related factors. The results point to the 
importance of absorptive capacity and the level of cooperation between consultant and 
client. 
Klein and Rai (2009) conduct an empirical study that focuses on information flow 
between buyers and suppliers. It documents the positive effect of strategic information 
flows on firm performance for both the buyer and supplier. Specifically, the results show 
improved asset management, reduced operational costs and improved productivity. Klein 
and Rai also find information sharing is enhanced through customized IT applications, 
established trust between the buyer and supplier, and inter-dependent relationships 
between the buyer and supplier. These results support sharing strategic information 
within the supply chain. 
Using data from manufacturing firms in the U.K., Squire, Cousins, and Brown 
(2009) examine relational factors on knowledge transfer within the supply chain: 
cooperation, trust, length of relationship, and supplier performance. The results support 
the development of supplier relationships and provide insights for managers. The process 
of knowledge transfer, particularly tacit knowledge, can be costly, complex, and slow, 
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making it imperative to establish relationships with suppliers that require an exchange of 
information. Squire et al. go on to state that knowledge transfer decisions should be part 
of the supply chain network design because it has an impact on sourcing strategies and 
supply chain performance. 
2.6.2 Swift knowledge transfer 
Zander and Kogut (1995) develop five central constructs which characterize a 
firm’s knowledge; 1) codifiability, 2) teachability, 3) complexity, 4) system dependence, 
and 5) product observability. Their empirical study shows that the degree in which 
knowledge can be codified and the ease of teaching capabilities significantly influences 
the speed of transfer. The ability to quickly transfer capabilities to new markets provides 
a competitive advantage. The authors point out that capabilities which can be easily 
communicated within a firm are more likely to be imitated by competitors. Their 
discussion characterizes knowledge of the firm as either explicit or tacit. Understanding 
the characteristics of knowledge is fundamental to speedy transfer in that it defines the 
ability to codify and teach knowledge, and defines the correct means of communication. 
The authors argue that tacit knowledge is not easily codifiable or teachable and requires a 
different method of transfer. 
 Freeman, Hutchings, Lazaris, and Zyngier (2010) argue that born-global 
managers can use pre-existing and new relationships to swiftly develop new knowledge 
for rapid commercialization of products. Born-global firms are defined by Moen and 
Servais (2002) to be firms that are international less than two years after inception. 
Building relationships involves locating partners with technical knowledge to ease the 
process of transferring knowledge and allow knowledge sharing to proceed quickly. The 
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empirical study shows establishing inter-firm relationships and developing trust between 
firms for both current and new partnerships leads to an efficient transfer of tacit 
knowledge, increased ability to apply knowledge, and the generation of new knowledge. 
 Thomas, Fugate, and Koukova (2011) look at time pressure coping mechanisms 
in buyer-supplier relationships using empirical methods. It finds suppliers using such 
mechanisms decrease a buyer’s willingness to exchange information and share 
knowledge. Time pressure coping mechanisms include the behaviors of working faster 
and avoiding risk by focusing on negative information. Because of these behaviors levels 
of trust are negatively impacted as is the quality of communication and decisions. 
I develop a model that includes the cost of supplier development. This cost is 
directly impacted by the ability of the buyer to effectively communicate and transfer 
knowledge to a potential new supplier. This knowledge may be technical in nature or 
tacit and difficult to understand or apply. Understanding the factors that facilitate 
effective knowledge transfer can enhance the quality of information shared, increase the 
amount of information transferred, and reduce the time to launch thereby reducing the 
cost of new supplier development. The factors affecting knowledge transfer are discussed 
in the following sections. 
2..6.3 Communication within a supply chain 
Communication among supply chain members can positively impact inter-
organizational learning, providing a competitive advantage (Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr 1996, Chen and Paulraj 2004). Chen and Paulraj review previous research and 
communication is a key factor in buyer-supplier relationships. Effective inter-
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organizational communication is characterized as frequent, genuine, and involving 
personal contacts between buying and selling personnel. 
 An empirical study of U.S. firms by Paulraj, Lado, and Chen (2008) provides 
support for the positive impact of inter-organizational communication on buyers’ and 
suppliers’ performance. It is argued that inter-organizational communication provides a 
strategic advantage for firms; by positively influencing the effects of long-term 
relationships, network governance, and information technology. 
More recently Gligor and Holcomb (2012) identified communication as a 
significant factor for supply chain agility through a survey of North American companies. 
The research finds that cooperation between supply chain members leads to coordination 
and communication which directly impact the agility of the supply chain. 
2.6.4 Collaboration between supply chain partners 
 Collaboration between supply chain partners has been shown to lead to a more 
efficient transfer of knowledge. Swink (2006) states “the organization’s ability to 
collaborate is key to its innovative success”. Using the results of an empirical study, 
Swink examines collaborative innovation approaches to promote product innovation and 
supply chain process innovation. One of the approaches is information sharing between 
supply chain partners. 
Through a series of interviews, Soosay, Hyland, and Ferrer (2008) look at the 
effect of supply chain collaboration on innovation. The results show innovation is 
impacted by different relationships. Effective collaborative relationships enable firms to 
integrate and link their operations for improved operational performance, enhanced 
systems and improved supply chain processes. The majority of the improvements involve 
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more effective processes, which include knowledge transfer. Areas in which firms 
collaborate include technology, capital investment, research and development, vendor 
management of inventory, and marketing. 
Knowledge integration in collaborative new product development projects is 
explored by Jayaram and Pathak (2013) using empirical means. In the analysis a 
distinction is made between short-term knowledge sharing mechanisms and long-term, 
iterative knowledge enrichment mechanisms. The effect of these mechanisms on the 
effectiveness of new product development is examined for both suppliers and customers. 
It is found that knowledge sharing mechanisms have a positive impact on supplier new 
product development and long-term knowledge enrichment mechanisms improve supplier 
manufacturing capabilities. 
2.6.5 Absorptive capacity of supply chain partners 
Absorptive capacity refers to the ability of a firm, group or individual to recognize 
the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply the information to provide value for 
the firm. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that absorptive capacity is critical for a firm 
to be able to apply new, external information. In a study that focuses on firm innovation, 
Cohen and Levinthal suggest absorptive capacity is a function of previous knowledge and 
positively impacts innovation.  
Three dimensions of knowledge absorption, efficiency, scope, and flexibility are 
utilized by Van den Bosch, Volberda, and Boer (1999). The authors assume that scope 
and flexibility have a positive impact on absorptive capacity, while efficiency has a 
negative influence. They suggest that organization form and combinative capabilities 
affect absorptive capacity by impacting these three dimensions. The three forms of 
 
 
51 
 
organization described are functional, divisional, and matrix. Differences between the 
three forms are evaluated with regards to the three dimensions of knowledge. Likewise, 
three types of combinative capabilities that can be utilized by a firm are described and 
compared; systems capabilities, coordination capabilities, and socialization capabilities. 
Concluding this discussion a framework for the evolution of firm absorptive capacity is 
proposed. The authors illustrate this framework by reviewing two case studies of 
publishing companies that evolve and adapt to industry changes. 
Furthering the discussion of absorptive capacity, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & 
Volberda (2005) explore organizational antecedents that affect potential and realized 
absorptive capacity. They breakdown absorptive capacity into two categories; acquisition 
and assimilation of new external knowledge (potential absorptive capacity), and 
transformation and exploitation of knowledge (realized absorptive capacity). They 
suggest that specific organizational mechanisms influence absorptive capacity. These 
mechanisms are classified into three types of combinative capabilities: 1) coordination 
capabilities, 2) systems capabilities, and 3) socialization capabilities.  Each capability 
may have a positive or negative impact on absorptive capacity, depending on the type of 
absorptive capacity discussed. Hypotheses are tested using an empirical study of a large 
European financial firm. Results show an interaction between type of absorptive capacity 
and the organizational mechanism. 
Malhotra, Gosain, and Sawy (2005) conduct an exploratory field study of supply 
chain partnerships. Five supply chain configurations are identified and their knowledge 
creation, operational efficiencies, and shortcomings in information exchange compared. 
The ability of each configuration to absorb information is documented. The study 
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indicates that firms need to build internal absorptive capacity in preparation for 
knowledge transfer within the supply chain. 
In a second publication, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Volberda (2006) continue to 
explore the differences in exploration and exploitation of knowledge. Their work 
examines how environmental aspects of the firm, dynamism and competitiveness, affect 
exploratory and exploitative innovation. It is found that firm centralization negatively 
impacts exploratory innovation, whereas formalization positively influences exploitative 
innovation. The degree of connectedness within a firm is significant for both types of 
innovation, but the impact, negative or positive, depends on the degree of connectedness. 
An empirical study of a European financial firm shows that firm performance is 
positively impacted by exploratory innovation in dynamic environments, whereas in 
competitive environments, exploitative innovation is more beneficial. 
Todorova and Durisin (2007) review previous research and suggest that feedback 
loops must be part of a dynamic model for absorptive capacity. They reintroduce the idea 
of ‘recognizing value’, clarify what is meant by ‘potential absorptive capacity’, elaborate 
on socialization mechanisms, and investigate the role of ‘power relationships’.  A model 
is proposed that includes positive feedback loops between the absorbed new external 
knowledge and the prior organizational knowledge.  It is suggested that knowledge 
transformation is not a step after knowledge assimilation, but rather an alternative process 
linked to assimilation by multiple paths. Power relationships are shown to influence both 
the valuing and exploitation of new knowledge.  
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The results of an empirical study by Saenz, Revilla, and Knoppen (2011) support 
the findings of Cohen and Levinthal. Saenz et al. document the ability of absorptive 
capacity to promote efficient learning and enhance innovation within a supply chain. 
Absorptive capacity encompasses three learning processes: exploration, 
assimilation, and exploitation. Revilla, Saenz, and Knoppen (2013) find support for these 
three learning processes and use them to categorize buyer-supplier relationships based on 
the supplier’s absorptive capacity. From firm data and interviews, it is found that there is 
a significant relationship between the strength of a supplier’s absorptive capacity and 
firm performance. However, it is found that suppliers still encounter problems when 
adding new processes or components to existing processes and products, possibly due to 
pressure from the buyer to meet cost and quality standards. 
2.6.6 The role of trust in knowledge transfer 
 Research reveals trust can speed the transfer of knowledge and make the process 
of knowledge sharing more efficient. Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1999) report on case studies 
of global virtual teams that consist of members who are separated by location and culture. 
Team members collaborate on a common project and the only means of communication 
is computer-mediated. Trust is established quickly, but appears to be temporary and 
limited to the specific task. The authors describe communication behaviors that facilitate 
trust; behaviors such as social communication in the early stages of team building, 
enthusiasm, systems that cope with technical and task uncertainty, timely responses, 
predictable communication, and leadership. 
Adler (2001) reviews trends in inter-firm relations and finds evidence which 
suggests that as firms become more knowledge-intense, there is a greater reliance on 
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trust. The author states that trust is effective for the coordination of knowledge-intense 
activities between firms. A distinction is made between “reflective” trust and traditional, 
“blind” trust. Reflective trust is a distinctly modern kind of trust, appearing to threaten 
dominant social actors. The argument is that reflective trust is a form of organization, the 
community form. Traditional trust is based on the market form of organization, which 
relies on price, or the hierarchy form of organization which relies on authority. The 
author proposes that as knowledge becomes more important to our economy there is a 
greater reliance on trust and reflective trust is the most effective form of trust. 
McEvily, Peroone, and Zaheer (2003) look at how trust affects the coordination of 
economic activities and the firm. Based on a review of empirical research, it is argued 
that trust is efficient when monitoring and formal controls are difficult to execute. Trust 
is seen to be an organizing principle that manages interdependency in the face of 
uncertainty and McEvily et al. define trust as an expectation or interpretation. It is 
revealed that trust has a positive impact on the effectiveness of information processing 
and simplifies acquisition and interpretation of information by creating pathways for 
information sharing.  
Tatham and Kovacs (2010) examine swift trust in the humanitarian aid supply 
network where a variety of organizations come together quickly to bring relief to a 
disaster-stricken area, unlike long-term relationships in supply chains. Using empirical 
methods a model of swift trust is developed and potential facilitators of swift trust are 
presented. The facilitators are: third party information, general disposition of a person to 
be trusting, rules (in business this may be contracts or pricing), membership in 
organizational categories such as race, and the role of the individual within the 
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organization. It is determined that inter-organizational teams when deployed together can 
overcome issues with trust. 
2.6.7 The role of knowledge management systems 
The purpose of a knowledge management system is to support the creation, 
transfer, and application of knowledge in organizations (Alavi and Leidner 2001). 
Knowledge management systems should be designed to assist users in assigning meaning 
to information and to capture user knowledge in the form of information or data. 
 Mason and Mitroff (1973) suggest five considerations for an effective 
management information system: 1) psychological type of user, 2) class of problem, 3) 
method of evidence,   4) organizational context, and 5) modes of presentation. The article 
suggests that designers of management information systems must know what information 
managers need and how best to present the information in order for the system of be 
effective. 
 An empirical study of knowledge workers by Kulkarni, Ravindran, and Freeze 
(2006) provides evidence of the factors that determine whether a knowledge management 
system is effective. The model includes knowledge sharing and knowledge quality; which 
in turn impact knowledge reuse, which is the goal of a knowledge management system. 
Included in the model are measures of organizational support, quality of the knowledge 
content, quality of the system, and general perceptions of benefits to the user. It finds a 
knowledge management system significantly contributes to knowledge reuse. 
 Lai (2009) supports the use of knowledge management systems in high-tech 
firms. An empirical study of high-tech firms reveals that knowledge management systems 
provide a competitive advantage. A survey of employees from the firms studied provides 
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a better understanding of the factors that make a knowledge management system 
successful. These factors are 1) an employee understands the benefits of the system, 2) an 
employee has a perceived ability to use the system, and 3) cost factors. Lai argues that 
effective knowledge management systems allow employees to acquire more knowledge. 
 Ko and Dennis (2011) examine the value of a knowledge management system in a 
pharmaceutical firm over a 24-month period. They find that the knowledge management 
system is a positive influence on individual performance. More experienced workers 
were able to more quickly absorb and apply the information than those with less 
experience, although this difference diminished over time. It is noted that these 
improvements emerge as time elapses and are not immediately realized. 
2.7 Quality and its impact on supply chain performance 
 Recent recalls in the automotive industry highlight the important role of quality in 
manufacturing supply chains. In April 2013, six automakers, including Toyota, Honda, 
and Nissan, issued a recall of 3.4 million vehicles due to defective airbags. The airbags 
were all made by the same supplier. The recall is extensive due to the use of common 
parts in multiple models to simplify manufacturing and reduce costs. For Toyota this is 
the fourth recall since October 2012. Toyota also had extensive recalls in 2009 and 2010 
for faulty breaking, sticky gas pedals and defective floor mats. 
Because of the impact on costs, reputation and firm performance I review the literature 
on quality and supply chains. During supplier development and qualification of a new 
supplier, the buyer must be assured that product quality meets the expectations and 
required standards set by the buying firm. Suppliers undergo an intensive review of 
current systems, procedures and processes to prevent defective material. Understanding 
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what these requirements are and assisting suppliers with process or product 
improvements requires a transfer of knowledge and is part of the cost of supplier 
development included in the proposed model. 
 Juran (1979) argues that inspection is not an effective system for quality 
management. Furthermore, the quality function should have strong upper management 
leadership and include activities aimed at finding and eliminating causes of poor quality. 
Juran authored a hands-on comprehensive and detailed practical guide for a total quality 
management system that emphasizes the prevention of quality problems.  
Nandakumar, Datar, and Akella (1993) employ a stochastic dynamic 
programming model to evaluate trade-offs between the costs of prevention and appraisal 
and reduced defect rates. They show that poor quality negatively affects the variation in 
lead times more than it affects the average lead time. Unlike accounting-based models, 
this model includes costs of congestion and disruption caused by quality problems. The 
firm incurs a cost for long lead times as well as a cost for tardy orders. There are no 
benefits of delivering early, and the number of defective units is a proportion of total 
production. Their results show that delivery performance is improved by focusing on 
quality improvement efforts for products with long processing times, particularly when 
facilities are at or near capacity. They also reveal the benefits of investing resources in 
prevention, and show that appraisal activities vary dynamically with defect rates, 
increasing with higher defect levels. Finally, the results show that an increase in defects 
for one product will delay delivery of all other products, and so cost savings due to 
quality improvement impact all other products as well.  
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Gjerde and Slotnick (1997) quantify the trade-offs between two dimensions of 
quality, product performance and timeliness of delivery measured by lateness or tardiness 
costs, in both a traditional quality setting and a continuous improvement quality 
environment such as total quality management. The conditions for when it is profitable to 
invest in quality improvement programs are examined in a manufacturing facility where 
demand may exceed capacity, in which case maximizing profits implies that per-job 
revenue, customer priorities, and product quality are critical. In the traditional setting, the 
time to complete a job consists of two components: unit processing time and rework time. 
The total quality management setting emphasizes the prevention of defects and therefore 
there is a different relationship between processing time and defect rate. Prevention has 
an associated fixed cost. The model captures the difference in base processing time 
between the two settings and reveals that improvements from a quality improvement 
program reduce base processing times and increase job related revenues. In addition, 
similar product lines benefit from the improvements. 
Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan (2000) look at costs of quality and the impact of 
contractual arrangements on these costs. The relationship between product quality, cost 
of quality and contract information is analyzed to reveal the best decisions. Optimal 
decisions are obtained if either: 1) suppliers’ prevention decision is contractible, 2) 
buyer’s appraisal decision and either internal or external failure are contractible, or 3) 
both internal and external failures are contractible events. Quality levels are shown to 
increase if penalty costs increase.  In one case, if a higher penalty is imposed when 
defects are detected, a supplier has an increased incentive to avoid making defects. If the 
cost of an external failure for the buyer increases and this cost can be imposed on the 
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supplier, this also leads to improved quality. A secondary aspect explored in Baiman et 
al. is the benefit of an information system (IT), and they find that IT encourages suppliers 
to increase quality and buyers to decrease appraisal costs, resulting in improved product 
quality. 
Ittner (1996) contributes to the quality cost discussion by providing empirical 
support for continuous improvement models for quality costs and pointing out the need 
for distinguishing between prevention and appraisal costs. Prevention costs are costs 
incurred to keep nonconforming product from being produced. Appraisal costs are 
incurred after product is made and ensures that products meet specifications. Ittner finds 
that once an effective quality program is established, firms continue to experience an 
improvement in quality with little or no increase in prevention and appraisal costs.  
Terwiesch and Bohn (2001) study learning and process improvements during 
production ramp-up. Production ramp-up is the period between the end of product 
development and full capacity production. They use dynamic programming to analyze the 
interactions between capacity utilization, yields, and yield improvement through learning 
and derive solutions for the cost, value, and level of experimentation (learning), where 
deliberate learning through experiments is the focus. They show that misperceptions 
about what drives learning can result in financial losses.   
Gjerde and Slotnick (2004) develop a dynamic programming model that seeks to 
maximize profits while including production costs, cost of defects, and two types of 
quality improvement costs. Profits are a function of price, quality and quantity produced 
minus these costs. The price is a function of production quantity, competitors’ current 
prices and competitors’ past defect levels, and the buyer’s current and past defect levels, 
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thereby taking into consideration the effects of internal and external factors over time 
along with quality and reputation. They assume that price decreases as defect levels 
increase, but at a diminishing rate, and that as the defect rate increases customers are 
more price sensitive, thus taking into account firm reputation. Two types of quality 
efforts are included: short-term costs or detection costs, such as inspection and rework, 
and long-term, continuous improvement costs which include training and process 
redesign, to name a few. The results show that there are synergies to increasing quantities 
and quality levels. They also reveal how the reputation of the firm and the duration of 
long-term quality issues influence decision-making about quality and quantity. The firm’s 
internal and external environment is a critical factor when developing quality and 
production strategies.  
Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) evaluate the quality implications of 
warranty/penalty contracts between a buyer and supplier. They use mathematical models 
to examine the economic trade-off between using incoming inspection or external 
warranty failure to penalize a supplier. The results indicate under what contract first-best 
quality is achieved, dependent on whether a buyer’s quality is observable. 
One of the questions answered by Zhu, Zhang, and Tsung (2007) is who pays for 
quality improvement: the buyer, or supplier, or a combination of both. The questions are 
answered differently depending on whether or not the supply chain is integrated or 
decentralized. They also consider varying cost structures and cost sharing between buyers 
and suppliers. For an integrated supply chain, if the quality level is acceptable, the best 
policy is to not engage in supplier improvement efforts and only control the supplier lot 
size. For a decentralized supply chain, the answer to “who invests and how much” is 
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more complex, but the cost to the supply chain will never be less than that achieved 
through an integrated supply chain. Factors considered are the cost of quality for the 
buyer and supplier, the current level of quality, the buyer’s optimal level of quality, the 
supplier’s optimal level of quality and the associated costs for both the buyer and 
supplier. The production costs include holding costs for inventory, order quantities, 
production rates, and supplier lot sizes. The current level of quality is defined by two 
variables: the percentage of nonconforming units and the average time until the process 
deteriorates and begins producing nonconforming units. Quality can be improved by 
either the buyer or supplier. For a decentralized supply chain it is almost always 
advantageous for the buyer to invest in quality. 
Zhang, Wang, Li, Wang, Wang, and Tan (2011) discuss measures for ensuring 
supply chain quality. A review of the literature finds that measures involving supply 
chain quality coordination, technology application, supply chain risk management and 
reliability control lead to continuous supply chain quality improvement. Supply chain 
coordination is classified into two categories: design-oriented and execution-oriented 
issues. The authors classify coordination into four categories: logistics coordination, 
information sharing, incentive alignment, and collective learning. Advanced technologies 
such as information technology or advanced manufacturing technologies improve supply 
chain quality by coordinating supply chain partners. The authors discuss effective supply 
chain risk management strategies that can protect quality levels during periods of 
disruption. Finally, a focus on reliability engineering practice can ensure that supply 
chain quality levels are maintained when considering changes in operations or suppliers. 
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From an empirical study of the pharmaceutical industry Gray, Roth, and Leiblein 
(2011) show there are increased quality risks associated with offshore production. 
Differences in quality risks are observed across domestic and offshore plants. These 
findings reveal the challenges that arise in the transfer and use of knowledge required for 
operations. 
Tse and Tan (2011, 2012) argue that better visibility of potential risks in the 
supply chain would minimize the risk of poor quality. A mathematical product quality 
risk framework is applied to a case study of a toy manufacturer’s global supply chain 
(2011). The results show that this framework provides better visibility of quality risks in 
a supply chain, allows firms to establish risk indexes by component, and aids in the 
supplier evaluation process. The target for visibility is sub-tier suppliers. Three important 
factors are defined:1) risk, 2) sub-component, and 3) quality dimension visibility. These 
findings are extended to include any multi-layer supply chain (2012). 
The economic order quantity model is relaxed by Rezaei and Salimi (2012) to 
allow for imperfect quality and inspection by either the buyer or supplier in order to 
determine the maximum price that a buyer is willing to pay to a supplier to avoid 
receiving imperfect items. The problem is modeled mathematically and the optimal 
selling price and order quantity determined for two conditions: 1) assume no relationship 
between the buyer’s selling price, buyer’s purchasing price, and customer demand; 2) 
assume buyer’s selling and purchasing price and customer demand are related. In both 
cases, it is shown that the buyer agrees to pay more to avoid receiving imperfect items. 
Paying this additional cost implies that the supplier performs the inspection process, since 
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the costs for the supplier are lower because the supplier is more familiar with the product, 
revealing that it is not cost efficient for the buyer to perform the inspection. 
Wang, Plante, and Tang (2013) develop a model to assess minimum cost 
allocations to maximize supplier quality improvement. The model accounts for the effect 
of learning on process variation. Disruptions in production are accounted for, since gaps 
in production decrease the amount of autonomous learning while providing opportunities 
for induced learning. The model also includes variation in learning rates and levels of 
disruption. When applied to data from a tire manufacturer’s supply chain, the model 
provides insight into the impact of disruption and learning on a buyer and its suppliers’ 
collaborative quality improvement strategy.  
Multiple suppliers for a firm are studied by Altug and Ryzin (2013) where the 
buyer chooses the quality level of each component, trading off cost and quality. Each 
supplier bases its price on the quality level for each component. The problem faced by the 
buyer is to balance total cost and total quality of their product so as to obtain high value 
for their product to give them pricing flexibility for a competitive advantage. Using 
mathematical models, they find inefficiencies due to quality competition. Several 
mechanisms are proposed to restore efficiency within the supply chain which includes 
quality-price schedules and revenue sharing. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSTRUCTS OF SWIFT KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
A firm’s success is directly tied to the performance of its supply chain. 
Maintaining these critical networks of suppliers has an impact on the competitive 
advantage of a firm. Supply disruption is costly in terms of interrupted production and 
lost sales and these disruptions not only impact the buyer’s ability to remain solvent, but 
have ramifications for the sustainability of the entire supply chain. Where supply 
disruption is present and a management decision is to develop a new source of supply, it 
is advantageous that this happen quickly. What can be drawn from discussion of supply 
chain management and the knowledge management literature when the pressure of time 
significantly distorts the discussion of new supplier development and the development of 
advantageous relationships with suppliers? In this chapter, time pressure will be defined 
as not having enough time to develop a new supplier using the standard routines and 
procedures.  
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When time is a critical element the usual procedures for new supplier 
development can be too slow and ineffective (Squire et al., 2009). The urgency of the 
situation requires a different perspective. The objective of this chapter is to explore the 
critical factors that impact one aspect of new supplier development, the sharing of 
knowledge and how this activity is impacted under the pressure of time. Chapter 3 begins 
with a brief review of supply chain management and supplier development followed by a 
discussion of knowledge management, knowledge transfer and factors that impact the 
transfer of knowledge.  
3.1 Supply chain management 
The foundation of effective supply chain management can be drawn from the 
relational view discussed by Dyer and Singh (1998) which focuses on inter-
organizational capabilities called relational rents that cross firm boundaries and provide 
competitive advantage. Supply chain networks can be viewed as a network of 
relationships that provide material, information and services.  
Business strategies based on the relational view promote the development of a 
complex network of buyers and suppliers with long-term as well as dependent 
relationships between firms. The literature on supplier development and supply chain 
management discusses the competitive advantages for a supply chain resulting from an 
investment in the buyer-supplier relationship. The empirical study by Chen and Paulraj 
(2004) demonstrates that key aspects of the buyer-supplier relationship include a 
reduction in the number of suppliers, establishing long-term relationships and supplier 
involvement. 
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Firms may realize an advantage by focusing on this buyer-supplier network and 
establishing inter-organizational routines and processes (Krause, 1999; Paulraj et al., 
2008; Wagner & Krause, 2009). These networks create relational rents that provide an 
advantage over competing firms. The alliances move the buyer-supplier relationship 
away from a market-based relationship and toward a collaborative partnership. 
Coupling these strategies with policies that minimize inventory magnify the 
impact to a supply chain when a supplier cannot provide goods or services and the buyer 
seeks to establish a new source of supply. Collaborative relationships between a buyer 
and supplier typically are established over time; but in the event of a supply disruption, 
the element of time pressure is introduced. The issue is that the relational aspects that are 
important for supply chain performance can leave firms vulnerable in the event they seek 
to quickly add a new supplier. My research views the supply chain as a dyadic 
relationship between a buyer and supplier with the emphasis being on the behavior of the 
buyer. 
3.2 Supplier development 
Given the cost of supplier development and the benefit of having a second source 
of supply, a speedy launch of a new supplier is beneficial. Understanding the factors that 
positively impact supplier development provides an advantage. Krause et al. (1998) 
define supplier development as an effort by the buyer to improve a supplier’s 
performance, where a firm may target specific areas in order to improve quality, cost or 
delivery. The authors argue that a buyer should focus on process-oriented improvement 
instead of results-oriented improvement. Supplier involvement is supported by Ragatz et 
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al. (1997) who state that costs are reduced when suppliers are involved in new product 
development.  
Another positive result of supplier development is that it can mitigate the risk of a 
disruption in supply. Zsidisin and Smith (2005) find that a pro-active approach can 
improve the delivery performance of suppliers. They suggest that involving suppliers 
early in product development and establishing shared goals allows the buyer to draw on 
the supplier’s technical knowledge and manage costs. Talluri et al. (2010) recognizes that 
there must be a return on a firm’s investment in suppliers and identifies optimum 
investment levels to achieve high levels of risk reduction. Based on these findings, 
managers can develop risk reduction strategies that incorporate factors critical to the 
successful development of suppliers.  
Because supplier development is costly and requires a commitment of resources 
and success is not guaranteed, Ragatz et al. (1997) discusses measures to overcome 
barriers to success. The authors find that membership in cross-functional teams is the 
most effective means. Other effective measures discussed include communication, 
sharing information, and developing trust.  
Zsidisin and Smith (2005) study early supplier involvement in new product 
design. They summarize both the benefits and drawbacks of early supplier involvement. 
Benefits include reducing the time to develop a product, improved quality, reduced costs, 
and access to suppliers’ technical expertise. The authors list increased costs, incorrect 
sequencing of tasks, incorrect level of involvement by supplier, organizational resistance, 
and selecting incapable suppliers as drawbacks to early supplier involvement. 
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Throughout the supplier development literature several means that lead to 
successful supplier development are identified. Practices that include inter-firm 
communication, sharing information, transfer of knowledge between the buyer and 
supplier, shared education and training, shared goals, commitment of the buyer and 
supplier, cross-functional teams, processes to develop trust, and a commitment of 
resources are discussed.  A common theme is the transfer of knowledge and methods to 
ensure the process is effective 
Dyer and Singh (1998), as well as Chen and Paulraj (2004), state that one of the 
important tasks when developing new suppliers is the transfer of knowledge between the 
buyer and supplier. Grant (1996b) argues that knowledge is one of the core competencies 
of a firm and through knowledge sharing a buyer attempts to improve a supplier’s 
performance. During a time of disruption, knowing what knowledge is critical and which 
practices are the most efficient for swiftly transferring knowledge can be a benefit to 
practitioners.  
This research incorporates the cost of supplier development, which consists of 
sharing information in an attempt to transfer usable knowledge from buyer to supplier. I 
also include a factor that measures the effectiveness of supplier development processes 
(rate of improvement). Because a firm has a competitive advantage when it effectively 
and efficiently develops a supplier which requires a transfer of knowledge, I review the 
constructs of knowledge management.  
3.3 Knowledge management 
The relational view, which was first proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998), provides 
support for a discussion of knowledge management in that it proposes that the utilization 
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of knowledge sharing routines provide a competitive advantage to both buyers and 
suppliers. The relational view also supports the development of inter-firm collaborative 
routines and procedures which lead to a swift transfer of knowledge. By working together 
the collaborative efforts of buyers and suppliers begin to accumulate an inter-
organizational knowledge base and the communication channels become more efficient 
and effective which in turn reduces knowledge sharing errors. 
The knowledge based view of the firm provides context for understanding which 
constructs lead to a speedy transfer of knowledge. Zander and Kogut (1995), Grant 
(1996b), and Spender (1996) all propose that a firm is defined by its collective 
knowledge and how well it shares and transfers this knowledge. They also indicate that a 
competitive advantage is gained from the effective transfer of knowledge both within and 
between firms.  
The idea that inter-organizational knowledge transfer is critical to gaining 
competitive advantage is supported in the supply chain management literature by 
Lascelles and Dale (1989), Krause (1999), and Paulraj et al. (2008). Moreover Grant 
(1996a) proposes the strategic importance of knowledge is in its ability to create 
organizational capabilities. The concept that knowledge defines the competitive 
advantage of a firm is further discussed by Spender (1996) and Alavi and Leidner (2001) 
who view knowledge as a process which defines the firm and provides competitive 
advantage. When it crosses firm boundaries its value is increased.  
Knowledge is core to the ability of a firm to remain competitive; furthermore it is 
important to the ability of a supply chain to function efficiently and effectively. Gupta 
and Govindarajan (2000) and Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) show the effective use of 
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knowledge positively impacts supplier performance and enhances productivity for both 
buyers and suppliers. Therefore it can be concluded that the effective use of knowledge 
positively impacts supplier performance and enhances productivity for both buyers and 
suppliers. Given the time pressure created by the supply disruption it is even more critical 
that this transfer of knowledge take place as quickly as possible. 
3.4 Factors that Facilitate Knowledge Transfer  
The next sections draw from the literature on knowledge transfer and examine 
swift knowledge transfer due to a supply disruption. The objective is to examine 
constructs that facilitate a speedy transfer of knowledge between buyers and suppliers. 
Understanding these key constructs will aid in the fast development of new suppliers, 
minimize supply disruption, and maintain the quality of the finished product or services. 
It is recognized that the exchange of knowledge is not the only factor that must occur in 
order to bring a supplier on-line quickly; rather, the transfer of knowledge is one aspect 
of new supplier development. Following the discussion of swift knowledge transfer the 
following constructs and their impact on knowledge transfer will be explored. First, 
communication channels between buyers and suppliers which are critical for the transfer 
of knowledge. Secondly, the transfer of knowledge is more effective when a collaborative 
relationship has been established between the buyer and supplier and this relationship is 
further enhanced through the building of trust. In order to effectively use the knowledge 
transferred the supplier must have the absorptive capacity to effectively utilize shared 
information. Lastly, the impact of a knowledge management system on the ability to 
transfer knowledge is explored. 
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3.4.1 Swift knowledge transfer 
Thomas et al. (2011) document that speedy transfer of knowledge requires 
accelerated processes and routines which can create strained relationships between buyers 
and suppliers and hence reduce trust and communication. In order for buyers and 
suppliers to have an effective transfer of knowledge, the buyer must recognize key 
aspects of the knowledge transfer process and develop strategies to mitigate the risk of 
communication error. In their discussion of speedy knowledge transfer, the authors 
advise managers that certain behaviors employed by individuals working under the 
pressure of time may be counter-productive to the knowledge transfer process, and that it 
is an important first step to create awareness of these time pressure coping mechanisms 
and their influence. Behaviors such as accelerated decision-making can lead to errors. 
Time pressure can also impose a decision bias that leads to avoiding losses and buyers 
only consider very safe options.  
Managers can use newly formed relationships to quickly develop new knowledge 
for rapid commercialization of products. Freeman et al. (2010) explore rapid knowledge 
development for a global firm and the transfer of technology. Their study of rapid 
knowledge development for a global firm that must quickly transfer technical knowledge 
provides support for establishing inter-organizational teams. In their research absorptive 
capacity is not a restraint, which may not apply to all buyer-supplier relationships.  
Understanding the characteristics of knowledge is fundamental to speedy transfer 
in that it defines the ability to codify and teach knowledge, and defines the correct means 
of communication. Zander and Kogut (1995) reveal that the pressure of speedy 
knowledge transfer can be reduced by the degree of codification of knowledge and the 
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ease in which tacit knowledge can be communicated.  Zander and Kogut also show that 
the more easily a capability can be communicated and understood the shorter the time to 
transfer. From this it can be concluded that on-site visits, a hands-on training program, 
and inter-organizational teams that cross firm boundaries help suppliers to learn and 
apply tacit knowledge. 
3.4.2 Communication channels 
The collective knowledge of a firm resides in individuals (Grant 1996a), and in 
order for organizations to gain an economic advantage from this knowledge, the process 
of communicating becomes important. There is extensive research on the impact of 
communication channels on knowledge transfer. The fact that communication is critical 
for the transfer of knowledge within a supply chain is well documented throughout the 
supply chain literature (Krause, 1999; Chen & Paulraj 2004; Paulraj et al., 2008). In fact, 
Lascelles and Dale (1989) discover that many supplier problems are due to poor 
communication.  
Due to the complex nature of supply networks, it is necessary to establish 
effective communication routines between buyers and suppliers. Spender (1996) proposes 
that a firm utilizes communication channels through collaboration can provide an 
advantage. The case study of Toyota’s supply chain by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) 
examines Toyota’s knowledge sharing network. The authors find that Toyota has solved 
several issues associated with sharing knowledge in a supply chain; one issue resolved is 
the cost of finding and accessing knowledge which is reduced because of effective inter-
organizational channels of communication. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) show that the 
existence and richness of communication channels positively impacts knowledge transfer 
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within multinational corporations. The influence of information technology and 
communication channels that fit the task are shown to enhance not only the transfer of 
information, but also the absorptive capacity of the receiver of this information, thus 
increasing the knowledge transfer between sender and receiver. 
The work of Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1999) as well as Paulraj and Chen (2007) 
show the means of communication and use of information technology are important 
facilitators of the knowledge transfer process. Paulraj and Chen also document that the 
use of information technology suitable for the task enhances not only the transfer of 
information but the absorptive capacity of the receiver of this information, thus 
increasing the knowledge transfer between sender and receiver.  
The element of human interaction for effective organizational learning is explored 
by Brown and Duguid (1991) who argue that significant learning and innovation, hence 
knowledge transfer takes place through informal “communities-of-practice”. Brown and 
Duguid suggest that it is possible to redesign organizations to improve organizational 
learning. 
In a study of supply chains and supplier development, Wagner and Krause (2009) 
found that knowledge transfer from the buyer to the supplier is positively impacted by the 
degree of human interaction. They demonstrate that rich channels of communication 
involve face-to-face interactions (possibly through remote access) and reduce 
communication error. The authors discover that knowledge transfer from the buyer to the 
supplier is positively impacted by the degree of human interaction.  
When operating under time pressures and the need exists to transfer significant 
volumes of knowledge quickly, it is imperative that the appropriate methods of 
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communication be employed and those communications occur frequently. Methods that 
promote establishing collaborative relationships and trust will further speed the transfer 
of knowledge.   
3.4.3 Establishing collaborative relationships 
The importance of collaboration based on mutual trust, shared goals, and 
openness has been extensively studied. Collaboration involves joint planning and the 
establishment of mutual objectives and goals. How supply chains collaborate and 
establish procedures for sharing knowledge, enhances the ability of the supply chain to be 
competitive. 
Inter-organizational collaboration requires the buyer and supplier working 
together to accomplish the goal of bringing the new supplier into production quickly. 
Team efforts that involve joint decision-making, shared goals, a free exchange of 
information, and practices built on trust that continually provide feedback as well as 
updating team members as required are part of an effort to establish inter-organizational 
collaboration. Grant (1996a) argues that organizations learn through collaborating with 
other organizations and through the sharing of critical knowledge, thus, successfully 
managing supply chain knowledge resources is fundamental.  
The work of Chen and Paulraj (2004) reveal that collaboration increases supplier 
performance, reduces conflict, speeds new product development, and reduces 
manufacturing lead time. Both Grant (1996a) and Chen and Paulraj argue that 
collaborative efforts between organizations promote learning and enhance the speed of 
knowledge transfer.  
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As noted by Swink (2006), an organization’s ability to collaborate is fundamental 
to innovation through knowledge sharing. Furthermore, Soosay et al. (2008) show that 
through collaboration, firms establish efficient and interactive relationships as well as 
work together to solve common problems. These relationships can mitigate the risk of 
communication error, enhance shared understanding, and promote a trusting relationship 
between buyers and supplier. By sharing information in a collaborative manner 
knowledge can be transferred more easily and quickly.  
Christopher et al. (2011) observe that firms use a number of informal approaches 
to cope with supply chain risk. One of the informal approaches being the establishment of 
close working relationships between buyers and suppliers which enhances collaboration. 
Team efforts that involve joint decision-making, shared goals, a free exchange of 
information, and practices built on trust that continually provide feedback as well as 
update team members are part of an effort to establish inter-organizational collaboration. 
The benefits of collaborative efforts are even more critical when operating under 
time pressure with new suppliers. Therefore, it follows that when time is a critical 
component in the development of a new supplier, collaborative routines must be 
established to speed the time to production.  Collaborative relationships have a secondary 
benefit in that they promote trust and can impact the absorptive capacity of the partners. 
3.4.4 Building a trusting relationship 
In efforts to quickly bring a new supplier into production, it is important to swiftly 
develop a trusting relationship, because critical knowledge needs to be shared with a 
supplier with whom the buyer has had no shared experiences. Squire et al. (2009) show 
that trust between a buyer and supplier mitigates the risk involved with sharing critical 
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information while allowing for a faster transfer of information. Likewise, the supplier 
shares critical information under time pressures that are normally not present. Therefore, 
trust has a significant impact on the transfer of knowledge and simplifies the sharing and 
interpreting of information as documented by McEvily et al. (2003). The recent trends in 
the development of global suppliers, close alliances with suppliers, and the risk of supply 
disruption require this discussion of trust. 
The challenge of establishing trusting relationships quickly is pronounced with 
global suppliers who may have different cultural norms. Personal communication and on-
site visits can help to establish trust between buyer and supplier. The literature on trust 
has limited application to networks that are quickly formed without a long-term 
component. The establishment of swift trust between emergency response teams is 
studied by Tatham and Kovacs (2010). These teams come together from a variety of 
organizations to provide disaster relief. A model of swift trust is presented. This model 
indicates that third party information or reputation, a disposition to be trusting, the 
presence of rules, membership in social groups or organization categories such as gender 
or race, and the role of an individual such as a medical doctor impact the level of trust. 
Trust in turn positively influences cooperative behaviors which impacts the outcome of 
the relief effort. Tatham and Kovacs note that fundamental to establishing trust quickly is 
a shared goal, established through collaboration. 
Establishing a trusting relationship with a potential new supplier can be 
accomplished through face-to-face interactions between the buyer and supplier along 
with policies that establish collaborative routines during new supplier development. 
Moreover, the impact of trust is pervasive throughout the process of knowledge sharing. 
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In order to quickly launch a new supplier, a buyer that can create a trusting relationship 
with a potential new supplier and leverage this relationship will minimize the impact of a 
supply disruption and reduce the launch time.  
3.4.5 The role of absorptive capacity 
Efforts to share knowledge depend on a receiver’s ability to process the 
information received because information alone does not drive action. Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as the ability of an individual to recognize 
the importance and value of externally sourced knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it. 
Several studies show that the ability to leverage knowledge is a predictor of 
organizational learning and allows organizations to acquire knowledge, which includes 
strategic alliances studied by Mowry et al. (1996) that support the role of absorptive 
capacity in the transfer of technological capabilities. Ko et al. (2005) show evidence that 
the absorptive capacity of a client increases the amount of knowledge transfer in a 
consultant to client relationship. Supply chains absorptive capacity is explored in detail 
by Malhotra et al. (2005) and two distinct elements that enhance absorptive capacity are 
identified; collaboration and information technology.  
The way in which a firm is organized influences how a firm processes knowledge 
(Van den Bosch et al., 1999). Firms can restructure and redefine their capabilities in order 
to influence the level of absorptive capacity within the organization, which impacts the 
knowledge process. Assessing the knowledge environment for an industry is an important 
first step. Depending on whether the environment is stable (mature industry) or turbulent 
(focus is on innovation) will dictate the best organizational structure which influences 
how knowledge is processed.  
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The most efficient structure for a quick transfer of knowledge is the functional 
form based on grouping similar activities under major functional managers. While this 
form of organization is not the best for exploration and adaption of new knowledge, it is 
best for exploiting and assimilating existing knowledge. Jansen et al. (2006) refers to the 
centralization of decision-making and finds that it lowers the level of exploratory 
innovation, but increases the level of exploitative innovation, which is the primary focus 
when working with a new supplier. 
A second organizational determinant that influences absorptive capacity is a 
firm’s combinative capabilities for synthesizing and applying knowledge (Van den Bosch 
et al., 1999, Jansen et al., 2005). There are three types of combinative capabilities; 1) 
systems capabilities, 2) coordination capabilities, and 3) socialization capabilities. For 
swift and efficient knowledge transfer firms should have established systems and 
socialization capabilities. 
Systems capabilities describe behaviors in advance and provide a means for 
handling routine situations, supporting the retrieval of knowledge that is already 
available. Features of systems capabilities include formalization and routinization. 
Formalization enhances the transformation and exploitation of new external knowledge. 
Established routines limit the amount of time required to process knowledge, but are 
negatively associated with acquiring new knowledge (Jansen et al. 2005, 2006).  
Socialization capabilities refer to those tacitly understood rules for appropriate 
action and the informal connections within an organization. The more dense the social 
networks, the greater the trust and cooperation, but a dense social network has a negative 
influence on acquiring and assimilating new knowledge (Jansen et al., 2005).  The fact 
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that connectedness facilitates the sharing of existing knowledge is supported by Jansen et 
al. (2006) and is beneficial to a speedy development of new suppliers. Organizations can 
promote these dense networks in advance within the organization and quickly build social 
networks during supplier selection and development through actions such as frequent 
visits to potential suppliers or assigning an employee to work on-sight with the supplier. 
Lastly, coordination capabilities involve cross-functional interfaces, participation 
in decision making, and job rotation (Jansen et al. 2005, 2006). These capabilities are not 
as efficient at transferring knowledge as socialization or systems capabilities. However, 
these cross-functional interfaces increase knowledge flow and promote non-routine 
exchanges and reciprocal information sharing. They help to overcome differences, assist 
in interpreting problems and build understanding about new external knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity is important because the transfer of information is not the end 
goal of the buyer. Instead the buyer needs to enable the supplier to fully understand and 
comprehend the information being shared. In turn, the supplier needs to be able to take 
action and provide the needed goods or services. In a time of critical supply disruption, 
the level of absorptive capacity of the supplier will speed the transfer and use of 
information. When a supplier understands and comprehends the information; the buyer 
can increase the amount of knowledge transfer resulting in increased supplier 
performance.   
3.4.6 Knowledge Management Systems 
The extent to which a supplier has an established system to document procedures 
and practices has a significant impact on their ability to quickly bring a new product into 
production.  Alavi and Leidner (2001) state “the objective of a knowledge management 
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system is to support creation, transfer and application of knowledge in organizations”. 
Formalized documents and procedures are part of a knowledge management system that 
consists of codified information and tacit knowledge. The use of a knowledge 
management system is related to the degree of codification of knowledge which is 
directly related to the speed of knowledge transfer (Zander & Kogut, 1995).  
Other research shows the positive impact that a knowledge management system 
can bring to an organization. Kulkarni et al. (2006) show that a knowledge management 
system significantly contributes to knowledge reuse; but it requires knowledge sharing 
routines and quality of the knowledge content. Lai (2009) examines the factors 
influencing the success of a knowledge management system; an employee understands 
the benefits of the system, an employee has a perceived ability to use the system, and the 
cost. Lai argues that effective knowledge management systems allow employees to 
acquire more knowledge. 
Knowledge management systems are effective at many levels of the organization. 
Klein and Rai (2009) show that established knowledge management systems positively 
impact the performance of a supply chain. Ko and Dennis (2011) show that the 
establishment of a knowledge management system positively impacts individual 
performance by providing pertinent knowledge to employees.  
Previously established practices that document knowledge facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge in that information will be in a format that allows for ease of communication. 
A review of written documents and procedures facilitates communication and provides 
for discussion points which allow for further clarification of requests and requirements. 
Communicating this knowledge through formalized systems and processes reduces 
 
 
81 
 
communication error, thus increasing the amount of knowledge transferred (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001). Therefore, it follows that an established knowledge management system 
will facilitate the flow of information.  
If a firm has an established knowledge management system, then a buyer can 
more quickly begin discussions of product requirements and establish an inter-
organizational team which leads to a fast launch of a new supplier. It can be concluded 
that the existence of a knowledge management system will enhance the swift transfer of 
knowledge between a buyer and supplier.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The factors for successful knowledge transfer are relevant for practitioners as part 
of a risk mitigation strategy to develop new sources of supply. Pro-actively establishing 
routines and procedures to promote communication and collaboration between the buyer 
and supplier can be effective. These routines and procedures need to emphasize building 
trust and allowing for different levels of absorptive capacity for the supplier. By 
establishing these systems in advance, development of a new supplier can take place 
faster with less disruption and cost. Likewise a supplier that has sophisticated systems in 
place can capitalize on a supply disruption and quickly gain entrance into new markets. 
It is expected that rich channels of communication and inter-organizational 
collaborative efforts will improve knowledge transfer. For example, a firm can have 
technology in place that mimics face-to-face interaction. The prior establishment of intra-
firm collaborative teams that are equipped and familiar with the use of the latest 
innovations in communication technology would be to a firm’s advantage. If these teams 
are already in place, team dynamics and roles are established, allowing for a speedy 
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response time. Furthermore, these teams need to be aware of the need to quickly establish 
a trusting relationship with a supplier. Prior knowledge of behaviors that build or reduce 
trust can guide managers through the process of interacting with potential new suppliers. 
Forward thinking firms as part of a risk management strategy can redesign their 
organizational structure and promote mechanisms that enhance the absorptive capacity of 
the firm and promote a swift transfer of knowledge. These organizational capabilities can 
be inter-functional and inter-organizational in nature.  
Firms with established knowledge management systems also have an advantage. 
A buyer’s swift and successful launch of a new supplier or a supplier’s ability to quickly 
obtain new business has a higher likelihood of success if a knowledge management 
system is in place. Therefore, it should be the goal of a firm to continue to build upon and 
improve its knowledge management systems or to begin development of a rudimentary 
knowledge management system. Firms need to understand that knowledge transfer can be 
more efficient and effective with documented routines and procedures that reduce 
equivocality and communication errors.  
I acknowledge that other factors, besides knowledge transfer, will impact the 
swift development of a new supplier. Factors that look at logistic mechanisms, 
centralization of the purchasing department, size of the supply base, and the presence of 
risk mitigation policies have not been discussed. Even within the discussion of 
knowledge transfer, the constructs of trust, communication, and information technology 
could be explored in more detail. For instance, with the rapid development of new 
technology, communication has become more personable and enables a richer 
conversation that facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge.  
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The literature on trust is vast but the literature on the establishment of swift trust 
between a buyer and a new supplier is minimal. Given the pervasiveness of trust on 
communication, collaboration, absorptive capacity, and knowledge transfer, a richer 
discussion of behaviors that build swift trust within a supply chain is warranted. 
Risk mitigation policies have been extensively studied in supply chain literature. 
The unexpected loss of suppliers is inevitable. How a firm responds has a significant 
economic implication for the firm. One action item of developing a new supplier is the 
transfer of knowledge which is fundamental to conducting business. If a supplier does not 
have all the required information or cannot take action due to a lack of critical knowledge 
the supplier’s performance will be reduced, resulting in increased time to launch new 
products, poor quality, and reduced productivity for the firm.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL WITH DISRUPTION AND QUALITY 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies reveal that a disruption in the delivery of goods and services, no matter 
what the cause or length, has a financial impact on the firm. My work focuses on supply 
risk using quantitative methods to determine the impact of choices available to a buyer.  
Effective risk management requires a mix of risk mitigation tactics, including introducing 
flexibility within a supply chain. Multiple sourcing is one means of achieving flexibility 
and increasing capacity within the supply chain to better absorb risk.   
The review of literature on supply chain risk management reveals a gap in the 
research on quantitative models for risk management that involve multiple sources of 
supply. There have been no studies that allow for differences in quality levels between 
two suppliers and incorporate quality costs. I develop a model that includes the cost and 
effectiveness of supplier development and accounts for defective units, determining the 
best strategy for a given level of quality. A new supplier may require 100% inspection 
until an acceptable level of quality is achieved through supplier development (knowledge 
transfer) activities that implement systems to prevent defects. In this model, demand is 
allocated between two suppliers, and costs are incurred for new supplier development and 
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product appraisal. The model includes two suppliers because research shows that the 
most gain in flexibility is achieved by going from one to two suppliers.  
4.2 Definitions 
Consider a manufacturer with two suppliers of a critical component. The old 
supplier delivers products at an acceptable quality level but with a random possibility of 
disruption. The new supplier performs at a lower quality level, but without disruption. 
This represents the growing practice of supplementing an offshore supplier (here, the old 
supplier) with a local/domestic supplier (here, the new supplier), to hedge against 
delivery disruption. New suppliers often take some time to produce at a quality level 
acceptable to the customer, and the manufacturer may choose to spend resources to raise 
the quality level of the new supplier. 
The manufacturer holds inventory. In each period the manufacturer decides how 
much to order from each supplier, and how much to spend on quality efforts at the new 
supplier. 
The old supplier is subject to disruption, which means independently and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) hazards in successive periods; if a delivery is disrupted, it is 
lost forever. There is a one-period lead-time for deliveries from both suppliers. At the 
moment when the manufacturer places an order, she doesn’t know whether the old 
supplier will be disrupted that period or not. At the beginning of a period, the 
manufacturer does know whether the previous period’s order has been delivered  
The manufacturer’s needs (exogenous “demand”) are i.i.d. random variables. The 
manufacturer incurs per-unit ordering, holding and backlogging costs. Revenues are a 
known constant exogenous price times amount of product delivered, and are realized at 
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the time of the order. Excess demand is backordered. It is assumed that both suppliers 
have infinite capacity.   
The new supplier has a lower quality level than the old supplier, but it can be 
improved by spending a fixed amount per period. The manufacturer also may choose to 
do 100% inspection in any period, resulting in per-unit appraisal costs.  There is a per-
unit failure cost if defective components go undetected.  
4.3 Decisions 
Zt
U
: order quantity from old supplier in period t 
Zt
N
: order quantity from new supplier in period t 
Zt
U  
+ Zt
N
: total order quantity in period t 
Qt: supplier development costs to improve new supplier’s quality and prevent 
defects 
It: decision to inspect product   
4.4 Model 
xt:  inventory in period t; before orders are received. 
Zt
U
: order quantity from old supplier in period t 
Zt
N
: order quantity from new supplier in period t 
ϴt: Bernoulli r.v. that is 0 if a disruption occurs in period t and is otherwise 1; 
Ut: amount of goods received from old supplier 
Dt: demand in period t (not known at the moment when Zt
U 
and Zt
N
 are chosen); 
c: unit cost of ordering; 
h: unit holding cost; 
b: unit backlog cost; 
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r: unit revenue; 
α: quality level of old supplier (percent of product meeting specifications); 
yt: for the old supplier, the amount of defective components that are not detected 
γt: quality level of new supplier in period t (percent of product meeting 
specifications)  
wt: for the new supplier, the amount of defective components that are not detected 
Nt: amount of usable goods received from new supplier after inspection 
γt  ≤  α 
Q: supplier development cost;  
Qt  = {0, Q} 
ξ: new supplier’s quality improvement from expenditure in previous period; 
0 < ξ < 1 
It: decision to inspect product; It = 0 or 1 
at: per-unit appraisal cost 
δ: probability of detecting a defective component using appraisal 
e: per-unit failure cost 
β: single-period discount factor, 0 ≤ β < 1 
Assume that (ϴ1, D1), (ϴ2, D2), … are i.i.d. random vectors.  In this formulation, 
the amount of goods delivered in period t from the old supplier is a random variable 
whose expected value is ϴt-1Zt-1
U
.  The amount of apparently usable goods from the old 
supplier delivered in period t is a random variable Ut whose expected value is ϴt-1Zt-1
U
. 
For the old supplier the proportion of defective components that are not detected is yt = 
(1-α).  
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Spending money on supplier development to prevent the occurrence of defects 
(for example sending engineers to help new suppliers) costs Q each period if resources 
are allocated to the new supplier, else zero. The new supplier’s quality level increases by 
ξ(1-γt) in each period when the firm invests in the supplier. This captures the diminishing 
returns of quality improvements. 
If the manufacturer decides to do 100% inspection for the new supplier product in 
a given period, she incurs a per-unit cost of at. The probability of detecting defective 
components is δ, and so the proportion of defective components that are not detected is a 
random variable  
wt, whose expected value is (1 – γt-1)(1 – δt) for the new supplier. The amount of 
apparently usable goods from the new supplier delivered in period t is  
Nt =  (γt-1 + wt ) Zt-1
N
. 
If there is no inspection in a given period, δ = 0.  
So the dynamics in this model are  
xt+1 = xt + Ut + Nt – Dt,   t=1, 2, …         (1) 
γt+1 = γt + ξ(1-γt) if Qt = Q, otherwise γt    (2) 
The amount owed to the customers at the beginning of period t, i.e., the amount of 
demand in previous periods that has been backlogged, is (-xt)
+
. So the decision problem is 
to select Z1
U
, Z2
U, …, Z1
N
, Z2
N, …, Q1, Q2, …, a1, a2, …, non-anticipatively (as 
information is received; without benefit of hindsight) to maximize 
 
E (∑∞t=1 β
t-1
 [r ∗min{[Dt + (-xt)
+
], Ut + Nt + (xt)
+
} 
-c(Zt
U
 + Zt
N
) – h(xt + Ut + Nt – Dt)
+
 - b(Dt – xt – Ut – Nt)
+ 
-Qt – It(aNt) – e[ytUt + wtNt] (3) 
subject to (1) and (2). 
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4.5 Research hypotheses 
This model is used to determine how much should be ordered, how orders should 
be allocated between the two suppliers and whether to invest in quality improvements at 
the new supplier. Order allocation is expected to be influenced by the frequency of 
disruption experienced by the unreliable supplier and the quality level of each supplier. 
Suppliers with low quality levels produce fewer products that are acceptable for use and 
leave the buyer vulnerable to increased appraisal and failure costs, where failure costs 
include the cost of rework, scrap, and customer dissatisfaction. In addition, the model 
will investigate the interaction between disruption and quality on order allocation. Data 
obtained from a simulation study will be analyzed to evaluate the following hypotheses. 
1. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality depends on the frequency of disruption. As the 
frequency of disruption increases, the majority of orders should be 
placed with the new supplier.  
 
2. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality depends on the quality level of the new supplier. 
As the quality level increases the policy should be that a larger 
percentage of demand be allocated to the new supplier. 
 
3. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality is a function of the interaction between 
disruption and quality levels of the new supplier. As the frequency of 
disruption increases a larger percentage of orders should be placed 
with the new supplier, despite their quality level. 
 
4. The best order allocation policy for a firm that experiences a 
disruption in supply depends on the profit margin of revenue minus 
purchase price per unit. When the profit margin is high, the firm will 
be less sensitive to disruption and will continue to choose to allocate 
more demand to the old supplier than when the profit margin is low. 
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As a result of this research, managers will gain an understanding as to when an 
investment in a new supplier is justified. At what point is the cost of supplier 
development no longer justified for the given rate of return on improvement? How much 
of an increase in quality is required to offset the cost of new supplier development?  
These questions are captured in the model by including a variable Q that captures the cost 
of preventative activities and supplier development and ξ (rate of improvement or 
knowledge transfer). As ξ increases, the supplier quality levels increase at a faster rate. 
The following hypotheses are addressed by the model. 
5. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the quality level 
of the supplier. A firm is more likely to develop a supplier with a 
lower initial level of quality. When the initial quality level is high, the 
firm should not develop the new supplier and not continually 100% 
inspect incoming components, instead choose to do nothing. 
 
6. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the expected rate 
of improvement. If the firm’s ability to transfer knowledge and 
improve new supplier quality is poor then the firm’s best policy is to 
not develop a new supplier, instead continually inspect incoming 
components. 
 
7. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the per-unit cost 
of appraisal. When inspection is relatively inexpensive, the firm 
should not develop a new supplier and instead continually inspect 
incoming components. 
 
8. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the effectiveness 
of appraisal activity. If the ability to detect a defect is poor the firm 
should invest in new supplier development. 
 
Following previous studies, this research includes multiple suppliers 
and direct involvement with suppliers. My model examines the trade-off in the 
cost to develop a new supplier and the cost of unfulfilled orders from the 
current supplier. 
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In order to utilize the model, management must engage in advance 
planning and anticipate the likelihood of disruption based on potential causes. 
By evaluating the performance of suppliers from a quality perspective, 
management determines the appropriate level of investment needed to ensure 
the quality of incoming material while maximizing profits.  
This research builds on previous work that quantifies the impact of 
supply chain risk management practices. It also helps to fill a gap in the 
research with respect to the impact of disruption on new supplier development 
and supplier quality performance.  
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CHAPTER V 
SIMULATION STUDY  
5.1 Introduction 
 Disruption can be catastrophic if a firm does not adjust its policies when it knows 
that a supplier may experience disruption. I find that the probability of disruption is a 
significant source of variation in profit, and that from 30% to 47% of variation in profit 
can be explained by a disruption in supply. Profit always decreases as the probability of 
disruption increases which supports Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) who 
document the economic impact of disruption for a two-year period after a loss of supply. 
If a firm knows that the probability of disruption is low, then allocating all orders to the 
old supplier provides the highest profit. As the probability of disruption increases, single 
sourcing to the old supplier incurs more cost and the best decision is to allocate the 
majority of orders to another supplier, despite the fact that the second supplier initially 
has a lower level of quality. My simulation results show that the best policy is to allocate 
demand to multiple suppliers, when the probability of disruption is not taken into 
account.  
Looking only at total average costs, ordering from a new supplier is not justified 
in the first six months and thereafter, only 50% of orders should be allocated to the new 
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supplier. It is important to understand that minimizing costs is not the objective. The 
firm’s objective is to maximize profit which may require incurring more costs to develop 
a new supplier and inspect incoming components. The results with regard to profit are 
more complicated. 
Profit is significantly reduced when the quality of incoming components is poor. 
Lower quality means fewer good components available for use and an increase in failure 
cost. Poor quality has an increasingly negative affect on profit as the frequency of 
disruption increases. I find the quality of incoming components has an effect on firm 
profitability but does not affect order allocation between two suppliers.  
I compare three policies for new supplier development, as discussed in section 5.2 
and summarized in Figure 1. The results show that policy choice significantly impacts 
profit as do all variables and interaction terms. Since the interaction between policy 
choice and the initial quality level of the new supplier is significant, I find that the quality 
level of the new supplier should influence the decision to invest in development efforts. 
When the quality of the supplier is low, then the highest profits result when a firm 
chooses the supplier development policy. If the quality level of the new supplier is high, 
then choosing to do nothing yields the highest profit.  
I also find that the rate of improvement should influence the firm’s decision to 
invest in supplier development. A higher rate of improvement should result in higher 
profits for the firm, when it invests in supplier development.  Likewise, when the rate of 
improvement is low, profit is higher with continual inspection of incoming components. 
For policies that involve inspection of incoming components (100% inspection or 
supplier development), the per-unit cost of inspection, and its effectiveness, should also 
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influence the decision to invest in supplier development. Both policies provide protection 
against defective components, and should be chosen when failure cost is high. For a 
critical component I assume a relatively high failure cost. When the cost of failure is 
relatively low and the cost to develop a new supplier is relatively high, the results reveal 
that the best policy is to do nothing.  
5.2 Policies for developing new suppliers 
I consider three policies for dealing with a new supplier. The first policy is to 
invest in developing the new supplier for a minimum period of time and require 100% 
inspection of incoming components until acceptable quality levels are reached. I call this 
initial period of time the launch period, and it can last for two to six months. This policy 
incurs a cost to develop the new supplier which requires sharing knowledge. For 
example, engineers can be on assignment at the supplier to assist with quality 
improvement efforts. The firm should spend money on development for at least two 
months and inspect 100% of incoming orders for at least four months. This policy is 
based on current practices in the automotive industry. When a supplier reaches a high 
level of quality and maintains that level for two months, supplier development activities 
should cease, and within four months 100% inspection of incoming components should 
be discontinued. An acceptable level of quality is defined here as 0.9997, the quality level 
of the old supplier.  
A second policy is to not spend resources on new supplier development and 
instead continually inspect 100% of incoming components. Inspection continues for as 
long as the firm buys from the new supplier. Finally, a third policy is to do nothing, 
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accept the new supplier’s level of quality and not inspect incoming material, and so incur 
a higher cost of failure (see Figure 1). 
Policy Cost Advantages Disadvantages 
Supplier Development 
Supplier development and 
inspection during launch 
period 
new supplier 
development 
100% inspection 
during launch 
quality improvement 
ensure quality of 
incoming components 
to minimize failure cost 
initial costs for 
development and 
inspection 
100%  Inspection 
No supplier development 
and continual 100% 
inspection of incoming 
components 
continual 100% 
inspection 
ensure quality of 
incoming components 
to minimize failure cost 
on-going cost to 
inspect 
Do nothing 
No supplier development 
and no inspection 
no costs no initial cost for 
development or 
inspection 
increased failure 
cost 
Figure 1: Three policies for new supplier development 
 
5.3 Discussion of input variables used in simulation study 
The values for the input variables are based on my experience in the automotive 
industry. These values are chosen to create scenarios of low and high cost. Table A1 
summarizes the input and output variables discussed in this section.  
The probability of disruption (pdisrupt) is set at 0.01, 0.20, 0.50 or 0.70. Pilot 
studies show that profits become negative when pdisrupt is at least 0.60 for allocation 
policies that source at least 50% of orders with the old supplier. The pilot study also 
found no significant difference in profits for levels of disruption set at 0.002 and 0.05; 
therefore I use a value of 0.01 to indicate a low probability of disruption. The probability 
of disruption is generated from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p and the output 
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takes on values of 0 for no disruption and 1 if disruption occurs. The length of a 
disruption can be either one or two periods and is generated using an integer uniform 
distribution with minimum and maximum values of one and two. 
Demand occurs at the beginning of the period and is generated using a triangular 
distribution with a mean of 30 and minimum and maximum values of 25 and 40, 
respectively. Forecast demand is calculated from the average of the previous five periods 
and is used to determine total order quantity for that period. My study assumes that both 
suppliers have infinite capacity and a one-period lead time.   
I set revenue per unit at 10 and purchase price (purchase) at three or five, to 
ensure that on average the firm is always profitable. The firm allocates orders between 
the old and new supplier with the option of single sourcing from either the old or new 
supplier. The variable allocate (with values of 0, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 and 1.0) indicates what 
portion of orders are placed with the old supplier. When the variable allocate equals zero, 
the firm places no orders with the old supplier. A value of 1.0 indicates that all orders are 
placed with the old supplier.  
A study by MacKenzie et al. (2012) on the Japanese tsunami shows that inventory 
can minimize the impact of disruption in supply. Because inventory can mitigate the 
impact of disruption, minimum inventory (mininv) levels for my study are based on 
minimum levels of demand. I use a lean level of two (approximately two days of 
inventory) and a level of eight (approximately one week inventory). When inventory 
exceeds the maximum inventory (maxinv) level, orders are reduced to adjust for high 
inventory levels. The values I use are based on average demand: either 10, slightly more 
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than one week of demand, or 30, average demand for one period. Inventory incurs a 
holding cost per unit which is 10% of the purchase price. 
Not meeting demand affects profit because the firm incurs backorder costs. 
Higher backorder costs should increase the effect of disruption. I use 0.1 for a low level 
and 3 for a high level of backorder cost (bocost). A high value accounts for costs such as 
expedited shipments and manufacturing overtime.  
World-class quality levels are considered to be 0.9997 by the American Society of 
Quality, which is the quality level of the old supplier. If the new supplier’s initial quality 
is already at this level then the firm should chose to order only from the new supplier. 
However, if a supplier has a lower level of quality, then the firm will want to see 
improvement in the supplier’s quality. For a critical component, I assume that any 
supplier with quality level below 0.75 would not be considered. The levels of 0.99 and 
0.75 are chosen for the new supplier’s initial quality level (newSqlty). 
Inspection cost (inspect) is set at 0.01 and 1.00. The value of 0.01 is appropriate 
for visual inspections that are relatively inexpensive compared to the purchase price. A 
cost of 1.00 for inspection is expensive relative to purchase price and might be incurred if 
additional gauging equipment is required. 
A firm may choose to continually inspect components received from the new 
supplier to ensure that defective components are not further processed. Since 100% 
inspection is never 100% effective, I include the probability of detecting defects 
(pdetect). A value of 0.65 represents the ineffectiveness of visual inspections, or 
inspections where technology is not capable. Effective means of inspection perform at a 
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level of 0.99 or higher. Therefore I use values of 0.65 and 0.99 for the probability of 
detecting a defective component. 
If a part must be scrapped or reworked, it generates a failure cost. Failure cost 
(failcost) is 1 or 10, where 1 might be considered the cost of rework and 10 is the cost of 
scrap. I find that when failcost is relatively low (1 or 10) and the cost of new supplier 
development (NSDcost) is relatively high (50), my results always support a policy to do 
nothing. My experience in industry is that firms do not choose to practice a policy that 
does nothing with new suppliers of critical components. The cost of failure for a critical 
component has a significant impact on firm profits and reputation, and firms tend to 
choose policies that will ensure that failure cost is minimal. For a critical component, I 
assume that the cost of failure is high relative to the revenue earned per unit. Based on a 
pilot study that examined the cost of failure and supplier development, I find that failure 
cost significantly impacts the results, so I use a failure cost of 50 to compare the three 
policies. This relatively high cost is justified, because failure can result in cost to inspect 
finished product at the customer, warranty return cost, lost sales due to customer 
dissatisfaction and the cost of disruption during production. 
The firm must choose whether or not to invest in new supplier development. The 
variable new supplier development cost (NSDcost) is either 25 or 50. The cost is fixed 
and represents a significant investment. In general, firms continually seek to improve the 
supply base, but the focus of this study is to consider a situation where a swift response to 
a loss in supply creates an urgent need to launch a new supplier into production quickly. I 
examine the benefit of a significant investment in a new supplier, and whether the benefit 
outweighs the cost. I set NSDcost to 50 to examine order allocation policies and new 
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supplier quality, and to 25 to compare supplier development policies. The lower NSDcost 
reflects the practice of reassigning resources as opposed to assuming additional resources 
for supplier development. 
The rate of improvement in quality for a new supplier (rate) can take on values of 
0.1, 0.5 and 0.9. Pilot studies show significant differences in profits based on the rate of 
improvement, which measures how well a firm transfers knowledge. 
The dependent variables, cumulative costs and profits, are calculated for the first 
six months, one year, two years, three years and four years after a firm chooses to 
develop a new supplier. These outputs are designated cost6, cost12, cost24, cost36, 
cost48, profit6, profit12, profit24, profit36, profit48. The net present value is determined 
for all costs and profit variables. An annual discount rate of 10% is used to calculate the 
net present value.  
5.4 Data methodology 
The profit maximization model presented in Chapter 4 is analyzed using 
simulation data. The analysis examining order allocation and new supplier quality 
considers 12 different input variables with multiple levels; the total number of possible 
combinations of these variables is 15,360. Evaluating the three different policies for 
launching new suppliers using a different cost structure where failure cost is fixed at 50 
and the cost of supplier development is reduced to 25 includes 12 different input 
variables, for a total of 8,160 iterations (pdisrupt of 0.70 was not considered). 
Using a simulation approach has many advantages for risk analysis. 
First of all it facilitates the connection between disruption and a firm’s 
profitability. Secondly it can identify and create extreme conditions. Also it 
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provides a level of sensitivity to risk by comparing the results of order 
allocation and costs decisions to the probability of disruption.  
The Palisades @RISK problem solver software is used to run the simulation, 
using a Windows Vista Business 32-bit operating system with an Intel® core ™2 Duo 
CPU P8799 at 2.53 GHz and 6.00 GB of memory. For the simulation settings I use a 
Latin Hypercube method for sampling with 1000 iterations for each simulation run. The 
Latin Hypercube method is recommended by Winston and Albright (2012) over Monte 
Carlo sampling for its efficiency because it produces more accurate estimates of the 
output distributions. The Mersenne Twister setting was used to generate random numbers 
because it has been shown to have very good statistical properties. 
The GLM module in SAS is used for the regression analysis that examines the 
relationship between the independent, input variables and the dependent, cost and profit 
output variables. Interaction between the independent variables for probability of 
disruption, allocation of orders and new supplier initial quality levels are included in the 
regression model. The model was analyzed using dummy variable regression (Draper & 
Smith 1966). Regression variables usually take on values over a continuous range. 
Dummy variable regression is required when a factor has two or more distinct levels. The 
dummy variable takes a value of zero or one. If a factor has three levels, A, B and C, two 
dummy variables are required. We set (X1=1, X2=0) for level A, ( X1=0, X2=1) for level 
B and ( X1=0, X2= 0) for level C. Regression equations for order allocation decisions and 
two analyses comparing supplier development policies are given below. 
 
 
101 
 
Figure 2: The general regression equation for examining order allocation decisions: 
Yi = β0 + β1X1,1 + β2X1,2 + β3X1,3 + β4X2 + β5X3,1 + β6X3,2 + β7X3,3 + β8X3,4 + β9X4 + β10X5 + β11X6 + β12X7  
 + β13X8 + β14X9 + β15X10 + β16X11,1 + β17X11,2 + β18X12,1 + β19X12,2 + β20X12,3 + β21X12,4 + β22X12,5  
 + β23X12,6 + β24X12,7 + β25X12,8 + β26X12,9 + β27X12,10 + β28X12,11 + β29X12,12 + β30X13,1 + β31X13, 2 
  + β32X13, 3 + β33X14,1 + β34X14,2 + β35X14,3 + β36X14,4 + β37X15,1 + β38X15,2 + β39X15,3 + β40X15,4 + β41X15,5 + 
β42X15,6 + β43X15,7 + β44X15,8 + β45X15,9 + β46X15,10 + β47X15,11 + β48X15,12 + ε 
where:  
main effects for pdisrupt, purchase, allocate, mininv, maxinv, bocost, newSqlty, inspect, pdetect, failcost, rate 
X1,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X1,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20, 0 otherwise 
X1,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50, 0 otherwise 
X2 = 1 if purchase = 3, 0 otherwise 
X3,1 = 1 if allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X3,2 = 1 if allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X3,3 = 1 if allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X3,4 = 1 if allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X4 = 1 if mininv = 2, 0 otherwise 
X5 = 1 if maxinv = 10, 0 otherwise 
X6 = 1 if bocost = 0.1, 0 otherwise 
X7 = 1 if newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X8 = 1 if inspect = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X9 = 1 if pdetect = 0.65, 0 otherwise 
X10 = 1 if failcost = 1, 0 otherwise 
X11,1 = 1 if rate = 0.1, 0 otherwise 
X11,2 = 1 if rate= 0.5, 0 otherwise 
two-way interaction effects with pdisrupt 
X12,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X12,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X12,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X12,4 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X12,5 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X12,6 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X12,7 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X12,8 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X12,9 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X12,10 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X12,11 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X12,12 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X13,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X13,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X13,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
two-way interaction effects for allocate and newSqlty 
X14,1 = 1 if allocate = 0 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X14,2 = 1 if allocate = 0.2 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X14,3 = 1 if allocate = 0.5 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X14,4 = 1 if allocate = 0.8 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
three-way interaction effects for pdisrupt, allocate, newSqlty 
X15,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.2 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.5 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,4 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and allocate = 0.8 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,5 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,6 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.2 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,7 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.5 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,8 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and allocate = 0.8 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,9 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,10 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.2 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,11 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.5 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X15,12 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.50 and allocate = 0.8 and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
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Figure 3: The general regression equation for comparing supplier development policies. 
Yi = β0 + β1X1,1 + β2X1,2 + β3X2,1 + β4X2,2 + β5X3 + β6X4 + β7X5 + β8X6 + β9X7,1 + β10X7,2 + β11X7,3 + 
β12X7,4 + β13X8 + β14X9,1 + β15X9,2 + β16X9,3 + β17X9,4  
+ β18X10,1 + β19X10,2 + β20X11,1 + β21X11,2 + β22X11,3 + β23X11,4    β24X11,5 
+ β25X11,6   + ε 
where:  
main effects for policy, pdisrupt, purchase, allocate, mininv, maxinv, bocost, newSqlty 
X1,1 = 1 if policy = do nothing, 0 otherwise 
X1,2 = 1 if policy = continual inspection, 0 otherwise 
X2,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X2,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20, 0 otherwise 
X3 = 1 if mininv = 2, 0 otherwise 
X4 = 1 if maxinv = 10, 0 otherwise 
X5 = 1 if purchase = 3, 0 otherwise 
X6 = 1 if bocost = 0.1, 0 otherwise 
X7,1 = 1 if allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X7,2 = 1 if allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X7,3 = 1 if allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X7,4 = 1 if allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X8 = 1 if newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
two-way interaction effects for pdisrupt, policy and newSqlty 
X9,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and policy = do nothing, 0 otherwise 
X9,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and policy = continual inspection, 0 otherwise 
X9,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and policy = do nothing, 0 otherwise 
X9,4 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and policy = continual inspection, 0 otherwise 
X10,1 = 1 if policy = do nothing and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X10,2 = 1 if policy = continual inspection and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
three-way interaction effects for pdisrupt, policy, newSqlty 
X11,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and policy = do nothing and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise  
X11,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and policy = do nothing and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X11,3 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and policy = continual inspection and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X11,4 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and policy = continual inspection and newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X11,5 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01 and policy = supplier development and  
 newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X11,6 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20 and policy = supplier development and  
 newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
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Figure 4: The general regression equation for comparing supplier development policies 
that require inspection. 
Yi = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2,1 + β3X2,2 + β4X3 + β5X4,1 + β6X4,2 + β7X4,3 + β8X4,4 + β9X5  
 + β10X6 + β11X7 + β12X8 + β13X9 + β14X10 + β15X11 + β16X12 + β17X13,1  
 + β18X13,2 +  ε 
where:  
main effects for policy, pdisrupt, purchase, allocate, mininv, maxinv, bocost, newSqlty, inspect, pdetect 
X1 = 1 if policy = continual inspection, 0 otherwise 
X2,1 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X2,2 = 1 if pdisrupt = 0.20, 0 otherwise 
X3 = 1 if mininv = 2, 0 otherwise 
X4 = 1 if maxinv = 10, 0 otherwise 
X5 = 1 if purchase = 3, 0 otherwise 
X6 = 1 if bocost = 0.1, 0 otherwise 
X7,1 = 1 if allocate = 0, 0 otherwise 
X7,2 = 1 if allocate = 0.2, 0 otherwise 
X7,3 = 1 if allocate = 0.5, 0 otherwise 
X7,4 = 1 if allocate = 0.8, 0 otherwise 
X8 = 1 if newSqlty = 0.75, 0 otherwise 
X9 = 1 if inspect = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X10 = 1 if pdetect = 0.65, 0 otherwise 
two-way interaction effects for policy, inspect, pdetect 
X11 = 1 if policy = continual inspection and inspect = 0.01, 0 otherwise 
X12 = 1 if policy = continual inspection and pdetect = 0.65, 0 otherwise 
three-way interaction effects for policy, inspect, pdetect 
X13,1 = 1 if policy = continual inspection and inspect = 0.01and  
 pdetect = 0.65, 0 otherwise 
X13,2 = 1 if policy = supplier development and inspect = 0.01and  
 pdetect = 0.65, 0 otherwise 
 
 Predictive regression equations for each model and dependent cost and profit 
variables are found in Appendix C.  
5.5 Results for order allocation decisions 
I find that all main effects except failcost and pdetect are significant (Table A2). 
The only significant interaction is between pdisrupt and allocate. The probability of 
disruption significantly affects profit, (see Table A3); profit after 12 months ranges from 
923.70 to a loss of -902.76. From Table A4, the highest profit (except after six months) is 
earned when 20% of orders are allocated to the old supplier (435.20, 897.11, 1082.56 and 
1161.42). When the probability of disruption is high, 0.70, the firm will lose money in the 
first two years despite how orders are allocated. After two years, the firm can be 
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profitable if at least 50% of orders are filled by the new supplier. See Table A5 (-818.95, 
-467.71, -3.61, 184.79 and 256.18). 
The mean costs in Table A8 (coefficients are found in Table A9) show that the 
best policy is to allocate 50% of orders to the old supplier when a pdisrupt is moderate 
(0.20 and 0.50), since lowest costs are 1445.41 and 1743.87 at 12 months. However, at 
this level of disruption, mean profits indicate that 20% of orders should be allocated to 
the old supplier, with profit of 844.83, 461.88 at 12 months for pdisrupt of 0.20 and 0.50, 
respectively.  When the probability of disruption is low (0.01), a firm should allocate 
100% of orders to the old supplier (see Tables A6 and A7), with profit of 549.08, 952.46, 
1404.86, 1586.10 and 1662.34. These results support the first hypothesis. 
1. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality depends on the frequency of disruption. As the 
frequency of disruption increases, the majority of orders should be 
placed with the new supplier.  
 
The probability of disruption is the largest source of variation in profit (see Table 
A10). For the first year, 40.05% of the variability in profit is due to disruption 
(SSpdisrupt/SStotal). Over the next three years, this percentage remains relatively high. When 
the regression model includes the variable pdisrupt the predictive capability is relatively 
low: adjusted R
2
 values range from 0.6635 to 0.7297 (Table A2).  Separate models for 
each level of disruption improve the predictive capabilities when the probability of 
disruption is not relatively high (0.70) (see Table A11). Adjusted R
2
 values range from 
0.9159 to 0.9737 for low (0.10) to moderate (0.20 and 0.50) levels of disruption. The data 
is divided into sub-sets which improves the predictive capability of each model.  The 
variation due to pdisrupt is not included which reduces the total adjusted sum of squares. 
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For pdisrupt high (0.70) I find that the adjusted R
2
 value is still relatively low, ranging 
from 0.5458 to 0.6621.  
New supplier development decisions are analyzed with separate regression 
models for each level of disruption. Profit is always higher when the initial quality level 
of the new supplier is high (0.99) (see Table A12). Profit after 12 months, for the various 
levels of disruption, is 939.37, 764.40, 227.54 and -860.98. When the new supplier has 
poor quality, fewer good components are available.  
I find that the level of quality should not affect how orders are allocated, even 
though the interaction term for newSqlty and allocate is significant (Table A11). The 
interaction is significant because the difference in profit, for the two levels of quality, 
increases as the probability of disruption increases. Table A13 documents that profit12, 
for pdisrupt 0.50 and for a poor level of quality (0.75), is 426.68 compared to 497.09 for 
high level of quality (0.99). This is a difference of 70.41. Compare this when pdisrupt is 
low (0.01), we see that profit12, (894.76 and 918.51) differs by 23.75. After 48 months 
the difference in profit for higher levels of disruption is even more pronounced. When 
pdisrupt is 0.50, profit48 (1155.41 and 1239.64) differs by 84.23 compared to pdisrupt 
0.01, where the difference is 23.13 (1607.43 and 1630.56). This shows that disruption 
magnifies the effect of other variables.  
Demand should be met by the old supplier when pdisrupt is low, despite the 
quality level of the new supplier (see Table A13). For profit at six months, the highest 
values are 543.40 (low quality) and 554.76 (high quality). When pdisrupt is moderate 
(0.20 and 0.50) the results do not change depending on the quality level of the new 
supplier. After six month I find that 20% of orders should be allocated to the old supplier. 
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Profit at 12 months is highest for the values of 808.71 (low quality) and 880.96 (high 
quality). Table A14 gives the regression coefficients for the interaction effect. Therefore 
hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported. 
2. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality depends on the quality level of the new supplier. 
As the quality level increases the policy should be that a larger 
percentage of demand be allocated to the new supplier. 
 
3. Order allocation between an old supplier with a high level of quality 
that experiences disruption and a new supplier with no disruption but a 
lower level of quality is a function of the interaction between 
disruption and quality levels of the new supplier. As the frequency of 
disruption increases a larger percentage of orders should be placed 
with the new supplier, despite their quality level. 
 
Order allocation decisions should not change for the different levels of purchase 
price despite results (Table A15) that show the interaction of purchase and allocate is 
significant. The results in Tables A16 and A17 continue to support an order allocation 
policy that places 20% of orders with the old supplier: the highest values for profit12, 
purchase price 3 and 5, are 771.56 and 98.83, respectively. Therefore hypothesis 4 is not 
supported. 
4. The best order allocation policy for a firm that experiences a 
disruption in supply depends on the profit margin of revenue minus 
purchase price per unit. When the profit margin is high, the firm will 
be less sensitive to disruption and will continue to choose to allocate 
more demand to the old supplier than when the profit margin is low. 
 
 Table A18 compares purchase price for varying levels of disruption. At high 
levels of disruption, purchase price has a larger impact on profit since there is not enough 
supply to meet demand, revenue is lower and profit is further reduced by the high 
purchase price. When pdisrupt is low (0.01), profit48 is 2061.06 and it is 1208.06 for 
purchase prices of three and five, a difference of 853. For high pdisrupt (0.70), the 
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difference in profit48 between low (3) and high (5) purchase price is 1439.33, (8.05 – (-
1431.28)). Therefore, it can be stated, that the effect of disruption on firm profit is more 
pronounced when operating with relatively small contribution margins (revenue minus 
purchase price).  
The rate of new supplier development affects profit. Average profit by rate is 
given in Table A19. After 48 months, profit for a high rate of improvement (0.9) is more 
than double that for a low rate (0.1): 930.41 compared to 445.34. This emphasizes the 
importance of effective and efficient practices for swift development (knowledge 
transfer). 
Higher minimum inventory requirements always create higher holding costs. For 
increased probabilities of disruption, the increase in holding cost is offset by having 
inventory available to meet demand. When the probability of disruption is low (0.01), the 
firm should chose a policy to maintain low (2) minimum inventory levels in order to 
achieve the highest profit (535.86, 937.91, 1398.43, 1583.22 and 1661.42). See Table 
A20. For moderate to high levels of disruption, it is better to choose a higher (8) 
minimum inventory. The highest values for profit after 12 months are 751.87, 229.72 and 
-708.43. Likewise a higher (3) (30?) maximum inventory is always best for all levels of 
disruption. See Table A21, profit6 (552.96 (0.01), 428.78 (0.20),   -26.41 (0.50) and -
876.71 (0.70). 
5.6 Results for comparing supplier development policies 
I compare the three policies for new supplier development, and results are shown 
in table B1. I find that policy choice significantly affects profit as do all variables and 
interaction terms included in the regression model. See figure 2 in section 5.4.  
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Profit for the first two years is highest when the firm chooses to continually 
inspect incoming components. See Table B2 (435.34, 767.62 and 1100.74). After two 
years, profit is highest when a firm chooses to develop a new supplier. The largest profit 
at 36 months and 48 months are 1251.47 and 1315.83. Table B2 also reveals that the 
policy to do nothing results in profit that is significantly lower than either the policy to 
continually inspect or develop a new supplier. 
The results when supplier development cost is high (50) and failure cost is 
relatively low (1 or 10) are found in Tables B3 and B4. Table B3 reveals that all variables 
are significant. Note the relatively high cost when the firm chooses a policy of supplier 
development (Table B4). For the first year a policy of supplier development incurs total 
cost of 1822.36, compared to total cost of 1581.71 when the firm does nothing, and 
1563.79 when the firm chooses to continually inspect incoming components. The policy 
to do nothing always results in the highest profits (549.74, 879.38, 1009.54 and 1061.65) 
when the cost of failure is relatively low. 
When the quality level of the new supplier is high (0.99), profit is always higher 
(Table B5). At six months, the profit for a higher level of quality (newSqlty) is 437.61 
and after 48 months is 1420.25. Better quality means more good components available 
and lower failure costs. 
The best policy depends partly on the new supplier initial quality level (newSqlty). 
Table B1 shows that the interaction term for policy and newSqlty is also significant. After 
the first six months, when newSqlty is low (0.75), the largest profit occurs when the 
policy is to develop a supplier (Table B6). Table B6 gives the mean profit and regression 
coefficients for each policy choice by level of newSqlty. Beginning at 12 months, the 
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highest profit is associated with the supplier development policy (650.31, 1030.23, 
1185.21 and 1247.13). When newSqlty is high (0.99), the best policy is to do nothing.  In 
this situation, the highest profit for each time period is 506.32, 899.45, 1295.42, 1454.01 
and 1516.93 (Table B6).  
The interaction of policy and pdisrupt is significant (Table B1).  In Table B7 we 
see that when pdisrupt is low (0.01), the best policy is not to develop new suppliers and 
instead continually inspect incoming components. The highest profit of 678.87, 1098.71, 
1535.12, 1710.14, and 1780.15 for the five reporting periods is associated with the policy 
to continually inspect, when pdisrupt is low. When pdisrupt is 0.20, the results do not 
support the policy of supplier development until year three.  At this level of disruption, 
supplier development yields the highest profit, starting at 36 months (1399.48 and 
1466.68). For pdisrupt of 0.50, within two years supplier development is the best policy, 
since the firm has more good components available. At 24 months a policy of supplier 
development yields a profit of 550.04. See Table B8 for cost means.  
A firm should consider both pdisrupt and newSqlty when choosing a policy for 
supplier development, since the three-way interaction for policy, pdisrupt and newSqlty is 
significant (Table B1). For each combination of pdisrupt and newSqlty (Table B9) it can 
be seen that the policy to continually inspect will never incur the least profit (italics 
indicate least profit and bold font highest profit). When pdisrupt is low (0.01), and 
newSqlty high (0.99), the results support choosing a policy to do nothing. The mean profit 
for 12 months is 1205.48, 1196.11 and 1074.80, respectively. If pdisrupt is low and 
newSqlty is low (0.75), the best choice is to continually inspect incoming components. In 
this case, mean profit figures for 12 months are       -110.79, 1001.30 and 82.10.  
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After two years, when pdisrupt is low and newSqlty is low, the data support 
supplier development (1454.00). Likewise, when pdisrupt is high (0.50) and newSqlty 
low (0.75), the benefit of supplier development is realized sooner: the largest value for 
profit12 is 191.56. In summary, I find that the best policy is to do nothing when the 
supplier has a high level of quality. If this is not the case, the firm should implement a 
supplier development policy. Thus hypothesis five is supported. 
5. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the quality level 
of the supplier. A firm is more likely to develop a supplier with a 
lower initial level of quality. When the initial quality level is high, the 
firm should not develop the new supplier and not continually 100% 
inspect incoming components, instead choose to do nothing. 
 
If a firm has no knowledge of the supplier’s initial quality, and if the probability 
of disruption is low then the firm should chose to continually inspect. See Table B7, 
profit for pdisrupt at 0.01 (678.87, 1098.71, 1535.12, 1710.14 and 1780.15). If pdisrupt is 
moderate (0.20) or high (0.50), and the firm does not know the supplier’s initial quality 
then the firm should implement a policy to develop the supplier. See Table B7, proft36 
for pdisrupt at 0.20 and 0.50 (1399.48 and 662.25). 
To test hypothesis six I compare the three supplier development policies with low 
(0.10) and high (0.9) rates of improvement (rate). For both values of rate, all independent 
variables, except mininv, are significant across all periods (Table B10). 
We see the highest profit, after 12 months, when the rate of improvement or 
knowledge transfer is high (0.90) and when the firm decides to develop new suppliers 
(profit12 at 810.91). See Table B11. Profit for 24, 36 and 48 month periods continues to 
be highest when rate is high and the policy choice is to develop a supplier (1232.82, 
1401.43 and 1468.61). See Table B11. Corresponding regression coefficients are given in 
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Table B12. When rate is low (0.10), the highest profit occurs when a firm choses to 
continually inspect incoming components (435.24, 767.62, 1100.74, 1234.01, and 
1287.25).  
These results indicate that a firm should expend efforts to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of knowledge sharing activities between the firm and the supplier, 
when the rate of improvement is low. The benefit of effective supplier development is 
reflected in increased profit under these conditions. Therefore hypothesis six is 
supported. 
6. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the expected rate 
of improvement. If the firm’s ability to transfer knowledge and 
improve new supplier quality is poor then the firm’s best policy is to 
not develop a new supplier, instead continually inspect incoming 
components. 
 
Managers should also consider the initial quality level of the new supplier, as well 
as the rate of improvement (Table 10). Tables B13 and B14 provide mean profit and 
regression coefficients for the interaction of policy and newSqlty. When newSqlty is high, 
the policy to do nothing yields the largest profit regardless of rate. The highest profit 
after 12 months is 899.45 for the do nothing policy, which is highest across all policies 
and rates (893.80, 712.09 and 847.49).  Over time, the difference in profit between doing 
nothing and supplier development decreases. At 12 months, the difference is 51.96 
(899.45 - 847.49).  After 48 months, the difference is 12.56 (1516.93 - 1504.37). Given 
an effective supplier development process, if a firm decides to develop a new supplier 
then firm profit will not be significantly lower, regardless of the initial quality level. 
Furthermore, the best policy when newSqlty is low depends on the rate of 
improvement since the three-way interaction between policy, newSqlty and pdisrupt is 
 
 
112 
 
significant. (Mean profit and regression coefficients for the three-way interaction of 
policy, pdisrupt and newSqlty are given in Tables B15 and B16.) The probability of 
disruption affects when the benefits of a supplier development policy are reflected in 
higher profits, under the condition that the firm has a high rate of improvement (0.9). For 
a high level of disruption (0.50), newSqlty low (0.75) and rate high (0.90), profit6 (0.52) 
already supports the supplier development policy (Table B15). For levels of pdisrupt 
lower than 0.50, the supplier development policy is not supported until 12 months 
(1093.58, 902.62). As stated previously, continual inspection is the best policy when 
newSqlty is low (0.75) and rate is low (0.10). See Table B15, profit24 (1393.50, 1075.75 
and 281.78). The only exception occurs when pdisrupt is 0.50, rate low, and the highest 
value for profit48 is 363.90 for the supplier development policy.  I find that when the 
supplier has a high (0.99) initial level of quality, the firm should adopt a policy to do 
nothing, for any level of disruption and rate of improvement (Table B15). The highest 
profits for 12 months, given a high level of quality, across different levels of disruption, 
are 1205.48, 1025.15 and 467.73. These results imply that 1) if a supplier has a high level 
of quality the firm should do nothing or 2) if the supplier has a low level of quality the 
best choice depends on the rate of improvement. 
Next I compare the two policies that require some level of inspection of incoming 
components (continually inspect or supplier development), in order to examine the effect 
of inspection cost on these policy decisions. Both policies provide protection against 
defective components. In Table B17, we see that after 24 months the main effect policy is 
not significant, but the interaction term for policy and inspect becomes significant. All 
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other variables are significant except the three-way interaction term for policy, inspect 
and pdetect. 
As expected, profit is higher when the cost of inspection (inspect) is low (0.01). A 
review of mean profit by inspect in Table B18 shows that the profit after six months 
when inspect is 0.01 is 418.74 compared to 343.80 for inspect equal to 1.0. A low cost of 
inspection means higher profit for all periods.  
After 24 months, the interaction of policy and inspect is significant (Table B17). I 
find that when inspect is high (1.0), profit24 is highest when the policy choice is supplier 
development: 1033.37 compared to 1007.74 for continual inspection (Table B19). Note 
that the supplier development policy is not supported by first-year profit figures: 659.63 
compared to 703.09. When inspect is low (0.01) the results always support continual 
inspection. For example, profit at 24 months is 1193.75 compared to 1159.60 for supplier 
development. Therefore hypothesis seven is supported. 
7. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the per-unit cost 
of appraisal. When inspection is relatively inexpensive, the firm 
should not develop a new supplier and instead continually inspect 
incoming components. 
 
I also compare the effectiveness of inspection on policy choice for the two 
policies requiring inspection. The main effect for effectiveness of detection, pdetect, and 
the interaction between policy and pdetect, are both significant (Table B17). The mean 
profit and regression coefficients for the main effect of pdetect are shown in Table B20 
and reveal that when pdetect is high (0.99), profit is always highest. For example, 
profit12 is 657.36 for pdetect low and 795.87 for pdetect high. These results are expected 
since a high level of pdetect means that fewer defective parts go undetected, therefore 
failure cost is lower.  
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When the effectiveness of detection (pdetect) is poor (0.65), the policy of supplier 
development yields the largest profit. However when the effectiveness of detection is 
high (0.99), the firm should always choose to continually inspect. See Table B21 (508.83, 
890.81, 1277.56, 1432.088 and 1493.74). These results are based on the significance of 
the interaction of policy and pdetect  (Table B17), which supports hypothesis eight. 
8. The decision to invest in the new supplier depends on the effectiveness 
of appraisal activity. If the ability to detect a defect is poor the firm 
should invest in new supplier development. 
 
My simulation results find support for allocating orders based solely on the 
probability of disruption. The quality level of the supplier, and purchase price have an 
effect on profit but should not be considered in order allocation decisions. The best policy 
for supplier development depends on the initial quality level of the new supplier. When 
the supplier has a high level of quality the firm need not do anything. However, if the 
supplier initially has a poor level of quality, then policy choice should depend on the rate 
of improvement (knowledge transfer) and the cost and effectiveness of 100% inspection. 
Depending on the level of disruption, the length of time until a firm realizes benefits from 
supplier development will vary.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
6.1 Conclusions 
My investigation of the effect of supply chain disruption on a firm’s ordering 
policy and investment in quality provides information for managers that can improve 
business strategy decisions. The results of my study show that, when failure costs are 
relatively high, the best strategic choice depends on the frequency of disruption, initial 
quality level of the new supplier, cost and effectiveness of inspection, and rate of 
improvement (knowledge transfer). I assume complete visibility throughout the supply 
chain, that is, the firm has perfect information about the estimated frequency of 
disruption and supplier quality level, including sub-suppliers. Disruption and poor quality 
at the sub-supplier level affects the probability of disruption and quality level of both 
suppliers.  
Developing a new source of supply can be avoided when disruption is unlikely, 
and single sourcing from a supplier with a high level of quality yields the highest profit. 
However, when the probability of disruption is relatively high, the firm should allocate a 
larger percentage of orders to a second source of supply. This is the best decision even 
when that new supplier initially has a low level of quality.  
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Suppliers with low quality levels deliver fewer components that are acceptable for 
use and leave the buyer vulnerable to increased inspection and failure cost, where failure 
cost includes the cost of rework, scrap, and customer dissatisfaction. I find that a firm’s 
decision to invest in a new supplier should be based on the probability of disruption, the 
new supplier’s initial quality level, the cost to inspect incoming components and the 
ability of the inspection process to detect nonconforming components. A policy to invest 
in supplier development is best when the initial quality level is low and the rate of 
improvement (knowledge transfer) is high. Choosing to develop suppliers is also the best 
policy when the cost of inspection is high and inspection is ineffective. If a new supplier 
already has an acceptable level of quality, the firm should not expend resources to raise 
that quality level, nor should it inspect incoming components. 
These results support proactive supply chain management efforts. Increased 
visibility throughout the supply chain and metrics that measure quality levels, cost and 
effectiveness of inspection, rate of improvement, and failure cost, for suppliers of critical 
components, can improve management decision-making.  
6.2 Future research 
My study provides insights and recommendations for managerial decision-making 
about supply-chain management (in particular, order allocation and supplier 
development) when disruption is possible and the firm has a choice about quality 
improvement efforts. There are several avenues of future research. In light of recent 
recalls in the automotive industry, the cost of failure on policy decisions should be 
examined further. My study finds that if a supplier delivers a high level of quality, the 
firm should not invest in supplier development. However, if failures can be catastrophic, 
this policy could be considered negligent, and so supplier development might always be 
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the best decision. Investment in supplier development results in processes and systems 
that prevent defective components. Further studies of the effect of failure cost would help 
direct strategies for managing new suppliers.  
A firm has direct control over how well it communicates and transfers knowledge 
to a supplier. There is extensive literature on the subject of knowledge transfer and 
learning. Knowing how to measure the rate of improvement (knowledge transfer) would 
help managers understand whether their supplier development process is effective. It 
would also be interesting to determine at what level the rate of improvement is 
considered to be effective, and to study what happens when that rate may vary.  
Supplier development (knowledge transfer) must happen quickly during a time of 
disruption. Certain knowledge regarding processes and specifications must be shared 
swiftly and immediately implemented in order for the new supplier to begin production. 
Other forms of knowledge may not be critical in order to meet initial production 
requirements and may take longer to implement. A firm that understands what knowledge 
is required immediately will have an advantage. 
Allowing the length of disruption to be longer than two periods would extend my 
findings.  My research does not consider lengthy disruptions in supply. Planning for 
extended periods of disruption requires a different strategy. My current results do not 
support single sourcing to the new supplier. If the potential exists for a lengthy 
disruption, that result could change. I also assume a one period lead time for both 
suppliers which may not be realistic for a new supplier. How might decisions change if 
the new supplier lead time was variable? Understanding lead-time requirements during a 
period of disruption is critical for strategizing the best policy for a swift recovery. It is 
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reasonable to assume that a new supplier may require more than one period to begin 
production of a new product. Future research could allow lead time to vary for the new 
supplier as a non-increasing function of time. 
Finally, I use a discount rate of 10% to evaluate the net present value of profit and 
cost variables. Current monetary rates are significantly lower than 10%. How might my 
results change if the discount rate is changed to 4%? When the discount rate is low, the 
net present value for costs are reduced, which favors investing in supplier development. 
In summary, strategic planning must include information regarding supply chain 
disruption and quality of suppliers. Without good information, managerial decision 
making is compromised. 
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TABLES FOR COMPARING ORDER ALLOCATION DECISIONS  
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Table A1: Input and output variables for simulation study 
Input Variables for Simulation  Values 
Policy decision for supplier development do nothing, continual 
inspection, supplier 
development  
Probability of disruption, pdisrupt Bernoulli 0.01, 0.20, 0.50, 
0.70 
Length of disruption Uniform 0, 1 
Demand Triangular  
mean=30, min=25, max=40 
Revenue per unit 10 
Purchase price per unit, purchase 3, 5 
Percent of orders allocated to old supplier, allocate 0, 20%, 50%, 80%, 100% 
Minimum inventory levels, mininv 2, 8 
Maximum inventory levels, maxinv 10, 30 
Holding cost per unit 10% of order cost 
Cost when components are backordered, bocost 0.1, 3 
Old supplier quality level, percent conforming 99.97%  
New supplier quality levels, newSqlty 75%, 99%  
Cost per unit to inspect incoming components, inspect 0.01, 1 
Probability a defect is detected when incoming 
components are 100% inspected, pdetect 
0.65, 0.99 
Failure cost per unit, failcost 1, 10, 50 
New supplier development cost, NSDcost 25, 50 
Rate at which a new suppliers quality level increases, rate 10%, 50%, 90% 
Discount rate 10% annual 
Output Variables  
Costs for first 2 quarters of the first year 
and each 12 month period following 
decision to allocate orders to new supplier. 
cost6, cost12, cost24, cost36, cost48 
Profit for first 2 quarters of the first year 
and each 12 month period following 
decision to allocate orders to new supplier. 
profit6, profit12, profit24, profit36, 
profit48 
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Table A2: Sum of squares for ANOVA to examine order allocation decision 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
pdisrupt ** ** 
 
** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv ** ** ** ** ** 
maxinv ** ** ** ** ** 
ordrcost ** ** ** ** ** 
inspcost ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** 
failcost NS NS NS NS NS 
newSqlty * ** ** ** ** 
rate ** ** ** ** ** 
pdetect ^ NS NS NS NS 
pdisrupt*allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt*newSqlty NS NS NS NS NS 
allocate*newSqlty NS NS NS NS NS 
pdisrupt*allocate*newSqlty NS NS NS NS NS 
R-square 0.6635 0.7019 0.6914 0.7196 0.7297 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
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Table A3: Mean profit by probability of disruption 
pdisrupt profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
0.01 528.66 923.70 1376.25 1557.78 1634.56 
0.20 404.79 731.57 1112.40 1265.74 1331.02 
0.50 -36.45 189.16 445.87 549.72 594.83 
0.70 -1021.19 -902.76 -796.66 -740.45 -711.61 
 
Table A4: Mean profit by order allocation policy  
 
allocation profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
0% -16.40 395.42 849.34 1028.58 1105.12 
20% 22.62 435.20 897.11 1082.56 1161.42 
50% 51.20 409.76 813.38 973.49 1041.96 
80% -16.05 188.09 417.81 509.87 551.20 
100% -196.60 -251.36 -305.33 -303.52 -298.70 
 
Table A5: Mean profit for 0.70 probability of disruption for different order allocation 
policies 
 
allocation profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
0% -1043.32 -568.30 -101.86 76.50 152.90 
20% -939.43 -472.57 -3.61 184.79 256.18 
50% -818.95 -467.71 -104.18 37.56 99.34 
80% -916.76 -913.18 -903.85 -900.86 -892.60 
100% -1387.49 -2092.02 -2869.80 -3100.24 -3182.89 
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Table A6: Mean profit by probability of disruption and order allocation   
 
  
Profit pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6 0.01 505.16 516.40 530.81 541.85 549.08 
 0.20 445.10 454.86 435.87 372.16 315.96 
 0.50 27.45 58.64 57.06 -61.44 -263.96 
 0.70 -1043.32 -939.43 -818.95 -916.76 -1387.49 
profit12 0.01 889.75 906.63 927.11 942.53 952.46 
 0.20 827.33 844.83 795.25 655.98 534.47 
 0.50 432.89 461.88 384.38 67.01 -400.35 
 0.70 -568.30 -472.57 -467.71 -913.18 -2092.02 
profit24 0.01 1339.44 1359.74 1381.52 1395.68 1404.86 
 0.20 1271.32 1301.15 1213.23 983.08 793.22 
 0.50 888.48 931.15 762.95 196.34 -549.58 
 0.70 -101.86 -3.61 -104.18 -903.85 -2869.80 
profit36 0.01 1520.22 1541.83 1563.58 1577.18 1586.10 
 0.20 1450.61 1485.63 1380.59 1114.16 897.73 
 0.50 1067.01 1117.99 912.24 249.02 -597.66 
 0.70 76.50 184.79 37.56 -900.86 -3100.24 
profit48 0.01 1597.05 1619.00 1640.64 1653.77 1662.34 
 0.20 1527.19 1563.97 1451.48 1170.33 942.14 
 0.50 1143.34 1197.52 976.38 273.31 -616.41 
 0.70 152.90 265.18 99.34 -892.60 -3182.99 
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Table A7: Profit regression coefficients by probability of disruption and order allocation 
 
  
Profit pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6 0.01 -422.27 -481.15 -609.49 -500.65 0 
 0.20 -224.99 -290.74 -455.32 -460.39 0 
 0.50 -58.52 -112.50 -249.84 -276.92 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit12 0.01 -1627.09 -1677.42 -1684.17 -1231.99 0 
 0.20 -1241.71 -1296.98 -1376.20 -1090.67 0 
 0.50 -691.74 -745.56 -842.86 -733.27 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit24 0.01 -2887.73 -2930.45 -2832.96 -2023.72 0 
 0.20 -2312.06 -2349.94 -2364.43 -1812.93 0 
 0.50 -1339.53 -1376.12 -1458.26 -1243.33 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit36 0.01 -3298.53 -3349.58 -3205.92 -2257.63 0 
 0.20 -2646.87 -2688.66 -2674.32 -2020.02 0 
 0.50 -1522.21 -1559.67 -1633.19 -1376.15 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit48 0.01 -3457.47 -3512.27 -3350.19 -2348.70 0 
 0.20 -2773.91 -2817.91 -2792.57 -2099.44 0 
 0.50 -1586.39 -1624.46 -1694.85 -1424.17 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A8: Mean cost by probability of disruption and order allocation 
 
  
Cost pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
cost6 0.01 1019.20 1002.66 979.30 958.19 945.50 
 0.20 966.15 947.19 926.75 912.23 901.98 
 0.50 1352.40 1295.42 1240.75 1212.03 1189.68 
 0.70 2156.92 2013.50 1863.84 1801.91 1726.49 
cost12 0.01 1563.69 1542.04 1512.80 1486.07 1469.09 
 0.20 1491.50 1464.44 1445.41 1447.48 1460.06 
 0.50 1833.79 1776.59 1743.87 1793.86 1888.66 
 0.70 2590.91 2447.76 2342.85 2461.95 2684.50 
cost24 0.01 2065.94 2041.82 2010.42 1982.12 1963.71 
 0.20 1982.04 1945.34 1938.52 1967.01 2000.36 
 0.50 2320.76 2254.23 2260.15 2389.90 2592.28 
 0.70 3057.42 2917.64 2874.19 3132.15 3650.33 
cost36 0.01 2263.40 2238.19 2205.95 2177.00 2158.03 
 0.20 2175.58 1945.34 1938.52 1967.01 2000.36 
 0.50 2320.76 2254.23 2260.15 2389.90 2592.28 
 0.70 3057.42 2917.64 2874.19 3132.15 3650.33 
cost48 0.01 2336.78 2311.24 2278.74 2249.71 2230.68 
 0.20 2247.56 2205.40 2208.14 2251.53 2297.01 
 0.50 2586.46 2512.51 2541.80 2716.49 2975.74 
 0.70 3323.30 3175.61 3167.33 3508.75 4188.25 
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Table A9: Cost regression coefficients by probability of disruption and order allocation 
 
 
 
Table A10: Percent of corrected total sum of squares attributed to probability of 
disruption 
 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
pdisrupt 47.37 40.05 32.01 31.39 31.15 
  
Cost pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
cost6 0.01 -387.35 -252.36 -97.31 -58.00 0 
 0.20 -390.17 -260.13 -105.49 -60.44 0 
 0.50 -277.34 -190.53 -78.96 -49.56 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
cost12 0.01 168.66 299.18 402.82 258.43 0 
 0.20 103.37 226.84 339.09 225.79 0 
 0.50 24.87 113.92 205.47 138.50 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
cost24 0.01 690.75 812.45 849.00 559.73 0 
 0.20 562.49 669.93 730.76 503.05 0 
 0.50 313.41 387.86 454.45 327.69 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
cost36 0.01 889.80 1016.52 1026.18 676.12 0 
 0.20 735.46 844.74 886.68 610.07 0 
 0.50 424.76 499.91 557.83 402.89 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
cost48 0.01 969.06 1097.86 1097.12 722.84 0 
 0.20 803.54 913.85 949.00 652.70 0 
 0.50 467.23 542.85 597.65 432.38 0 
 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A11: Sum of squares for ANOVA by probability of disruption to examine supplier 
quality 
Source pdisrupt profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
allocate 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
maxinv 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
inspcost 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 ** ** ** ** ** 
failcost 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** * * * * 
0.50 * * ^ NS NS 
0.70 NS NS NS NS NS 
newSqlty 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 NS * * * * 
rate 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.50 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.70 NS ** ** ** ** 
pdetect 0.01 ** ** ** ** ** 
0.20 * * * * * 
0.50 * * NS NS NS 
0.70 NS NS NS NS NS 
allocate*newSqlty 0.01 ** * * * * 
0.20 ** ** * * * 
0.50 ** * * NS NS 
0.70 NS NS NS NS NS 
R-square 0.01 0.9665 0.9671 0.9713 0.9725 0.9737 
0.20 0.9426 0.9562 0.9592 0.9604 0.9613 
0.50 0.9159 0.9204 0.9230 0.9240 0.9241 
0.70 0.5458 0.6169 0.6085 0.6478 0.6621 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
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Table A12: Mean profit and regression coefficients by new supplier quality level 
 
 
 
  
  Means Coefficients 
Profit pdisrupt newSqlty 0.75 newSqlty 0.99 newSqlty 0.75 newSqlty 0.99 
profit6 0.01 526.23 531.09 -11.36 0 
 0.20 389.18 420.40 -11.36 0 
 0.50 -54.11 -18.79 -11.36 0 
 0.70 -1039.61 -1002.76 -11.36 0 
profit12 0.01 908.03 939.37 -41.26 0 
 0.20 698.75 764.40 -41.26 0 
 0.50 150.78 227.54 -40.32 0 
 0.70 -944.53 -860.98 -41.26 0 
profit24 0.01 1362.48 1390.01 -41.26 0 
 0.20 1079.32 1145.48 -41.26 0 
 0.50 404.64 487.10 -41.26 0 
 0.70 -843.64 -749.68 -4126 0 
profit36 0.01 1545.00 1570.56 -41.26 0 
 0.20 1232.95 1298.54 -41.26 0 
 0.50 508.55 590.88 -41.26 0 
 0.70 -787.46 -693.44 -41.26 0 
profit48 0.01 1617.32 1651.48 -49.20 0 
 0.20 1293.79 1368.25 -49.20 0 
 0.50 549.16 640.50 -49.20 0 
 0.70 -763.22 -660.01 -49.20 0 
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Table A13: Mean profit by quality level, probability of disruption and order allocation 
 
profit newSqlty pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6  
0.75 
0.01 506.12 516.58 528.05 536.97 543.40 
0.20 421.84 436.22 417.10 360.46 310.28 
0.50 0.00 45.45 33.93 -80.29 -269.64 
0.70 -1076.54 -939.66 -844.40 -944.32 -1393.16 
 
0.99 
0.01 504.20 516.20 533.58 546.73 554.76 
0.20 468.36 473.50 454.63 383.87 321.64 
0.50 54.90 71.82 80.19 -42.59 -258.28 
0.70 -1010.10 -939.20 -793.50 -889.19 -1381.81 
profit12  
0.75 
0.01 879.27 894.76 910.82 923.46 931.83 
0.20 787.05 808.71 757.12 627.02 513.84 
0.50 383.47 426.68 337.32 26.97 -420.51 
0.70 -619.45 -496.58 -518.52 -975.48 -2112.65 
 
0.99 
0.01 900.23 918.51 943.40 961.61 973.08 
0.20 867.62 880.96 833.39 684.94 555.09 
0.50 482.31 497.09 431.44 107.05 -380.19 
0.70 -517.16 -448.56 -416.90 -850.88 -2071.40 
profit24  
0.75 
0.01 1333.00 1350.85 1366.93 1377.39 1384.23 
0.20 1232.72 1264.81 1173.45 953.04 772.59 
0.50 837.32 893.77 709.53 152.77 -570.21 
0.70 -162.66 -31.63 -162.77 -970.71 -2890.43 
 
0.99 
0.01 1345.88 1368.62 1396.12 1413.96 1425.49 
0.20 1309 .91 1337.50 1253.01 1013.11 813.85 
0.50 939.63 968.52 816.40 239.91 -528.95 
0.70 -41.05 24.42 -45.59 -836.98 -2849.18 
profit36  
0.75 
0.01 1515.24 1534.53 1550.06 1559.31 1565.47 
0.20 1413.40 1449.60 1340.87 1084.04 877.10 
0.50 1016.66 1080.72 858.42 205.26 -618.29 
0.70 16.00 157.23 -21.56 -968.08 -3120.86 
 
0.99 
0.01 1524.80 1549.13 1577.09 1595.06 1606.73 
0.20 1488.08 1521.66 1420.31 1144.29 918.35 
0.50 1117.35 1155.27 966.08 292.77 -577.04 
0.70 137.00 212.36 96.68 -833.65 -3079.61 
profit48  
0.75 
0.01 1588.15 1607.43 1622.95 1631.89 1637.73 
0.20 1485.05 1523.20 1407.22 1135.94 917.54 
0.50 1088.39 1155.41 917.83 225.19 -641.01 
0.70 87.60 232.74 35.38 -964.31 -3207.49 
 
0.99 
0.01 1605.95 1630.56 1658.33 1675.65 1686.94 
0.20 1569.33 1604.73 1495.75 1204.71 966.74 
0.50 1198.30 1239.64 1034.92 321.44 -591.81 
0.70 218.20 297.61 163.29 -820.88 -3158.29 
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Table A14: Profit regression coefficients by quality level, probability of disruption and 
order allocation 
 
profit newSqlty pdisrupt 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6  
0.75 
0.01 68.36 0.83 43.37 45.37 0 
0.20 19.92 -36.83 13.37 31.73 0 
0.50 11.53 -25.92 4.64 17.44 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit12  
0.75 
0.01 81.33 24.25 69.03 86.45 0 
0.20 21.72 -24.23 25.34 66.68 0 
0.50 2.51 -23.33 6.56 43.58 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit24  
0.75 
0.01 108.74 38..27 88.00 97.15 0 
0.20 44.43 -16.65 37.62 73.65 0 
0.50 19.30 -18.70 10.34 46.58 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit36  
0.75 
0.01 111.84 40.54 91.21 98.68 0 
0.20 46.06 -16.93 38.80 74.17 0 
0.50 20.30 -19.40 10.60 46.91 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
profit48  
0.75 
0.01 112.80 41.74 92.53 99.68 0 
0.20 46.33 -16.66 39.37 74.66 0 
0.50 20.70 -19.35 10.82 47.18 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0 
0.70 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Table A15: Sum of squares for ANOVA to evaluate interaction between purchase and 
allocate. 
 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv ** ** ** ** ** 
maxin ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** 
newSqlty * ** ** ** ** 
inspect ** ** ** ** ** 
pdetect ^ NS NS NS NS 
failcost NS NS NS NS NS 
rate ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt*allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt*purchase ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate*purchase ** * * * * 
pdisrupt*allocate*purchase * ^ ** ** ** 
R-square 0.6832 0.7143 0.7012 0.7278 0.7375 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
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Table A16: Mean profit by order allocation and purchase price 
 
Table A17: Profit regression coefficients by order allocation and purchase price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Profit purchase 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6 3 242.31 269.50 280.46 192.52 2.85 
 5 -275.12 -224.27 -178.06 -224.61 -396.05 
profit12 3 744.00 771.56 727.25 492.62 67.79 
 5 46.84 98.83 92.26 -116.45 -570.52 
profit24 3 1291.82 1327.18 1225.40 823.08 166.39 
 5 46.84 98.83 92.26 -116.45 -570.52 
profit36 3 1510.51 1551.82 1425.38 954.54 205.57 
 5 546.65 613.30 521.60 65.21 -812.60 
profit48 3 1602.84 1646.27 1509.45 1011.01 225.12 
 5 607.40 676.57 574.47 91.40 -822.53 
Profit purchase 0.0 allocate 0.2 allocate 0.5 allocate 0.8 allocate 1.0 allocate 
profit6 3 309.23 243.63 146.31 23.72 0 
 5 0 0 0 0 0 
profit12 3 25.07 -43.17 -143.34 -188.10 0 
 5 0 0 0 0 0 
profit24 3 -386.86 -453.53 -555.57 -571.79 0 
 5 0 0 0 0 0 
profit36 3 -361.02 -428.96 -526.85 -549.57 0 
 5 0 0 0 0 0 
profit48 3 -350.30 -418.87 -517.10 -544.62 0 
 5 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A18: Mean profit and regression coefficients by probability of disruption and 
purchase price 
 
 
 
 
Table A19: Mean profit and regression coefficients for different levels of rate 
 
 Means Coefficients 
Profit rate (0.1) rate (0.5) rate (0.9) rate (0.1) rate (0.5) rate 
(0.9) 
profit6 -45.50 -47.12 -0.51 -44.99 -46.61 0 
profit12 144.46 198.09 363.71 -219.25 -165.62 0 
profit24 324.19 554.77 724.43 -400.24 -169.66 0 
profit36 400.97 702.02 871.61 -470.63 -169.59 0 
profit48 445.34 760.85 930.41 -485.07 -169.56 0 
  Means Coefficients 
Profit pdisrupt purchase (3) purchase (5) purchase (3) purchase (5) 
profit6 0.01 695.76 361.56 -393.39 0 
 0.20 543.11 266.48 -471.33 0 
 0.50 136.87 -209.77 -445.89 0 
 0.70 -585.63 -1456.75 0 0 
profit12 0.01 1191.39 656.00 -608.07 0 
 0.20 964.94 498.21 -696.97 0 
 0.50 451.83 -73.50 -718.78 0 
 0.70 -365.58 -1439.93 0 0 
profit24 0.01 1745.94 1006.56 -990.92 0 
 0.20 1444.36 780.43 -1086.37 0 
 0.50 803.96 87.77 -1079.14 0 
 0.70 -127.16 -1466.15 0 0 
profit36 0.01 1968.23 1147.34 -960.62 0 
 0.20 1636.95 894.54 -1059.82 0 
 0.50 947.76 151.68 -1046.27 0 
 0.70 -34.67 -1446.23 0 0 
profit48 0.01 2061.06 1208.06 -949.00 0 
 0.20 1718.03 944.01 -1047.85 0 
 0.50 1008.62 181.04 -1034.54 0 
 0.70 8.05 -1431.28 0 0 
 
 
150 
 
Table A20: Mean profit and regression coefficients for minimum inventory levels by 
pdisrupt 
 
 
 
  
  Means Coefficients 
Profit pdisrupt mininv = 2 mininv = 8 mininv = 2 mininv = 8 
profit6 0.01 535.86 521.46 28.42 0 
 0.20 386.90 422.68 -40.59 0 
 0.50 -77.82 4.92 -81.11 0 
 0.70 -1186.30 -856.08 -388.64 0 
profit12 0.01 937.91 909.49 44.37 0 
 0.20 711.28 751.87 -42.73 0 
 0.50 148.61 229.72 -100.48 0 
 0.70 -1097.08 -708.43 -482.41 0 
profit24 0.01 1398.43 1354.06 44.37 0 
 0.20 1091.03 1133.76 -42.73 0 
 0.50 395.63 496.10 -100.48 0 
 0.70 -1037.86 -555.45 -482.41 0 
profit36 0.01 1583.22 1532.34 50.88 0 
 0.20 1244.53 1286.96 -42.43 0 
 0.50 497.89 601.55 -103.66 0 
 0.70 -982.77 -498.13 -484.64 0 
profit48 0.01 1661.42 1607.70 -53.73 0 
 0.20 1309.57 1352.48 -42.91 0 
 0.50 542.07 647.59 -105.51 0 
 0.70 -953.55 -469.68 -483.87 0 
 
 
151 
 
Table A21: Mean profit and regression coefficients for maximum inventory levels by 
pdisrupt 
 
 
  
  Means Coefficients 
Profit pdisrupt maxinv = 10 maxinv = 30 maxinv = 10 maxinv = 30 
profit6 0.01 504.36 552.96 -80.39 0 
 0.20 380.81 428.78 -91.29 0 
 0.50 -46.49 -26.41 -39.07 0 
 0.70 -1165.66 -876.71 -339.55 0 
profit12 0.01 883.50 963.89 -114.00 0 
 0.20 685.93 777.22 -130.55 0 
 0.50 169.63 208.70 -68.90 0 
 0.70 -1072.53 -732.98 -419.54 0 
profit24 0.01 1319.25 1433.25 -114.00 0 
 0.20 1047.13 1177.67 -130.55 0 
 0.50 411.42 480.31 -68.90 0 
 0.70 -1006.43 -586.89 -419.54 0 
profit36 0.01 1493.62 1621.94 -128.32 0 
 0.20 1192.29 1339.20 -146.90 0 
 0.50 509.73 589.71 -79.97 0 
 0.70 -951.57 -529.33 -422.24 0 
profit48 0.01 1567.46 1701.65 -134.19 0 
 0.20 1254.30 1407.75 -153.45 0 
 0.50 552.89 636.77 -83.88 0 
 0.70 -922.82 -500.41 -422.42 0 
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Table B1: Sum of squares for ANOVA to compare supplier development policies 
 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
policy ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv ** ** * * * 
maxinv ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*pdisrupt*newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** 
      
R-square 0.8020 0.7429 0.7130 0.7055 0.7035 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
 
Table B2: Mean profit and regression coefficients for different supplier development 
policies 
 
 Means Coefficients 
 
policy 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspection 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspection 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 71.54 435.34 363.25 84.27 85.12 0 
profit12 172.01 767.62 712.95 110.28 106.27 0 
profit24 254.56 1100.74 1096.49 118.17 107.52 0 
profit36 288.06 1234.01 1251.47 121.08 107.35 0 
profit48 301.15 1287.25 1315.83 116.57 102.32 0 
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Table B3: Sum of squares for ANOVA to compare supplier development policies 
(NSDcost equals 50, failcost equals 1 or 10) 
 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
policy ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv ** ** ** ** ** 
maxinv ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** 
failcost * * * * * 
policy*pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*newSqlty * * * * * 
policy*pdisrupt*newSqlty NS NS NS NS NS 
      
R-square 0.6910 0.6787 0.6293 0.6385 0.6422                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
 
Table B4: Cost and profit means and regression coefficients for different supplier 
development policies (NSDcost equals 50, failcost equals 1 or 10). 
 Means Coefficients 
 Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspection 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspection 
Supplier 
development 
cost6 1094.34 1074.04 1270.60 -147.16 -147.75 0 
cost12 1581.71 1563.75 1822.36 -216.42 -199.68 0 
cost24 2104.08 2088.99 2367.32 -233.75 -202.57 0 
cost36 2313.67 2298.70 2584.00 -238.81 -203.66 0 
cost48 2396.94 2381.89 2665.65 -236.36 -199.57 0 
profit6 208.78 219.09 -31.05 484.30 360.01 0 
profit12 549.74 549.72 235.42 585.14 427.78 0 
profit24 879.38 873.29 534.46 669.39 483.35 0 
profit36 1009.54 1002.23 658.20 688.70 491.21 0 
profit48 1061.65 1053.87 712.20 685.97 484.11 0 
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Table B5: Mean profit and regression coefficients for new supplier quality levels 
 
 Means Coefficients 
newSqlty 0.75 0.99 0.75 0.99 
profit6 288.50 437.61 -123.90 0 
profit12 577.30 810.69 -165.89 0 
profit24 896.74 1199.19 -177.55 0 
profit36 1026.68 1354.70 -178.22 0 
profit48 1078.58 1420.25 -183.39 0 
 
 
Table B6: Mean profit and regression coefficients by quality level of new supplier for 
different supplier development policies 
 
  Policy Means Policy Coefficients 
cumulative 
profit 
newSqlty Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.75 -365.64 364.36 317.72 -999.31 -58.33 0 
0.99 508.73 506.32 408.78 0 0 0 
profit12 0.75 -555.43 641.44 650.31 -1522.96 -152.15 0 
0.99 899.45 893.80 775.59 0 0 0 
profit24 0.75 -786.30 917.01 1030.23 -2184.90 -287.01 0 
0.99 1295.42 1284.47 1162.74 0 0 0 
profit36 0.75 -877.90 1027.23 1185.21 -2456.30 -344.88 0 
0.99 1454.01 1440.80 1317.73 0 0 0 
profit48 0.75 -914.63 1071.25 1247.13 -2559.87 -363.14 0 
0.99 1516.93 1503.25 1384.53 0 0 0 
 
  
 
 
156 
 
Table B7: Mean profit and regression coefficients by probability of disruption for 
different supplier development policies 
 
  Means Coefficients 
cumulative 
profit 
 
pdisrupt 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.01 377.27 678.87 599.90 23.27 14.39 0 
0.20 239.06 557.51 476.15 23.79 22.91 0 
0.50 -401.69 69.64 13.70 0 0 0 
profit12 0.01 547.35 1098.71 1028.45 20.40 15.04 0 
0.20 345.39 899.46 835.89 20.36 20.79 0 
0.50 -376.69 304.70 274.51 0 0 0 
profit24 0.01 733.15 1535.12 1501.69 22.45 19.85 0 
0.20 454.78 1253.05 1237.73 21.08 22.79 0 
0.50 -424.24 514.05 550.04 0 0 0 
profit36 0.01 809.50 1710.14 1692.68 23.05 22.10 0 
0.20 499.48 1394.73 1399.48 22.55 25.06 0 
0.50 -444.82 597.16 662.25 0 0 0 
profit48 0.01 840.34 1780.15 1771.20 24.21 23.36 0 
0.20 516.86 1451.24 1466.68 23.27 25.83 0 
0.50 -453.75 630.36 709.61 0 0 0 
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Table B8: Mean cost and regression coefficients by probability of disruption for different 
supplier development policies 
 
  Means Coefficients 
cumulative 
profit 
 
pdisrupt 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
cost6 0.01 1124.51 825.92 911.04 -21.19 -16.82 0 
0.20 1106.91 778.68 862.27 -20.65 -18.52 0 
0.50 1633.61 1143.82 1207.53 0 0 0 
cost12 0.01 1884.51 1340.21 1412.03 -17.66 -13.20 0 
0.20 1859.39 1292.82 1359.50 -13.86 -14.56 0 
0.50 2388.29 1680.89 1727.62 0 0 0 
cost24 0.01 2651.01 1856.77 1889.41 -20.17 -15.86 0 
0.20 2635.14 1823.52 1843.10 -15.75 -16.43 0 
0.50 3245.75 2274.34 2261.18 0 0 0 
cost36 0.01 2952.32 2059.30 2075.67 -21.26 -17.89 0 
0.20 2943.72 2034.63 2033.98 -17.06 -18.21 0 
0.50 3590.32 2512.37 2472.49 0 0 0 
cost48 0.01 3071.43 2139.31 2146.83 -22.14 -18.88 0 
0.20 3066.92 2118.68 2107.31 -17.62 -18.86 0 
0.50 3727.89 2606.97 2553.88 0 0 0 
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Table B9: Mean profit and regression coefficients by probability of disruption and new 
supplier quality level for different supplier development policies 
 
   Means Coefficients 
profit newS 
qlty 
 
pdisrupt 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6  
0.75 
0.01   14.27 625.51 567.06 397.21 75.51 58.23 
0.20 -147.89 489.05 434.36 349.31 45.32 40.31 
0.50 -963.30 -21.48 -48.26 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 740.27 732.24 632.73 0 0 0 
0.20 626.01 625.97 517.95 0 0 0 
0.50 159.92 160.76 75.65 0 0 0 
profit12  
0.75 
0.01 -110.79 1001.30 982.10 372.58 123.24 73.19 
0.20 -334.37 777.35 777.27 329.33 73.83 48.65 
0.50 -1221.12 145.68 191.56 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 1205.48 1196.11 1074.80 0 0 0 
0.20 1025.15 1021.57 894.51 0 0 0 
0.50 467.73 463.72 357.45 0 0 0 
profit24  
0.75 
0.01 -223.71 1393.50 1454.00 448.73 181.31 82.16 
0.20 -529.73 1075.75 1175.42 393.43 109.96 52.93 
0.50 -1605.46 281.78 461.27 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 1690.00 1676.75 1549.38 0 0 0 
0.20 1439.29 1430.34 1300.04 0 0 0 
0.50 756.98 746.33 638.81 0 0 0 
profit36  
0.75 
0.01 -265.04 1550.92 1645.44 485.43 204.66 83.75 
0.20 -606.57 1195.15 1337.06 422.43 123.95 53.39 
0.50 -1762.08 335.61 573.14 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 1884.05 1869.37 1739.92 0 0 0 
0.20 1605.53 1594.31 1461.89 0 0 0 
0.50 872.44 858.72 751.37 0 0 0 
profit48  
0.75 
0.01 -280.80 1613.92 1721.69 500.98 214.08 84.38 
0.20 -637.70 1242.74 1401.78 434.14 129.53 53.59 
0.50 -1825.39 357.09 617.92 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 1961.48 1946.38 1820.70 0 0 0 
0.20 1671.42 1659.74 1531.58 0 0 0 
0.50 917.88 903.62 801.31 0 0 0 
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Table B10: Sum of squares for ANOVA to compare supplier development policies for 
low and high rate of improvement 
  
 Low rate (0.10) High rate (0.90) 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
policy ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv * * NS NS NS * * NS NS NS 
maxinv ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*pdisrupt ** * * * * ** ** * * * 
policy*newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*pdisrupt*newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
           
R-square 0.7790 0.7242 0.6967 0.6895 0.6872 0.7934 0.7389 0.7110 0.7037 0.7012 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
 
Table B11: Mean cost and profit for low and high rates of improvement across all 
supplier development policies. 
 
 Low rate (0.10) High rate (0.90) 
 
 
 
Do 
nothing 
 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
cost6 1288.34 916.14 1020.05 1288.34 916.14 961.75 
cost12 2044.06 1437.97 1586.01 2044.06 1437.97 1402.60 
cost24 2843.97 1984.88 2158.92 2843.97 1984.88 1862.00 
cost36 3162.12 2202.10 2382.61 3162.12 2202.10 2044.42 
cost48 3288.75 2288.32 2463.60 3288.75 2288.32 2116.88 
profit6 71.54 435.34 334.07 71.54 435.34 396.52 
profit12 172.01 767.62 624.66 172.01 767.62 810.91 
profit24 254.56 1100.74 934.24 254.56 1100.74 1232.82 
profit36 288.06 1234.01 1061.87 288.06 1234.01 1401.43 
profit48 301.15 1287.25 1120.59 301.15 1287.25 1468.61 
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Table B12: Cost and profit regression coefficients for low and high rates of improvement 
across all supplier development policies. 
 
 Low rate (0.10) High rate (0.90) 
 
 
 
Do 
nothing 
 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
cost6 -98.12 -98.53 0 -62.29 -62.69 0 
cost12 -177.10 -172.59 0 -41.83 -37.33 0 
cost24 -253.66 -244.55 0 -13.70 -4.59 0 
cost36 -283.68 -272.18 0 -2.23 9.26 0 
cost48 -279.98 -267.91 0 2.52 14.59 0 
profit6 97.15 98.00 0 60.80 61.65 0 
profit12 174.65 170.64 0 38.83 34.82 0 
profit24 252.28 241.63 0 11.82 1.17 0 
profit36 282.83 269.10 0 0.92 -12.81 0 
profit48 279.03 264.77 0 -3.94 -18.20 0 
 
Table B13: Mean profit by new supplier quality for different supplier development 
policies and rates of improvement. 
 
  Low rate (0.10) High rate (0.90) 
cumulative 
profit 
 
newSqlty 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.75 -365.64 364.36 271.98 -365.64 364.36 361.04 
0.99 508.73 506.32 396.17 508.73 506.32 432.00 
profit12 0.75 -555.43 641.44 537.24 -555.43 641.44 774.33 
0.99 899.45 893.80 712.09 899.45 893.80 847.49 
profit24 0.75 -786.30 917.01 837.44 -786.30 917.01 1196.89 
0.99 1295.42 1287.47 1031.03 1295.42 1284.47 1268.76 
profit36 0.75 -877.90 1027.23 964.70 -877.90 1027.23 1365.64 
0.99 1454.01 1440.80 1159.04 1454.01 1440.80 1437.23 
profit48 0.75 -914.63 1071.25 1016.00 -914.63 1071.25 1432.84 
0.99 1516.93 1503.25 1225.17 1516.93 1503.25 1504.37 
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Table B14: Profit regressions coefficients by new supplier quality for different supplier 
development policies and rates of improvement. 
 
  Low rate (0.10) High rate (0.90) 
cumulative 
profit 
 
newSqlty 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.75 -960.89 -19.91 0 -1024.62 -83.64 0 
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
profit12 0.75 -1460.06 -89.26 0 -1586.75 -215.94 0 
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
profit24 0.75 -2105.17 -207.28 0 -2260.32 -362.43 0 
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
profit36 0.75 -2375.06 -263.65 0 -2532.48 -421.06 0 
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
profit48 0.75 -2468.31 -271.58 0 -2641.21 -444.48 0 
0.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table B15: Mean profit by probability of disruption and new supplier quality level for 
different supplier development policies comparing low and high rate of improvement. 
 
     Low rate (0.1) High rate (0.9) 
profit newSqlty  
pdisrupt 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Supplier 
development 
profit6  
0.75 
0.01 14.27 625.51 529.82 603.00 
0.20 -147.89 489.05 385.68 479.61 
0.50 -963.30 -21.48 -99.57 0.52 
 
0.99 
0.01 740.27 732.24 620.49 655.68 
0.20 626.01 625.97 505.26 541.21 
0.50 159.92 160.76 62.76 99.12 
profit12  
0.75 
0.01 -110.79 1001.30 885.05 1093.58 
0.20 -334.37 777.35 662.37 902.62 
0.50 -1221.12 145.68 64.30 326.80 
 
0.99 
0.01 1205.48 1196.11 1012.60 1147.20 
0.20 1025.15 1021.57 830.58 966.36 
0.50 467.73 463.72 293.09 428.90 
profit24  
0.75 
0.01 -223.71 1393.50 1283.16 1604.82 
0.20 -529.73 1075.75 981.72 1342.81 
0.50 -1605.46 281.78 247.43 643.04 
 
0.99 
0.01 1690.00 1676.75 1420.00 1655.38 
0.20 1439.29 1430.34 1168.41 1405.73 
0.50 756.98 746.33 504.70 745.16 
profit36  
0.75 
0.01 -265.04 1550.92 1448.26 1809.20 
0.20 -606.57 1195.15 1115.70 1518.24 
0.50 -1762.08 335.61 330.16 769.48 
 
0.99 
0.01 1884.05 1869.37 1584.02 1859.18 
0.20 1605.53 1594.31 1303.47 1580.98 
0.50 872.45 858.72 589.62 871.52 
profit48  
0.75 
0.01 -280.80 1613.92 1514.31 1890.48 
0.20 -637.70 1242.74 1169.79 1588.27 
0.50 -1825.39 357.09 363.90 819.77 
 
0.99 
0.01 1961.48 1946.38 1664.12 1940.31 
0.20 1671.42 1659.74 1372.54 1650.98 
0.50 917.88 903.62 638.85 921.82 
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Table B16: Profit regression coefficients by probability of disruption and new supplier 
quality level for different supplier development policies comparing low and high rate of 
improvement. 
 
     Low rate (0.1) High rate (0.9) 
profit newSqlty  
pdisrupt 
Do 
nothing 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
Supplier 
development 
profit6  
0.75 
0.01 397.21 75.51 71.66 45.92 
0.20 349.31 45.32 42.74 37.00 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
profit12  
0.75 
0.01 372.58 123.24 101.23 48.49 
0.20 329.33 73.83 60.58 38.37 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
profit24  
0.75 
0.01 448.73 181.31 120.43 51.56 
0.20 393.43 109.96 70.59 39.20 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
profit36  
0.75 
0.01 485.43 204.66 123.70 52.07 
0.20 422.43 123.95 71.68 39.30 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
profit48  
0.75 
0.01 500.98 214.08 125.14 52.23 
0.20 434.14 129.53 72.20 39.34 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
 
0.99 
0.01 0 0 0 0 
0.20 0 0 0 0 
0.50 0 0 0 0 
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Table B17: Sum of squares for ANOVA to compare supplier development policies that 
include 100% inspection of incoming components. 
 
Source profit6 profit12 profit24 profit36 profit48 
policy ** ** NS NS * 
pdisrupt ** ** ** ** ** 
mininv ** ** ** * * 
maxinv ** ** ** ** ** 
purchase ** ** ** ** ** 
bocost ** ** ** ** ** 
allocate ** ** ** ** ** 
newSqlty ** ** ** ** ** 
inspect ** ** ** ** ** 
pdetect ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*inspect NS ^ * * * 
policy*pdetect ** ** ** ** ** 
policy*inspect*pdetect NS NS NS NS NS 
      
R-square 0.8518 0.7876 0.7489 0.7386 0.7359 
NS = not significant for α=0.10,  ^pvalue < 0.10, * pvalue < 0.05, **pvalue < 0.0001 
 
Table B18: Mean profit and regression coefficients for cost of inspection. 
 
 Means Coefficients 
inspect 0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 
profit6 418.74 343.80 75.25 0 
profit12 782.74 670.50 107.52 0 
profit24 1168.14 1026.96 127.17 0 
profit36 1323.12 1171.09 134.08 0 
profit48 1386.47 1230.90 135.78 0 
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Table B19: Mean profit and regression coefficients for different inspect cost for all 
supplier development policies that includes 100% inspection of incoming components. 
 
  Means Coefficients 
 
profit 
 
inspect 
 
100% inspect 
Supplier 
development 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.01 473.44 400.51 2.01 0 
1.00 397.25 325.99 0 0 
profit12 0.01 832.16 766.26 23.90 0 
1.00 703.09 659.63 0 0 
profit24 0.01 1193.75 1159.60 62.51 0 
1.00 1007.74 1033.37 0 0 
profit36 0.01 1338.38 1318.04 78.83 0 
1.00 1129.65 1184.90 0 0 
profit48 0.01 1396.13 1383.25 86.38 0 
1.00 1178.37 1248.41 0 0 
 
 
Table B20: Mean profit and regression coefficients for probability of detection. 
 
 Means Coefficients 
pdetect 0.65 0.99 0.65 0.99 
profit6 330.96 431.58 -84.45 0 
profit12 657.36 795.87 -101.66 0 
profit24 1011.70 1183.40 -110.11 0 
profit36 1155.54 1338.67 -111.18 0 
profit48 1215.00 1402.41 -111.34 0 
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Table B21: Mean profit and regression coefficients for detection for policies that include 
100% inspection of incoming components. 
 
  Means Coefficients 
 
profit 
 
pdetect 
 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
100% 
inspect 
Supplier 
development 
profit6 0.65 361.86 320.66 -61.47 0 
0.99 508.83 405.84 0 0 
profit12 0.65 644.43 661.67 -142.38 0 
0.99 890.81 764.22 0 0 
profit24 0.65 923.93 1040.96 -239.85 0 
0.99 1277.56 1152.01 0 0 
profit36 0.65 1035.95 1195.41 -280.76 0 
0.99 1432.08 1307.53 0 0 
profit48 0.65 1080.75 1259.69 -297.26 0 
0.99 1493.74 1371.97 0 0 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ESTIMATED REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
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Table C1: Cost and profit regression equations for analyzing order allocation and supplier 
quality 
 
cost6 = 2127.59 – 780.99X1,1 – 824.51 X1,2 – 536.81X1,3 – 348.51X2 
 + 445.78X3,1 + 298.70X3,2 + 125.71X3,3 + 69.07X3,4 – 20.22X4 – 44.56X5 
 – 406.86X6 + 11.36X7 + – 54.99X8 + 14.18X9 – 11.32X10 + 41.37X11,1 
 + 46.72X11,2 – 387.35X12,1 – 252.36X12,2 – 97.31X12,3 – 58.00X12,4  
– 390.17X12,5 – 260.13X12,6 – 105.49X12,7 – 60.44X12,8 – 277.34X12,9  
– 190.53X12,10 – 78.96X12,11 – 49.56X12,12 + 0X13,1 – 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 
 – 30.71X14,1 – 23.38X14,2 + 23.27X14,3 + 12.69X14,4 + 61.23X15,1  
+ 45.02 X15,2 –12.49X15,3 – 9.46X15,4 + 47.81X15,5 + 36.65X15,6 – 14.18X15,7 – 9.47 X15,8 + 
19.26 X15,9  + 18.51 X15,10– 14.63 X15,11  – 7.01X15,12  
 
cost12 = 3149.91 – 1215.41X1,1 – 1224.44 X1,2 – 795.83X1,3 – 529.26X2  
 – 82.81X3,1 – 231.73X3,2 – 361.61X3,3 – 242.25X3,4 – 22.51X4 – 32.23X5  
– 561.42X6 + 41.26X7 + – 85.50X8 + 15.69X9 – 13.01X10 + 217.13X11,1  
 + 167.09X11,2 + 168.65X12,1 + 299.18X12,2 + 402.82X12,3 + 258.43X12,4  
 + 103.37X12,5 + 226.84X12,6 + 339.09X12,7 + 225.79X12,8 + 24.87X12,9  
 + 113.92X12,10 + 205.47X12,11 + 138.50X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 
  – 21.54X14,1 – 10.00X14,2 + 39.92X14,3 + 39.41X14,4 + 39.05X15,1  
 + 21.01X15,2 – 34.92X15,3 – 37.81X15,4 + 43.31X15,5 + 28.55X15,6  
 – 24.18X15,7 – 31.66X15,8 + 27.67X15,9 + 21.47X15,10  – 17.21X15,11  
  – 21.52X15,12  
 
cost24 = 4237.48 – 1686.62X1,1 – 1649.98 X1,2 – 1058.06X1,3 – 726.58X2  
 – 590.58X3,1 – 734.79X3,2 – 802.16X3,3 – 541.18X3,4 – 22.53X4  
  – 17.20X5 – 726.40X6 + 41.26X7 + – 104.19X8 + 16.78X9 – 13.90X10  
 + 397.29X11,1  + 170.36X11,2 + 690.75X12,1 + 812.45X12,2 + 849.00X12,3 
  + 559.73X12,4  + 562.49X12,5 + 669.93X12,6 + 730.76X12,7 + 503.05X12,8  
 + 313.41X12,9  + 387.86X12,10 + 454.45X12,11 + 327.69X12,12 + 0X13,1  
  + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 4.68X14,1 + 4.19X14,2 + 52.04X14,3 + 46.00X14,4  
  + 8.80X15,1 - 3.31X15,2 – 52.31X15,3 – 46.30X15,4  + 24.21X15,5   
 + 15.50X15,6 – 32.91X15,7 – 36.43X15,8 + 15.98X15,9 + 13.57X15,10  
  – 20.88X15,11   – 23.77X15,12  
 
cost36 = 4673.29 – 1880.26X1,1 – 1823.14 X1,2 – 1169.96X1,3 – 805.30X2  
 – 783.84X3,1 – 934.77X3,2 – 977.09X3,3 – 656.59X3,4 – 24.19X4  
  – 10.50X5 – 789.59X6 + 41.26X7 – 110.16X8 + 17.06X9 – 14.03X10  
 + 467.91X11,1  + 170.29X11,2 + 889.80X12,1 + 1016.52X12,2  
 + 1026.18X12,3 + 676.12X12,4 + 735.46X12,5 + 844.74X12,6  
 + 886.68X12,7 + 610.06X12,8  + 424.76X12,9  + 499.91X12,10  
 + 557.83X12,11 + 402.89X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 6.24X14,1  
 + 4.69X14,2 + 52.67X14,3 + 46.55X14,4 + 5.06X15,1 - 7.88X15,2  
 – 55.02X15,3 – 47.68X15,4  + 23.85X15,5  + 14.69X15,6  
 – 33.42X15,7 – 36.85X15,8 + 16.70X15,9 + 13.20X15,10  – 21.12X15,11  
  – 24.00X15,12  
 
cost48 = 4842.56 – 1957.57X1,1 – 1891.23 X1,2 – 1212.51X1,3 – 836.95X2  
 – 862.53X3,1 –1015.91X3,2 – 1048.09X3,3 – 703.31X3,4 – 24.23X4  
  – 7.40X5 – 814.91X6 + 49.20X7 – 112.56X8 + 17.12X9 – 14.06X10  
 + 482.40X11,1  + 170.26X11,2 + 969.06X12,1 + 1097.86X12,2  
 + 1097.12X12,3 + 722.84X12,4 + 803.54X12,5 + 913.85X12,6  
 + 949.00X12,7 + 652.70X12,8  + 467.23X12,9  + 542.85X12,10  
 + 597.65X12,11 + 432.38X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 4.82X14,1  
 + 6.54X14,2 + 54.35X14,3 + 47.64X14,4 + 3.95X15,1 - 9.34X15,2  
 – 56.30X15,3 – 48.63X15,4  + 23.89X15,5  + 14.34X15,6  
 – 33.93X15,7 – 37.38X15,8 + 16.86X15,9 + 13.12X15,10  – 21.35X15,11  
   – 24.29X15,12  
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profit6 = - 1821.58 + 1936.57X1,1 + 1703.45 X1,2 + 1123.52X1,3 + 457.15X2  
 + 371.70X3,1 + 442.60X3,2 + 588.31X3,3 + 492.61X3,4 – 108.59X4  
  – 101.40X5 + 522.89X6 – 11.36X7 + 172.73X8 – 13.93X9 – 11.76X10  
 - 44.99X11,1 – 46.61X11,2 – 422.27X12,1 – 481.15X12,2  
 - 609.49X12,3 – 500.65X12,4 – 224.99X12,5 – 290.74X12,6  
 - 455.32X12,7 – 430.39X12,8 – 58.52X12,9  – 112.50X12,10  
 - 249.84X12,11 – 276.92X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 55.08X14,1  
 + 10.90X14,2 – 39.54X14,3 – 43.77X14,4 + 68.36X15,1 + 0.83X15,2  
 + 45.37X15,3 + 45.37X15,4  + 19.92X15,5  - 36.83X15,6  
 + 13.37X15,7 + 31.73X15,8 + 11.53X15,9 – 25.92X15,10  + 4.64X15,11  
   + 17.44X15,12 
 
profit12 = - 2589.06 + 3044.48X1,1 + 2626.49X1,2 + 1691.21X1,3 + 650.45X2  
 + 1554.24X3,1 + 1622.84X3,2 + 1654.49X3,3 + 1220.51X3,4 – 120.48X4  
  – 137.58X5 + 689.07X6 – 41.26X7 + 212.07X8 – 15.05X9 + 13.42X10  
 - 219.25X11,1 – 165.62X11,2 – 1627.09X12,1 – 1677.42X12,2  
 - 1684.17X12,3 – 1231.99X12,4 – 1241.71X12,5 – 1296.98X12,6  
 - 1376.20X12,7 – 1090.67X12,8 – 691.74X12,9  - 745.56X12,10  
 - 842.86X12,11 – 733.27X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 61.03X14,1  
 - 6.77X14,2 – 60.36X14,3 – 83.34X14,4 + 81.33X15,1 + 24.28X15,2  
 + 69.03X15,3 + 86.45X15,4  + 21.72X15,5  - 24.23X15,6  
 + 25.34X15,7 + 66.68X15,8 + 2.51X15,9 - 23.33X15,10  + 6.56X15,11  
   + 43.58X15,12 
 
profit24 = - 3487.74 + 4274.66X1,1 + 3663.02X1,2 + 2320.22X1,3 + 864.62X2  
 + 2808.12X3,1 + 2873.59X3,2 + 2803.59X3,3 + 2012.19X3,4 – 145.31X4  
  – 183.25X5 + 871.10X6 – 41.26X7 + 251.53X8 – 15.95X9 + 14.33X10  
 - 400.24X11,1 – 169.66X11,2 – 2887.73X12,1 – 2930.45X12,2  
 - 2832.96X12,3 – 2023.72X12,4 – 2312.06X12,5 – 2349.94X12,6  
 - 2364.43X12,7 – 1812.93X12,8 – 1339.53X12,9  - 1376.12X12,10  
 - 1458.26X12,11 – 1243.33X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 80.36X14,1  
 - 14.79X14,2 – 75.93X14,3 – 92.47X14,4 + 108.74X15,1 + 38.27X15,2  
 + 88.00X15,3 + 97.15X15,4  + 44.43X15,5  - 16.65X15,6  
 + 37.62X15,7 + 73.65X15,8 + 19.30X15,9 – 18.70X15,10  + 10.34X15,11  
    + 46.58X15,12 
 
profit36 = - 3762.53 + 4686.34X1,1 + 3997.96X1,2 + 2502.57X1,3 + 942.73X2  
 + 3216.60X3,1 + 3291.97X3,2 + 3176.28X3,3 + 2245.95X3,4 – 144.96X4  
  – 194.36X5 + 933.84X6 – 41.26X7 + 257.15X8 – 16.20X9 + 14.46X10  
 - 470.63X11,1 – 169.59X11,2 – 3298.53X12,1 – 3349.57X12,2  
 - 3205.92X12,3 – 2257.63X12,4 – 2646.87X12,5 – 2688.66X12,6  
 - 2674.32X12,7 – 2020.02X12,8 – 1522.21X12,9  - 1559.67X12,10  
 - 1633.19X12,11 – 1376.15X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 79.74X14,1  
 - 13.88X14,2 – 76.99X14,3 – 93.17X14,4 + 111.84X15,1 + 40.54X15,2  
 + 91.21X15,3 + 98.68X15,4  + 46.06X15,5  - 16.93X15,6  
 + 38.80X15,7 + 74.17X15,8 + 20.30X15,9 – 19.40X15,10  + 10.60X15,11  
   + 46.91X15,12 
 
profit48 = - 3862.72 + 4845.22X1,1 + 4125.03X1,2 + 2566.48X1,3 + 973.48X2  
 + 3376.49X3,1 + 3455.90X3,2 + 3321.58X3,3 + 2337.41X3,4 – 144.64X4  
  – 198.49X5 + 958.16X6 – 49.20X7 + 258.53X8 – 16.26X9 + 14.49X10  
 - 485.07X11,1 – 169.56X11,2 – 3457.47X12,1 – 3512.27X12,2  
 - 3350.19X12,3 – 2348.70X12,4 – 2773.91X12,5 – 2817.91X12,6  
 - 2792.57X12,7 – 2099.44X12,8 – 1586.39X12,9  - 1624.46X12,10  
 - 1694.85X12,11 – 1424.17X12,12 + 0X13,1 + 0X13, 2 + 0X13, 3 – 81.41X14,1  
 - 15.67X14,2 – 78.70X14,3 – 94.23X14,4 + 112.80X15,1 + 41.74X15,2  
 + 92.53X15,3 + 99.68X15,4  + 46.33X15,5  - 16.66X15,6  
 + 39.37X15,7 + 74.66X15,8 + 20.70X15,9 – 19.35X15,10  + 10.82X15,11  
   + 47.18X15,12 
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Table C2: Cost and profit regression equations for comparing supplier development 
policies. 
 
cost6 = 1327.36 – 85.55X1,1 – 85.95X1,2 – 289.31X2,1 - 331.40X2,2 + 12.76X3  
+ 4.41X4 – 331.91X5 -249.85X6 + 232.51X7,1 + 177.35X7,2 +  107.15X7,3   
+ 45.40X7,4 +  99.97X8 – 21.19X9,1 – 20.65X9,2 – 16.82X9,3 – 18.52X9,4  
 + 1023.25X10,1 + 44.48X10,2 – 397.21X11,1 – 349.31X11,2 – 23.55X11,3  
- 30.45X11,4   - 14.37X11,3 – 27.72X11,4     
 
cost12 = 1985.77 – 113.07X1,1 – 108.57X1,2 – 299.84X2,1 – 350.38X2,2 + 9.18X3  
+ 24.56X4 - 523.79X5 - 358.35X6 + 226.52X7,1 + 156.28X7,2 +  74.01X7,3   
+ 20.05X7,4 +  141.36X8 – 17.66X9,1 – 13.86X9,2 – 13.20X9,3 – 14.56X9,4  
 + 1547.49X10,1 + 123.68X10,2 – 372.58X11,1 – 329.33X11,2 – 55.28X11,3  
- 46.25X11,4   - 31.50X11,3 – 35.48X11,4     
 
cost24 = 2677.88 – 119.85X1,1 – 110.74X1,2 – 350.20X2,1 – 398.14X2,2 + 5.54X3  
+ 46.98X4 – 723.45X5 – 469.09X6 + 214.62X7,1 + 126.97X7,2 +  42.05X7,3   
- 1.17X7,4 +  153.61X8 – 20.17X9,1 – 15.75X9,2 – 15.86X9,3 – 16.43X9,4  
 + 2208.83X10,1 + 247.81X10,2 – 448.73X11,1 – 393.43X11,2 – 103.02X11,3  
- 72.53X11,4   - 43.14X11,3 – 39.90X11,4     
 
cost36 = 2955.39 – 122.21X1,1 – 110.72X1,2 – 374.02X2,1 – 418.32X2,2 + 3.87X3  
+ 55.48X4 – 803.18X5 – 511.74X6 + 207.63X7,1 + 112.68X7,2 +  28.02X7,3   
- 10.04X7,4 +  154.44X8 – 21.26X9,1 – 17.06X9,2 – 17.89X9,3 – 18.21X9,4  
 + 2480.08X10,1 + 301.19X10,2 – 485.43X11,1 – 422.43X11,2 – 122.31X11,3  
- 82.42X11,4   - 45.60X11,3 – 40.37X11,4     
 
cost48 = 3061.03 – 117.81X1,1 – 105.74X1,2 – 383.82X2,1 – 426.28X2,2 + 3.34X3  
+ 58.92X4 – 834.79X5 – 528.74X6 + 203.92X7,1 + 106.27X7,2 +  21.95X7,3   
- 13.81X7,4 +  159.64X8 – 22.14X9,1 – 17.62X9,2 – 18.88X9,3 – 18.86X9,4  
 + 2583.62X10,1 + 317.65X10,2 – 500.98X11,1 – 434.14X11,2 – 129.92X11,3  
- 86.31X11,4   - 46.46X11,3 – 40.57X11,4     
 
profit6 = -212.20 + 84.27X1,1 + 85.12X1,2 + 557.08X2,1 + 442.30X2,2 - 24.16X3  
- 40.55X4 + 330.89X5 + 249.30X6 – 7.23X7,1 +  34.11X7,2 +  70.05X7,3   
+ 53.63X7,4  - 123.90X8  + 23.27X9,1 + 23.79X9,2 + 14.39X9,3 + 22.91X9,4  
 - 999.31X10,1 – 58.33X10,2 + 397.21X11,1 – 349.31X11,2 + 75.51X11,3  
+ 45.32X11,4   + 58.23X11,3 + 40.31X11,4     
 
profit12 = -182.81 + 110.28X1,1 + 106.27X1,2 + 717.35X2,1 + 537.06X2,2 – 26.38X3  
- 73.65X4 + 522.88X5 + 357.90X6 + 158.21X7,1 +  213.46X7,2 +  232.28X7,3   
+ 145.47X7,4  - 165.89X8  + 20.40X9,1 + 20.36X9,2 + 15.04X9,3 + 20.79X9,4  
 - 1522.96X10,1 – 152.15X10,2 + 372.58X11,1 + 329.33X11,2 + 123.24X11,3  
+ 73.83X11,4   + 73.19X11,3 + 48.65X11,4     
 
profit24  = -182.81 + 110.28X1,1 + 106.27X1,2 + 717.35X2,1 + 537.06X2,2 – 26.38X3  
- 73.65X4 + 522.88X5 + 357.90X6 + 158.21X7,1 +  213.46X7,2 +  232.28X7,3   
+ 145.47X7,4  - 165.89X8  + 20.40X9,1 + 20.36X9,2 + 15.04X9,3 + 20.79X9,4  
 - 1522.96X10,1 – 152.15X10,2 + 372.58X11,1 + 329.33X11,2 + 123.24X11,3  
+ 73.83X11,4   + 73.19X11,3 + 48.65X11,4     
 
profit36 =  -168.22 + 118.17X1,1 + 107.52X1,2 + 910.57X2,1 + 661.22X2,2 – 26.79X3  
- 107.79X4 + 722.37X5 + 467.75X6 + 339.91X7,1 +  414.62X7,2 +  406.87X7,3   
+ 234.92X7,4  - 177.55X8  + 22.45X9,1 + 21.08X9,2 + 19.85X9,3 + 22.79X9,4  
 - 2184.90X10,1 – 287.01X10,2 + 448.73X11,1 + 393.43X11,2 + 181.31X11,3  
+ 109.96X11,4   + 82.16X11,3 + 52.93X11,4     
 
profit48 = -157.46 + 116.57X1,1 + 102.32X1,2 + 1019.40X2,1 + 730.28X2,2 – 26.13X3  
- 126.33X4 + 833.77X5 + 527.26X6 + 446.72X7,1 +  532.79X7,2 +  507.19X7,3   
+ 285.68X7,4  - 183.39X8  + 24.21X9,1 + 23.27X9,2 + 23.36X9,3 + 25.83X9,4  
 - 2559.89X10,1 – 363.14X10,2 + 500.98X11,1 + 434.14X11,2 + 214.08X11,3  
+ 129.53X11,4   + 84.38X11,3 + 53.59X11,4     
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Table C3: Cost and profit regression equations for comparing supplier development 
policies that require 100% inspection. 
 
cost6 = 1349.61 - 109.16X1 - 301.84X2,1 - 350.23X2,2 + 13.80X3 + 4.81X4,1 
 - 331.36X4,2 - 250.04X4,3 + 189.42X4,4 + 141.52X5 + 83.00X6 + 34.70X7 
 + 96.06X8 - 75.25X9 + 84.50X10 - 2.01X11 + 65.06X12 + 2.12X13 
 + 1.45X13,2 
 
cost12 = 2027.10 - 123.89X1 - 321.86X2,1 - 373.11X2,2 + 10.09X3 + 25.12X4,1 
 - 523.27X4,2 – 358.54X4,3 + 153.70X4,4 + 95.08X5 + 32.17X6 + 1.10X7 
 +  147.07X8  - 107.52X9 + 101.89X10 - 23.90X11 + 146.73X12 + 4.70X13 
 + 1.78X13,2 
 
cost24 = 2735.22 - 105.53X1 - 383.22X2,1 - 426.27X2,2 + 6.69X3 + 47.34X4,1 
 - 722.88X4,2 – 469.31X4,3 + 108.50X4,4 + 37.43X5 – 19.68X6 – 29.41X7 
 +  180.17X8  - 127.17X9 + 110.50X10 - 62.51X11 + 244.82X12 + 7.33X13 
 + 1.88X13,2 
 
cost36 = 3019.29 – 97.20X1 – 410.88X2,1 – 448.31X2,2 + 5.04X3 + 55.72X4,1 
 – 802.61X4,2 – 511.97X4,3 + 88.04X4,4 + 11.72X5 - 41.69X6 - 41.97X7 
 +  191.19X8  - 134.08X9 + 111.63X10 – 78.83X11 + 286.09X12 + 8.38X13 
 + 1.89X13,2 
 
cost48 = 3127.76 – 90.93X1 – 422.20X2,1 – 457.00X2,2 + 4.53X3 + 59.12X4,1 
 - 834.21X4,2 – 528.97X4,3 + 78.95X4,4 + 0.74X5 – 50.96X6 - 47.24X7 
 +  199.28X8  - 135.78X9 + 111.80X10 - 86.38X11 + 302.75X12 + 8.79X13 
 + 1.89X13,2 
 
profit6 = -242.59 + 101.99X1 + 591.96X2,1 + 468.81X2,2 - 25.34X3 - 41.15X4,1 
 + 330.27X4,2 + 249.46X4,3 + 35.20X4,4 + 69.68X5 + 93.65X6 + 63.90X7 
 - 103.78X8  + 75.25X9 - 84.45X10 + 2.01X11 - 61.47X12 – 2.12X13 
- 1.45X13,2 
 
profit12 = -233.36 + 114.64X1 + 763.96X2,1 + 569.73X2,2 - 27.30X3 - 74.31X4,1 
 + 522.30X4,2 + 358.07X4,3 + 230.38X4,4 + 274.38X5 + 273.35X6 
 + 163.92X7  - 157.05X8  + 107.52X9 - 101.66X10 + 23.90X11 - 142.38X12 - 4.70X13 - 
1.78X13,2 
 
profit24 = -235.10 + 94.29X1 + 969.01X2,1 + 700.52X2,2 - 27.99X3 - 108.25X4,1 
 + 721.73X4,2 + 467.90X4,3 + 445.48X4,4 + 503.99X5 + 467.67X6 
 + 262.59X7  - 191.25X8  + 127.17X9 - 110.11X10 + 62.51X11 - 239.85X12 - 7.33X13 - 
1.88X13,2 
 
profit36 = -237.39 + 85.13X1 + 1051.07X2,1 + 752.31X2,2 - 27.48X3 – 121.29X4,1 
 + 801.48X4,2 + 510.49X4,3 + 534.42X4,4 + 599.16X5 + 546.83X6 
 + 302.31X7 - 202.78X8 + 134.08X9 - 111.18X10 + 78.83X11 – 280.76X12  
- 8.38X13 - 1.89X13,2 
 
profit48 = -233.99 + 78.59X1 + 1083.64X2,1 + 773.02X2,2 - 27.33X3 – 126.62X4,1 
 + 833.13X4,2 + 527.41X4,3 + 571.21X4,4 + 638.20X5 + 579.14X6 
 + 318.55X7 - 211.05X8 + 135.78X9 - 111.34X10 + 86.38X11 – 297.26X12  
- 8.79X13 - 1.89X13,2 
 
 
